So in a recent case where several heirs knowing that their deceased ancestor had taken out a policy of life insurance in the name of one of them, but not knowing in the name of which one, agreed that they would divide the proceeds equally, it was held that their agreement was binding. Supreme Assembly v. Campbell, 22 At. Rep. 307 (R. I.) And see Howe v. O'Mally, 1 Murphey, 287; Seward v. Mitchell, 1 Cold. 87. In all these cases last put, one party actually gave nothing, and from the standpoint of universal intelligence ran no risk of giving anything in return for what he received. The contracts were held binding because the law regards the question not from the standpoint of universal intelligence, or in the light of what events subsequently show, but from the standpoint of the parties to the contract at the time they entered into it.

1 On an agreement to extend time of payment and forbear to sue, if no definite time is agreed on, a reasonable time will be presumed. Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320. - K.

It is not enough to allege in the declaration that disputes and controversies existed concerning a certain debt, and that the promise on which the action is brought was made in consideration that the plaintiff promised not to sue for that debt: for this is no allegation that a debt actually existed, and there must be such an allegation; but with it there may be an allegation of disputes and controversies concerning its amount. (c) It seems* to be settled, that a general agreement to forbear all suits is to be construed as a perpetual forbearance; (d) and a promise resting on the consideration of such forbearance is no longer binding, when a suit, which was to be forborne, is commenced.

It is not material that the party who makes the promise, in consideration of such forbearance, should have a direct interest in the suit to be forborne, or be directly benefited by the delay. (c) It is enough that he requests such forbearance; for the benefit to the defendant will be supposed to extend to him, and it would also be enough to make the consideration valid, that the creditor is injured by the delay. But there must have been some party who could have been sued. (/) And in cases in which the person to be forborne is not mentioned, but the forbearance may be understood to be forbearance of whoever might be sued,

Downing v. Funk, 5 Rawle, 69; Hakes v. Hotchkiss, 23 Vt. 235. See also ante, note (u).

(a) King v. Upton, 4 Greenl. 387; Barnehurst v. Cabbot, Hardr. 5.

(b) Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East. 455; Nelson v. Serle, 4 M. & W. 795; Bixler v. Ream, 3 Penn. St. 282. See also Rix v. Adams, 9 Vt. 233.

(c) Edwards v. Baugh, 11 M. & W. 641. But see ante, p. *441, note 1.

(d) Clark v. Russell, 3 Watts, 213; Sidwell v. Evans, 1 Penn. St. 385.

(e) Smith v. Algar, 1 B. & Ad. 603. See Emmott v. Renins, 5 Bing. N. C.559. In Maud v. Waterhouse, 2 C. & P. 579. it was held that if a person, employed by the administrator of a deceased debtor to wind up the concerns of the deceased's business, give an undertaking to a creditor of the deceased, to furnish money to meet an acceptance which such creditor has given, in furtherance of an accommodation arrangement for delaying payment, in the hope that funds may be forthcoming, he is liable on such undertaking, though he was merely a clerk, and had DO interest in the goods sold by the creditor, and had not received any funds which he could apply to the discharge of the debt. (f) bines v. Ashburnham, 4 East, 455; Nelson v. Serle, 4 M. & W. 795. In this case, to a declaration in debt on a promissory note for £24, dated January 3d, 1837, made by the defendant, payable twelve months after date to the plaintiff, the defendant pleaded that one J. W., before and at his death, was indebted to the plaintiff in €24 for goods sold, which sum was due to the plaintiff at the time of the making of the promissory note in the declaration mentioned; that the plaintiff, alter the death of J. W., applied to the defendant for payment: whereupon, in compliance with his request, the defendant, after the death of J. W., for and in reaped of the debt bo remaining due to the plaintiff as aforesaid, and for no other consideration whatever, made and delivered the note to the plaintiff, and that .1.

the promise founded on such consideration is * binding, if there be any person liable to suit, though the defendant himself is not liable. (g)

In general, a waiver of any legal right, at the request of another party, is a sufficient consideration for a promise; (h) or a waiver of any equitable right; (i) and so it is, although it be a waiver of an action for a tort, by committing which the person doing the wrong gained a benefit, although the other party suffered no real injury from it. (j) Forbearance to eject a tenant at will is a sufficient consideration for a guaranty of past and future rent. (jj) So is forbearance by a collector to enforce the collection of taxes by a sale of the land a good consideration for the owner's promise to pay the tax.(jk)

And a promise to pay one if he would prove a debt against a deceased husband, (A;) or to pay a debt denied to be due, if the party creditor would swear to it, rests upon a sufficient consideration. And in an action upon such promise, it has been held that the defendant cannot show that the plaintiff was mistaken or swore falsely. (l)

The incurring of a liability in consequence of the promise of another, is held to be a good consideration; (m) and a subsisting legal obligation to do a thing is a good consideration for a promise to do that thing. (n)

W. died intestate, and that at the time of the making and delivery of the note no administration had been granted of his effects, nor was there any executor or executors of his estate, nor any person liable for the debt so remaining due to the plaintiff as aforesaid; and the defendant averred that there never was any consideration for the said note except as aforesaid. Held, that the plea was a good answer to the declaration.

(g) See Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East, 455.

(h) Stebbins v. Smith, 4 Pick. 97; Smith v. Weed, 20 Wend. 184; Haigh v. Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309; s. c. 2 Per. & D. 477; 3 id. 452; Farmer v. Stewart, 2 N. H. 97; Nicholson v. May, Wright, 660; Hinman v. Moulton, 14 Johns. 466; Williams v. Alexander, 4 Ired. Eq. 207; Waterman v. Barratt, 4 Harring. (Del.) 311.

(i) Whitbeck v. Whitbeck, 9 Cowen, 266; Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 Salk. 171; s. c. 12 Mod. 455.

(j) Davis v. Morgan, 4 B. & C. 8; Brealey v. Andrew, 2 Nev. & P 114; s. c 7 A. & E. 108.

(jj) Vinal v. Richardson, 13 Allen, 521.

( jk) Burr v. Wilcox, 13 Allen, 269.

(k) Traver v.---------, 1 Sid. 57.

(l) Brooks v Ball, 18 Johns. 337.

(m) Underhill v. Gibson, 2 N. H. 352; Homes v. Dana, 12 Mass. 190; Bryant v. Goodnow, 5 Pick. 228. See also Chapin v Lapham, 20 id. 467; Blake v. Cole, 22 id. 97; Ward v. Fryer, 19 Wend 494. In Baileyville v. Lowell, 20 Me. 178, it was determined, that an agreement by the owner of an execution against the inhabitants of a town, that if they would at once assess the amount required, and collect the same, he would make a certain discount, is founded on sufficient consideration, and will be enforced.

(n) Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; Warner v. Booge, 15 Johns. 233; Jewett v. Warren, 12 Mass. 300. In Russell v. Buck, 11 Vt. 166, it was held that a prom

Section VI. Assignment Of Debt

An assignment of a debt or a right is a good consideration for a promise by the assignee. (o) Such assignment may not be good at law, but it is valid in equity; and courts of law, for many purposes, and to a certain extent, recognize the validity of the transfer, if the assignee obtains a benefit which the law considers a sufficient and a proper consideration to found a promise upon. (p) But if the transaction amounts to maintenance, which is illegal, the consideration fails, and the promise is void.