Neither the courts of common law nor the equity courts of England, decree divorce. Almost all questions of marriage were, until recently, decided by the spiritual courts, having been originally under the cognizance and jurisdiction of the bishops. The * spiritual courts sometimes decreed that a marriage was void ab initio, and sometimes granted a divorce from bed and board, but never a divorce from the bond of marriage. This complete divorce formerly occurred in England only when Parliament, by a private act made for the case, annulled a marriage. But in 1857, by the Statute of 21 Vict. ch. 85, a new court was established, under the name of "The Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes." To this court is given the power exercised by Parliament of granting divorces, and all the jurisdiction over matrimonial questions formerly vested in the ecclesiastical courts. The statute also prescribes the grounds on which divorces may be granted; and it permits the husband to obtain a divorce for the wife's adultery; but the wife can obtain divorce only when the husband's adultery is accompanied with cruelty, or other aggravations which the statute specifies.

Very early in the settlement of New England, as we learn from Mather's Magnalia, the question was put to the clergy whether adultery was a sufficient cause for divorce; and they answered that it was. The courts of law thereafter decreed divorce in such cases, and this law and practice became nearly universal through this country. For many years, however, a divorce a vinculo was granted for no other cause than adultery, the law being made to conform to what was regarded as the positive requirement of Scripture. At length, however, the severity of this rule was modified. Divorce a vinculo was permitted for other causes; as desertion, cruelty, sentence to long imprisonment, and the like. The law and practice in this respect differ in the different States, being precisely alike in no two of them. (m) l And in some, the facility of obtaining a divorce has certainly been carried quite far enough. In nearly if not quite all the States, desertion for a longer or shorter period (sometimes called abandonment) is a ground of divorce. Mere absence is not enough, as the desertion must be wilful. (mm) 2 In California it is held that absence implies desertion, if unexplained. (mn) Generally, there must be affirmative proof of its character. Hence, an agreement to separate, either express, or inferable from conduct or language, is a bar to the divorce. (mo) So conduct which would naturally lead to a separation, or would justify it, is also a bar. (mp) But if, after such consent, there is an honest desire for a restitution of conjugal relations, duly expressed and manifested, the earlier consent to separation does not bar the divorce. (mq) And a refusal to accompany the husband in a change of residence, would bar him

(l) Dormer v. Williams, 1 Curteis, 870; Lane v. Goodwin, 4 Q. B. 861; Clowes v. Clowes, 8 Curteis, 186.

(m) Under the statute of Pennsylvania, allowing divorce to the wife when the husband has "offered such indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable, and life burdensome, and thereby forced her to withdraw from his home and family," it has been held, that a single act of violence, such as pulling or twisting her nose, though done in rudeness and anger, does not bring the husband within the provisions of the act. Richards v. Richards, 87 Penn. St. 226.

(mm) Cook v. Cook, 2 Beasley. 268; Pidge v. Pidge, 8 Met. 255; M'Coy v. M'Coy, 8 Ind. 555; Ingersoll v. Ingersoll,

18 Wright, 249; Word v. Word, 29 Ga. 281.

(mn) Morrison v. Morrison, 20 Cal. 431.

(mo) Jones v. Jones, 18 Ala. 145; Simpson v. Simpson, 31 Mo. 24; Crow v. Crow, 28 Ala. 588.

(mp) Wood v. Wood, 5 Iredell, 681; Fellows v. Fellows, 81 Me. 842; Sykes v. Halstead, 1 Sandf. 488; Levering v. Levering, 16 Md. 2ia from obtaining a divorce on account of the separation, if the refusal were reasonable; but otherwise it would be desertion. (mr) l In a late English case, desertion was held to begin not when cohabitation actually ceased, but when the husband determined to abandon his wife and live with another woman. (ms) 2

(mq) Fishli v. Fishli, 2 Litt 827; Fulton v. Fulton, 86 Miss. 617; Hanbury v. Hanbury, 29 Ala. 719.

1 As to what cruelty will justify a divorce, see Kennedy v. Kennedy, 73 N. Y. 369; Cook v. Cook, 5 Stewart, 475; McClung v. McClung, 40 Mich. 493; Beyer v. Beyer, 50 Wis. 254; Johns v. Johns, 57 Miss. 580; and as to what will not, Soper v. Soper, 29 Mich. 805; Small v. Small, 57 Ind. 568; Miller v. Miller, 48 Ia. 325; Miller v. Miller, 78 N. C. 102; Faller v. Faller, 10 Neb. 144. Violence to the person need not exist. Black v. Black, 3 Stewart, 215; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 53 la. 611. See Close v. Close, 10 C. E. Green, 526; Latham v. Latham, 30 Gratt 307.

2 If a wife leaves her husband because he is unable to support her, Bennett v. Bennett, 43 Conn. 313; because he gambles, Sandford v. Sandford, 5 Stewart, 420; because he lied to her, Angelo v. Angelo, 81 Ill. 251; or because he fails to maintain her authority over the servants, Harris v. Harris, 81 Gratt 13, - it is not desertion on his part If the party leaving would have returned if invited, it is not desertion, Thorpe v. Thorpe, 9 R. I. 57; but the invitation need not be extended if known that it will be ineffectual, Trail v. Trail, 5 Stewart, 981. See also Schanck v. Schanck, 6 Stewart, 363; Childs v. Childs, 49 Md. 509.

A divorce a vinculo annuls the marriage altogether; and it restores the parties to all the rights of unmarried persons, and relieves them from all the liabilities which grew out of the marriage, except so far as may be provided by statute, or made a part of the decree of divorce by the courts. Thus, it is a provision of some of our State statutes on this subject, that the guilty party shall not marry again.3 And the court generally have power to decree terms of separation, as to alimony, care and possession of children, and the like; and this decree is subject to subsequent modification. (mt)