Every person has, in law, a home, or domicil; (m) and every domicil which one has, whether the original domicil or a subsequent one, continues until a new one is acquired, (n) and when a new one is acquired, the former domicil ceases, (o) because no person can have more than one domicil at the same time. (p) One's domicil, or home, is in the country in which he permanently resides. To the idea of domicil, or home, two elements belong; one, that of act, the other, that of intent. The very beautiful definition of the Roman law cannot be literally and adequately translated into English. "It is not doubted that individuals have a home in that place where each one has established his hearth and the sum of his possessions and his fortunes (larem rerumque ac fortunarum suarum summam constituit); whence he will not depart if nothing calls him away; whence if he has departed he seems to be a wanderer, and if he returns he ceases to wander." (q)

The questions of domicil sometimes present much difficulty in determining what is the measure, or what is the evidence of the residence which constitutes domicil in fact, or in intent. Residence and domicil are not convertible terms, because they are not the same things. A man may have more than one * residence. He may reside a part of the time in the city, and a part in the country; or a part in one country and a part in another. But he can have but one domicil; (r)1 and where that is, must be determined, by a consideration on the one hand of the facts attending his residence, and, on the other, of the intention with which he resides in one place or another. For both fact and intent are necessary to constitute a domicil. Both are implied in favor of the home which one has by birth and parentage, and subsequent inhabitancy. The dwelling in a place, or even being there, may constitute prima facie evidence of domicil; but it is evidence which may be rebutted. (s) And it is quite certain that no definite period of time, no exact manner of residence, no precise declarations or specific acts, are necessary to ascertain domicil, or perhaps suffice to determine domicil; although the Supreme Court of the United States have intimated that an exercise of the right of suffrage would be the highest evidence; and perhaps it would be conclusive against the party. (t) l

(m) Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 604.

(n) Id.; Brewer v. Linnaeus, 36 Me. 428.

(o) Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 604.

(p) Id.; Abington v. North Bridgewater, 23 Pick. 170; Thorndike v. The City of Boston, 1 Met. 242.

(q) Code, lib. 10, tit 39, 7.

(r) Bartlett v. The Mayor, 5 Sandf. 44. On this point see also Hood's Estate, 21 Penn. St. 106, and Douglas v. Mayor of New York, 2 Duer, 110.

1 Where one's wife and children lire permanently, and his establishment is kept up, are material in considering a man's domicil. Platt v. New South Wales, 3 App. Cas. 336; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Penn. St. 466; Long v. Ryan, 30 Gratt. 718.

When a domicil is in any way acquired, it may be changed, by a change both in fact and in intent, but not by either change alone;2 the change in fact not being enough without intent, (u) nor the change in intent without the change in fact. (v) One who goes abroad animo revertendi, does not change his domicil, because only the fact of residence is changed, and not the intent. But if he remains very long abroad, and in one place, the intent may be inferred from the fact. And this inference may be made against the express declarations and assertions of the person. (w) For the fact and the intent together determine * the dom cil, and not the language; nor is this important except as evidence of intent. If, therefore, one insists upon his purpose of return, and the preservation of his domicil, but the facts are such as to lead to and justify the belief that this expressed intention of return is but a false pretence, made for the sake of preserving as long as he can the rights of domicil, while in fact he means to abide where he now is, the intent will govern, and the change of domicil will be complete. It seems to be agreed that "residence" and "inhabitancy" mean the same thing; (x) and there are cases in which these words and "domicil" are used as if they were synonymous, (y) which we think they are not, as we have just now stated. This may, however, be regarded as rather a question about the meaning and use of words, than a question . of principle; for all admit that one may dwell for a considerable time, and even regularly during a large part of the year, in one place, or even in one State, and yet have his domicil in another. (z) If one resides in Boston five months in the twelve, including the day on which residency determines taxation, and the other seven months at his house in the country, he will be taxed in Boston, and may vote there, and his domicil is there. (a)

(s) Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 504, 619; Bruce v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229, n. (a); Sears v. The City of Boston, 1 Met. 260.

(t) Shelton v. Tiffin, 6 How. 186. In this case the court say: "On a change of domicil from one State to another, citizenship may depend upon the intention of the individual. But this intention may be shown more satisfactorily by acts than declarations. An exercise of the right of suffrage is conclusive on the subject; but acquiring a right of suffrage, accompanied by acts which show a permanent location, unexplained, may be sufficient." See also Cole v. Cheshire, 1 Gray, 441.

(u) Bradley v. Lowry, 1 Speers, Eq. 1; Granby v. Amherst, 7 Mass. 1; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 id. 860; Harvard College v. Gore, 6 Pick. 370; Cadwalader v. Howell, 3 Harrison, 188; Wilton v. Falmouth, 16 Me. 479.

(v) The Attorney-General v. Dunn, 6 M. & W. 611; Hallowell v. Saco, 6 Greenl. 148; The State v. Hallett, 8 Ala. 169; Williams v. Whiting, 11 Mass. 424; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 704.

(w) See supra, n. (t).

1 A person may even change his domicil while in the military service. Mooar v. Harvey, 128 Mass. 219.