As to the cruelty for which divorce will be granted, while it seems to be generally held that it must be a cruelty which affects "life or limb or health," it is also held that this may be by any treatment, or even mere words, which are such as may affect the health. (mu) 4 In practice, proper precautions are used to prevent a divorce from being obtained by collusion; it not being granted merely upon the consent or on the default of the party charged, but only on proof of the cause alleged. (n)

(mr) Gleason v. Gleason, 4 Wise. 64; Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 14 Cal. 664.

(ms) Gatehouse v. Gatehouse, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 381. So also in Phelan v. Phelan, 12 Fla. 449.

(mt) Cox v. Cox, 25 Ind. 303.

(mu) Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Mass. 631; Odour v. Odour, 36 Ga. 286.

(n) Indeed, so careful are the courts to guard against any collusion between the parties, one of whom has applied for a divorce, that although the respondent be defaulted, yet the alleged cause of divorce must be as distinctly and satisfactorily proved as in other instances. So likewise must the fact of marriage. Williams v. Williams, 8 Greenl. 185. And a divorce a vinculo, for the adultery of the husband, has been frequently refused where the only proof was the defendant's admission of the fact. Holland v. Holland, 2 Mass. 154; Baxter v. Baxter, 1 id. 346. And this is done to avoid the possibility of collusion. But if it distinctly appear that the confessions were given under circumstances showing there was no collusion, the defendant's confessions are held sufficient. Billings v. Billings, 11 Pick. 461; Vance v. Vance, 8 Greenl. 132; Owen v. Owen, 4 Hagg. Ecc. 261. So the record of the conviction of the party upon an indictment for the same offence is admissible after default, and is sufficient proof of the marriage and the crime. Randall v. Randall, 4 Greenl. 826; Anderson v. Anderson, id. 100. Unless such conviction was had upon the testimony of the wife, as it might have been where the charge in the indictment was an assault and battery upon her. Woodruff v. Woodruff, 11 Me. 475.

1 Hunt v. Hunt, 2 Stewart, 96. See Mayer v. Mayer, 3 Stewart, 411. 2 Hankinson v. Hankinson, 6 Stewart, 66.

3 See Bullock v. Bullock, 122 Mass. 3; Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458; Thompson v. Thompson, 114 Mass. 566; Collins v. Collins, 80 N. Y. 1. 4 Beyer v. Beyer, 50 Wis. 254; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 53 Ia. 511.

* It has been held very distinctly, (o) and quite as em- phatically denied, (p) that the adultery of the wife, when insane, is a sufficient cause for a divorce a vinculo.1

A suit or petition for divorce for adultery will not be granted, if there be proof of connivance or collusion, (pp) 2 or of condonation by the petitioning party.3 The general meaning of condonation, as an English word, is forgiveness; but it has, as a law term and used in this connection, a technical meaning; it is, forgiveness proved by the continued cohabitation of the parties after the guilt of the defendant is made known to the petitioner. It would seem only just to apply this rule with much less severity to the wife, who may be constrained by many reasons to continue for a time with the guilty husband; whereas a husband is under no such necessity, and should renounce all cohabitation with a wife whom he knows to be an adulteress; and that a disregard of this requirement would bar his divorce is well settled. (pq)

The courts may also decree a divorce a mensa et thoro; and this kind of divorce was once the most common. But most of the causes which formerly only sufficed for a divorce from bed and board, are now very generally made sufficient for a divorce from the bond of marriage. In general, a woman divorced from the bed and board of her husband, acquires the rights, as to property, business, and contracts, of an unmarried woman. And her husband is freed from his general obligation to maintain her, the courts having power, which they usually exercise, of decreeing such maintenance from the husband as his means, and the character and circumstances of the case render proper. (q)

(o) Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Penn. St. 332.

(p) Nichols v. Nicholt, 31 Vt 828.

(pp) There is a strong recent case on this subject in Adams v. Adams, Law Rep. 1 P. 4 D. 333. See also Baylis v. Baylis, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 395.

(pq) Turnbull v. Turnbull, 28 Ark. 616; Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Cold. 123.

(q) Dean v. Richmond, 5 Pick. 461, where it was held, that a wife divorced a mensa et thoro may be sued, or sue, as a feme sole. Parker, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, after quoting from 2 Kent, Com. 136, as "a recently published book, which I trust, from the eminence of its author, and the merits of the work, will soon become of common reference in our courts," says: "So far as this opinion relates to the ease of divorce, we fully concur with him, and are satisfied that, although the marriage is not to all purposes dissolved by a divorce a mensa et thoro, it is so far suspended that the wife may maintain her rights by suit, whether for injuries done to her person or property, or in regard to contracts express or implied arising after the divorce; and that she shall not be obliged to join her husband in such suit; and to the same extent she is liable to be sued alone, she being to all legal intents a feme sole in regard to subjects of this nature. Such, however, is not the law of England, it having been recently decided that coverture is a good plea, notwithstanding a divorce a mensa et thoro. Lewis v. Lee, 3 B. & C. 291. But the difference in the administration of their law of divorce and ours, and the power of the Court of Chancery there to protect the suffering party, will sufficiently account for the seeming rigor of their common law on this subject. If the husband is not liable for the debts of the wife, after a divorce a mensa, the chief reason for denying her the right to sue alone fails." See also Pierce v. Burnham, 4 Met. 303.

1 Insanity following the offence is no bar. Mordaunt v. Moncreiffe, L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. & Div. 374. As to the insanity of both parties, see Garnett v. Garnett, 114 Mass. 379.

2 Thus a note given towards procuring a divorce is void as between the parties, Kilborn v Field, 78 Penn. St 194; as well as an agreement for alimony, Adams v. Adams, 25 Minn. 72. See Cairns v. Cairns, 109 Mass. 408; Baugh v. Baugh, 37 Mich. 59; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 39 Wis. 167; Sickles v. Carson, 11 C. E. Green, 440; Everbart v. Puckett, 73 Ind. 409.

3 See as to condonation, Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156; Rogers v. Rogers, 122 Mass. 428; Warner v. Warner, 4 Stewart, 225; Farnham v. Farnham, 73 Ill. 497; Clouser v. Clapper, 59 Ind. 548.

The law applying to foreign divorces is considered in our chapter on the Law of Place.