The relation of the law of place to the subject of divorce presents questions of much difficulty. And although many cases involving some of these questions, have been decided after very full consideration, both in England and in this country, some topics remain, in relation to which there exists at present much uncertainty.

The law of divorce differs greatly in different countries, because marriage itself is viewed under so great a diversity of aspect. The Catholic Church regards it as a sacrament, over which the civil law and civil tribunals have no power whatever, and which can only be dissolved by the supreme spiritual power of the Church. Protestants deny it to be a sacrament. They regard it as a civil contract, of a religious character it may be, and therefore properly associated with religious ceremonies; but wholly within the power of the civil authority. But England, which was Catholic while its common law was in course of formation, had no means provided for effecting divorce after it became Protestant; and in that country, complete divorce a vinculo, was effected only by parliament, until the statute of 20 and 21 Vict. ch. 85, constituted a special court for the trial of such questions, with full power to decree a dissolution of the marriage. We suppose that in all Protestant countries judicial tribunals may grant divorces a vinculo. In the States of this Union, divorce is granted by the tribunals, for reasons which * are defined by statute. In some States these causes are limited to adultery, and facts of equivalent character; and in others are extremely liberal, not to say lax. And in some of the States it is the custom of the legislatures to grant divorces by private acts, and in practice this is sometimes done for very feeble reasons, and almost without other reason than the request.

The question must therefore be one of much difficulty how far a State will recognize the validity of a foreign divorce, granted, perhaps, for causes which the law of the tribunal trying the question would hold to be wholly insufficient.

The general rule is certainly this. A divorce granted in a State in which both parties had their actual domicil, and also were married, is valid everywhere. (m) Then it may be said that, generally, every State recognizes the validity of a divorce granted where both parties have their actual domicil, if granted according to the law of that place. (mm) It has been very authoritatively declared to be the law of England, that the tribunals of that country acknowledge no foreign divorce of an English marriage. (n) l A more careful consideration of the cases

(m) Story's Confl. of Laws, § 201; 2 Kent, Com. 108. It would not be easy to find this rule established by distinct adjudications, for the reason that it is too well settled to be questioned.

(mm) Standridge v. Standridge, 31 Ga. 228.

(n) In Lolley's case, Russ. & Ry. Cr. Cases, 237, English subjects were married in England; the husband went to Scotland, there he was divorced a vinculo ; he returned to England and married there, his first wife living; he was indicted for bigamy, convicted, and sentenced to transportation. Lord Brougham, in deciding M'Carthy v. Decaix, 2 Russ. & M. 614, 619, comments upon Lolley's case, and upon Lord Eldon's remarks upon it, and says : "I find, from the note of what fell from Lord Eldon on the present appeal, that his lordship labored under considerable misapprehension as to the facts in Lolley:s case; he is represented as saying he will not admit that it is the settled law, and that therefore be will not decide, whether the marriage was or not prematurely determined by the Danish divorce. His words are, 'I will not without other assistance take upon myself to do so.' Now, if it has not validly and by the highest authorities in Westminster Hall been holden, that a foreign divorce cannot dissolve an English marriage, then nothing whatever has been established. For what was Lolley's case? It was a case the strongest possible in favor of the doctrine contended for. It was not a question of civil right, but of felony. Lolley had bona fide, and in a confident belief, founded on the authority of the Scotch lawyers, that the Scotch divorce had effectually dissolved his prior English marriage, intermarried in England, living his first wife. He was tried at Lancaster for bigamy, and found guilty: but the point was reserved, and was afterwards argued before all the most learned judges of the day, who, after heating the case fully and thoroughly discussed, first at Westminster Hall, and then at Sergeant's Inn, gave a clear and unanimous opinion, that no divorce or proceeding in the nature of divorce in any foreign country, Scotland included, could dissolve a marriage contracted in England; and they sentenced Lolley to seven years' transportation. And he was accordingly sent to the hulks for one or two years; though in mercy the residue of his sentence was ultimately remitted. I take leave to say, he ought not to have gone to the hulks at all, because he had acted bona fide, though this did not prevent his conviction from being legal. But he was sent notwithstanding, as if to show clearly that the judges were confident of the law they had laid down; so that never was there a greater mistake than to suppose that the remission argued the least doubt on the part of the judges. Even if the punishment had been entirely remitted, the remission would have been on the ground that there had been no criminal intent, though that had been done which the law declares to be felony. I hold it to be perfectly clear, therefore, that Lolley's case stands as the settled law of Westminster Hall at this day. It has been uniformly recognized since; and in particular it was repeatedly made the subject of discussion, before Lord Eldon himself, in the two appeals of Tovey v. Lindsey, 1 Dow, 117, 131, in the House of would, * however, lead to the conclusion, that the estab lished rule in England goes no further, than that an English marriage cannot * be terminated by a foreign divorce, unless both parties are actually domiciled in the country where the divorce takes place. All the courts in this country, and all our legislatures, do not go so far as this; for some hold and practise upon the rule, that if the parties, or indeed if only the party seeking the divorce, is within the jurisdiction of the court by a present domicil, it is enough, without asking whether