Work and service are a very common consideration for a prom -ise, and always sufficient, if rendered at the request of the party promising. (q) This request may often be implied; it is so, generally, from the fact that the party making the promise accepts and holds the benefit resulting from the work or service. (r) And it is an equally sufficient consideration for ise by one already legally liable for a debt, in consideration of such liability to pay, if waited on a certain time, creates no new liability; and that a promise to pay the debt of another, if waited on a certain time, leaving the debt to be enforced during that time against the debtor, is not binding. And see, to the same effect, Deacon v. Gridley, 28 E. L. & E. 345; 9 C. 15 C. B. 295.

(o) Loder v. Cheslevn, 1 Sid. 212; Moulsdale v. Birchall, 2 W. Bl. 820; Price v. Seaman, 4 B. & C. 525; 9. c. 7 Dow & R. 14, Graham v. Gracie, 13 Q. B, 548; Whittle v. Skinner, 23 Vt. 532; Harrison v. Knight, 7 Tex. 47: Edson v. Fuller, 2 Foster (N. H.), 185.

(p) Price v. Seaman, 4 B. & C. 525, 7

Dow. & R. 14, 10 Moore, 34, 2 Bing. 437; Peate v. Dicken, 1 C. M & R. 430, s. c. 5 Tyr. 116. And an assignment of a chose in action need not be by deed. Howell v. McIvers, 4 T. R. 690; Health v. Hall, 4 Taunt. 326.

(q) Hunt v. Bate, Dyer, 272, n; 1 Roll. Abr. 11, pl. 2, 3. In Taylor v. Jones, 1 Ld. Raym. 312, it was held that giving a soldier leave of absence at the instance of a third person is a good consideration for a promise from him to the captain to bring him back in ten days, or pay a sum of money.

(x) 1 Wms. Saund. 264 n. (1); Tipper Bicknell, 3 Bing N. C. 710. And see Lewis v. Trickey, 20 Barb. 387.

a * promise, if the work or service be rendered to a third party at the request of the promisor; (s) and such request will often be implied from very slight circumstances; as, in the case of clothing supplied to a child, where the mere knowledge and silence of the father are enough. (t)

If the work and service rendered are merely gratuitous, and performed for the defendant without his request or privity, however meritorious or beneficial they may be, they afford no cause of action, (u) and perhaps no consideration for a subsequent promise, although, as we have seen, a precedent request may in law be presumed from the promisor's acceptance of the service. So, if a workman employed and directed to do a particular thing choose to do some other thing, without the direction or assent of the employer, the implied promise of the employer to pay for his labor will not extend to the new work; (v) but if the work is accepted by the employer, it would be a sufficient consideration for a promise to pay for it, and such acceptance might imply such promise.

(s) See cases cited supra, note (q).

(t) Law v. Wilkins, 6 A. & E. 718; Nichole v. Allen, 3 C. & P. 36. See, however, Mortimore v. Wright, 6 M. & W. 485, where Lord Abinger denies these cases to be sound law. It is a question for the jury whether the circumstances are sufficient in any particular case. Baker v. Keen, 2 Stark. 501. See further, as to this point, ante, p. * 299, note (h), et seq.

(u) Hunt v. Bate, Dyer, 272 a; 1 Roll. Abr. 11, pl. 1; Hayes v. Warren, 2 Stra. 933; Roscorla v. Thomas, 3 Q. B. 234; Jeremy v. Goochman, Cro. E. 442; Dog-get v. Vowell, Moore, 643; Hines v. Butler, 3 Ired. Eq. 307. See also ante, p. *432, note (t).- So, in Frear v. Har-denbergh, 5 Johns. 272, where A entered on land belonging to B, and without his knowledge or authority cleared it, made improvements, and erected buildings, and B afterwards promised to pay him for the improvements he had made, it was held, that the work having been done, and the improvements made without the request of B, the promise was a nudum pactum, on which no action could be maintained. - But perhaps the strongest case to be found in the American reports in illustration of this principle, is that of Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28. A owned a wheat stubble-field, in which B had a stack of wheat, which he had promised to remove in due season for preparing the ground for a fall crop. The time for its removal having arrived, A sent a message to B, requesting the immediate removal of the stack of wheat, as he wished, on the next day, to burn the stubble on the field. B having agreed to remove the stack by ten o'clock the next morning, A waited till that time, and then set fire to the stubble in a remote part of the field. The fire spreading rapidly, and B not appearing to remove the stack, A removed it for him. Held, that as A performed the service without the privity or request of B, he was not entitled to recover for it.

(v) Hort v. Norton, 1 McCord, 22. See also Phetteplace v. Steere, 2 Johns. 442.