(e) Riddlesden v. Wogan.Cro. E. 868; Pride v. Earle of Bath, 1 Salk. 120; Martin's Heirs v. Martin, 22 Ala. 86.

(f) So at least say the court in Fen-ton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 68.

(g) Sutton v. Warren, 10 Met. 451. In this case it was held, that the intermarriage of a man and his mother's sister, though void by the law of Massachusetts, is not incestuous by the law of nature, and was not void by the law of England before the Statute of 6 Wm. IV. c. 54, though it was voidable by process in the ecclesiastical court. In Bon-ham v. Badgley, 2 Gilman, 622, it was decided, that a marriage between a man and the daughter of his sister, although within the Levitical degrees, was not void, but only voidable; that for all civil purposes such marriages are valid until sentence of nullity or separation; and that this sentence can be passed only during the lives of both parties. The children, therefore, of such marriage, after the death of either party, no sentence of nullity having been passed before such death, are legitimate; and if the husband die, the wife may have her dower.

1 The free consummation of such a marriage, with knowledge of the fraud, prevents relief. Hampstead v. Plaistow, 49 N H. 84. But a marriage of a man under arrest on a bastardy process, to escape prosecution, is valid. Sickles v. Carson, 11 C. E. Green, 440; Honnett v. Honnett, 38 Ark. 156; State v. Davis, 79 N. C. 603; Johns v. Johns, 44 Tex. 40. See Lyndon v. Lyndon, 69 111. 43.

2 The innocent party to a bigamous marriage is at liberty to marry again. Drum-mond v. Irish, 52 la. 41; Reeves v. Reeves, 54 Ill. 332. Glass v. Glass, 114 Mass. 563, was to the effect that a form of marriage entered into by the parties in good faith, with a full, but erroneous, belief of the woman's actual husband's death, is void, although he has been absent and not known to her to be alive for seven years, and may be decreed void with a provision legitimating the children begotten before the beginning of the suit consent to marriage, by the rules of the common law, as stated by Coke, (h) is fourteen for the male, and twelve for the female; these rules are borrowed, perhaps, from the Roman law, with which they agree; although the Roman law appears to have provided also that parties were marriageable whenever they had arrived at puberty. If the marriage take place when one is of sufficient age - as the husband of fifteen - and the other within the age of consent, - as the wife of ten, - when the wife reaches twelve, the husband may disagree and annul the marriage. Such, at least, is the rule as laid down by Coke. (i) He adds, that they cannot disagree before the age of consent; but this may be doubted; and the General Statutes of Massachusetts seem to assume that they may disagree within nonage. (ii)

The consent of parents or guardians, to the marriage of minors, is required by the Roman law, the marriage acts of England, and by the statutes of some of our States; but not by common law, nor in England until the Statute of 26 Geo. II. c. 33. The English statute makes the marriage of minors, without such * consent, absolutely void. In this country that would de pend upon the statutes of the several States. Generally, if not universally, the marriage would be held valid, although the person celebrating it might be punishable. (j)

It has been held in England, that a marriage, not lawfully celebrated, by reason of the fraud of one of the parties, shall yet be held valid in favor of the innocent party. As in case of a misnomer of the wife by the husband's fraud. (k) So where the husband falsely imposed upon the wife a forged or unauthorized license, and a pretended clergyman. (l) In the statutes of some of the States there are provisions to the same effect.

(h) Co. Lit. 78 b. And see Parton v. Hervey, 1 Gray, 110.

(i) Co. Lit. 79 b.

(ii) Ch. 107, § 3.

(j) It has been so decided in Massachusetts. Parton v. Hervey, 1 Gray, 119.

(k) King v. Wroxton, 4 B. & Ad. 640. It is held in this case that a marriage is not void because the banns were published under false names, unless both parties were privy to such false publication. See also King v. Billingshurst, 3 M. 4 Sel. 250. In a note to this case are given at length Frankland v. Nicholson, Pougett v. Tompkins, and Mather v. Ney, decided by Sir W. Scott, in all of which the banns were erroneous in the name of one of the parties, and the marriage was declared void ab initio. But in the two first cases there were circumstances of fraud. Heifer v. Heffer, Tree v. Quin, and Mayhew v. Mayhew, decided by the same judge, are also cited in the same note. In these there was an error of the name, but the marriages were not annulled. From all the cases taken together, it might perhaps be inferred, that a mere error in the name would not make a marriage void (especially if a name acquired by reputation were used), unless there were circumstances of fraud, or other objection. But in Cope v. Burt, 1 Hagg. Cons. 438, Sir W. Scott seems to insist that it is essentially necessary that the banns should be published in the true names.

The operation of the lex loci upon marriage and the rights of the married parties, has given rise to some questions which we shall consider when we treat of the Law of Place.