1 As to divorce in England of foreign subjects, see Le Sueur v. Le Sueur, 1 P. D. 139; Niboyet v. Niboyet, 3 P. D. 52. An English divorce court will recognize a Scotch divorce of persons there domiciled who were married in England, Harvey v. Farnie, 5 P. D. 153; but not a divorce in the United States of persons married in England if one party went there without the other involuntarily, or without a transfer of domicil, Briggs v. Briggs, 5 P. D. 163.

Lords, when I furnished his lordship with a note of Lolley's case, which he followed in disposing of both those appeals, so far as it affected them. That case then settled that no foreign proceeding in the nature of a divorce in an ecclesiastical court could effectually dissolve an English marriage." But in Conway v. Beazley, 3 Hagg. Ecc. R. 639, 648, Dr. Lushington says: "Cases have been cited in which it is alleged, that a final decision has been pronounced by very high authority upon the operation of a Scotch divorce on an English marriage; that it has been determined that a marriage celebrated in England cannot be dissolved by the sentence of a Scotch tribunal; that the contract remains forever indissoluble. The authorities principally relied upon for establishing that position are the decisions of the twelve judges in Lolley's case, and the decision of the present Lord Chancellor on a very recent occasion. If those authorities sustained to its full extent the doctrine contended for, the court would feel implicitly bound to adopt it; but I must consider whether in Lolley's case it was the intention of those very learned persons to decide a principle of universal operation, absolutely and without reference to circumstances, or whether they must not almost of necessity be presumed to have confined themselves to the particular circumstances that were then under their consideration. Lolley's case is very briefly reported, none of the authorities cited on the one side or on the other are referred to, nor are the opinions of the learned judges given at any length; all that we have is the decision. It is much to be regretted that some more extended reports of the very learned arguments which I well remember were urged upon that occasion, and the multitude of authorities quoted, have not been communicated to the profession and to the public. In that case the indictment stated, that on the 18th of July, Lolley was married at Liverpool to Ann Levaia, and afterwards to Helen Hunter, his former wife being then living. It was proved that both marriages were duly solemnized at Liverpool, that the first wife was alive a week before the assises, and that the second wife agreed to marry the prisoner if he could obtain a divorce. The jury did not find that any fraud had been committed, but there does not appear to have been any discussion upon the very important question of domicil. A case in which all the parties are domiciled in England, and resort is had to Scotland (with which neither of them have any connection) for no other purpose than to obtain a divorce a vinculo, may possibly be decided on principles which would not altogether apply to a case differently circumstanced; as where, prior to the cause arising on account of which a divorce was sought, the parties had been bona fide domiciled in Scotland. Unless I am satisfied that every view of this question had been taken, the court cannot, from the case referred to, assume it to have been established as a universal rule, that a marriage had in England, and originally valid by the law of England, cannot under any possible circumstances be dissolved by the decree of a foreign court. Before I could give my assent to such a doctrine (not meaning to deny that it may be true), I must have a decision after argument upon such a case as I will now suppose, namely, a marriage in England, - the parties resorting to a foreign country, becoming actually bona fide domiciled in that country, and then separated by a sentence of divorce pronounced by the competent tribunal of that country. If a case of that description had occurred, and had received the decision of the twelve judges, or the other high authority to which allusion had been made, then indeed it might have set this important matter at rest, but I am not aware that that point has ever been distinctly raised, and I think I may say with certainty that it never has received any express decision." the party came there merely for the purpose of obtaining the divorce. (o) In this country, the law on this subject is regulated very generally by statutes; and those differ very much, and are still subject * to not unfrequent change. In the absence of statutory provision, we should incline to think, that the courts would generally hold a divorce which was valid where granted, and was obtained in good faith, valid everywhere. Perhaps it may be said, that the tendency of American law is towards a recognition of a divorce obtained in another State, for causes which would be sufficient ground for divorce in the State whose tribunal tries the question, but not otherwise. For the courts of each State go behind a cause of divorce in another State, so far as to inquire into the sufficiency of the cause; but not so far as to deny the existence of the cause, if ascertained by a competent tribunal, on a regularly conducted trial. (oo)l

(o) There is but little uniformity among our different States, either as to statutory provisions on this subject, or the principles belonging to it as settled by adjudication, or the application of these principles to cases, or in the practice and usage of legislatures in relation to legislative divorces. Mr. Bishop, from a very full consideration of the American cases, deduces the following rules: "1. The tribunals of a country have no jurisdiction over a cause of divorce, wherever the offence may have occurred, if neither of the parties has an actual bona fide domicil within its territory. Nor is this proposition at all modified by the fact, that one or both of them may be temporarily residing within reach of the process of the court, or that the defendant appears and submits to the suit. This is the firmly established doctrine both in England and America." As authorities for this rule he cites Conway v. Beazley, 8 Hagg. Eccl. R. 631; Rex v. Lolley, Russ. & Ry. Cr. Cas. 237; Sugden v. Lolley, 2 Clark & F. 667, n.; Fellows v. Fellows, 8 N. H. 160; Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. 227; Barber v. Root, 10 Mats. 200; Pawling v. Bird, 18 Johns. 102; Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Johns. 424; Bradshaw v. Heath, 18 Wend. 407; Maguire v. Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407; Freeman v. Freeman, 8 West. Law Jour. 476; White v. White, 6 N. H. 476. - "2. To entitle the court to take jurisdiction, however, it is sufficient that one of the parties be domiciled in the country; it is not necessary that both should be, nor that the citation, when the domiciled party is plaintiff, should be served personally upon the defendant, if such personal service cannot be made." Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181; Harding v. Alden, 9 Greenl. 140; Mansfield v. Mclntyre. 10 Ohio, 27; Tolen v. Tolen, 2 Blackf. 407 ; Hull v Hull, 2 Strobb. Eq. 174. - " 3. The place where the offence was committed, whether in the country in which the suit is brought, or a foreign country, is quite immaterial. This is the universal doctrine; it is the same in the English, Scotch, and American courts, and there is no conflict upon the point.- 4. The domicil of the parties, at the time the offence was committed, is of no consequence; the jurisdiction depends upon their domicil at the time the proceeding is instituted, and judgment rendered. A contrary doctrine has been maintained in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, in which States it is held; that the tribunals of the country in which the parties were domiciled when the delictum occurred, have alone the jurisdiction." In support of the New Hampshire and Pennsylvania rule, he cites Clark v. Clark, 8 N. H. 21; Frary v. Frary, 10 id. 61; Smith v. Smith, 12 id. 80; Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, id. 200; Batchelder v. Batchelder, 14 id. 880; Dorsey v. Dorsey, 7 Watts, 840; Hollister v. Hollister, 6 Penn. St. 449. - " 5. It is immaterial to this question of jurisdiction, in what country, or under what system of divorce laws the marriage was contracted. - 6. The view we have taken is in no way controlled by that provision in the United States Constitution which prohibits the States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts." See Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, § 721 et seq.

In many of our States a woman divorced for her adultery cannot marry again whilst her husband lives. But it is also provided that she may marry, with leave of the court; and it has been said that she may have this leave on proof of good conduct since the divorce, and in the absence of any especial objection to her marrying. (op)