2 A man having acquired a domicil of choice, may abandon it without being obliged to acquire a new domicil. Per Jessel, M. B., King v. Foxwell, 3 Ch. D. 618. See Kellogg v. Winnebago, 42 Wis. 97.

(x) Roosevelt v. Kellogg, 20 Johns. 306; In the Matter of Wrigley, 4 Wend. 602, 8 id. 134.

(y) See Jefferson v. Washington, 19 Maine, 293; In the Matter of Thompson, 1 Wend. 45; Frost v. Brisbin, 10 id. 11; Thorndike v. The City of Boston, 1 Met. 246; McDaniel v. King, 6 Cush. 473; Cadwalader v. Howell, 3 Harrison, 144; Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 522. See also cases cited in preceding note. In Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barb. 522, the court put soldiers and seamen on the same footing with foreign ministers in respect to domicil. "The actual residence is not always the legal residence or inhabitancy of a man. A foreign minister actually resides and is personally present at the court to which he is accredited, but his legal residence or inhabitancy, and domicil, are in his own country. His residence at the foreign court is only a temporary residence. He is there for a particular purpose. So soldiers and seamen may be legal residents and inhabitants of a place, although they may have been absent therefrom for years. They do not lose their residence or domicil by following their profession." In regard to seamen, in Thorndike v. The City of Boston, 1 Met. 242, the court say: "If a seaman without family or property sails from the place of his nativity, which may be considered his domicil of origin, although he may return only at long intervals, or even be absent many years, yet if he does not by some actual residence or other means acquire a domicil elsewhere, he retains his domicil of origin." See also Sears v. The City of Boston, 1 Met. 250.

(z) Frost v. Brisbin, 19 Wend. 11.

(a) This is the established rule and common practice in Massachusetts, as to the right of taxing one not actually a resident. It is provided by statute, that personal estate shall be assessed to the owner in the town where be shall be an inhabitant on the first day of May. Rev. Stat. ch. 7, § 9. It is held, that inhabitancy under this statute means substantially the same thing as domicil. Thorndike v. The City of Boston, 1 Met. 242. In this case a citizen of Boston, who had been at school in the city of Edinburgh when a boy, and formed a predilection for that place as a residence, and had expressed a determination to reside there, if he ever should have the means of so doing, removed with his family to that city, in

1836, declaring, at the time of his departure, that he intended to reside abroad, and that if he should return to the United States he should not live in Boston. He resided in Edinburgh and the vicinity, as a housekeeper, taking a lease of an estate for a term of years, and endeavored to engage an American to enter his family for two years, as instructor of his children. Before he left Boston he made a contract for the sale of his mansion-house and furniture there, but shortly afterwards procured said contract to be annulled (assigning as his reason therefor, that, in case of his death in Europe, his wife might wish to return to Boston), and let his house and furniture to a tenant. Held, that he had changed his domicil, and was not liable to taxation as an inhabitant of Boston in

1837. Shaw, C. J., said: "The questions of residence, inhabitancy, or domicil, -for although not in all respects precisely the same, they are nearly so, and depend changes it with him. (b)1 A minor child has the domicil of his * father, (c) or of his mother if she survive his father; and the surviving parent with whom a child lives, by changing his or her own domicil in good faith, changes that of the child. (d) And even a guardian has the same power. (e)

* A woman marrying takes her husband's domicil, and upon much the same evidence, - are attended with more difficulty than almost any other which are presented for adjudication. No exact definition can be given of domicil; it depends upon no one fact or combination of circumstances, but from the whole taken together it must be determined in each particular case. It is a maxim, that every man must have a domicil somewhere; and also that he can have but one. Of course it follows that his existing domicil continues until he acquires another; and vice versa, by acquiring a new domicil he relinquishes his former one. From this view it is manifest that very slight circumstances must often decide the question. It depends upon the preponderance of the evidence in favor of two or more places; and it may often occur that the evidence of facts, tending to establish the domicil in one place, would be entirely conclusive, were it not for the existence of facts and circumstances of a still more conclusive and decisive character, which fix it, beyond question, in another. So, on the contrary, very slight circumstances may fix one's domicil, if not controlled by more conclusive facts fixing it in another place. If a seaman, without family or property, sails from the place of his nativity, which may be considered his domicil of origin, although he may return only at long intervals, or even be absent many years, yet if he does not by some actual residence or other means acquire a domicil elsewhere, he retains his domicil of origin. . . . The actual change of one's residence, with his family, and the taking up of a residence elsewhere, without any intention of returning, is one of the strong indications of change of domicil, and, unless controlled by other circumstances, is decisive. It was for the jury to determine whether there were any circumstances sufficient to control such conclusion. If the plaintiff had left Boston, and actually taken up a residence, with his family, in Scotland, without any intention of returning, thereby assuming that country as his definite abode and place of residence until some new intention had been formed or resolution taken, he had ceased to be an inhabitant of Boston, liable to taxation for his personal property." In Sears v. The City of Boston, 1 Met. 260, a native inhabitant of Boston, intending to reside in France, with his family, departed for that country in June, 1836, and was followed by his family about three months afterwards. His dwelling-house and furniture were leased for a year, and he hired a house for a year in Paris. At the time of his departure he intended to return and resume his residence in Boston, but had not fixed on any time for his return. He returned in about sixteen months, and his family in about nine months afterwards. Held, that he continued to be an inhabitant of Boston, and that he was rightly taxed there, during his absence, for his person and personal property. Shaw, C. J., said: "Actual residence, that is, personal presence in a place, is one circumstance to determine the domicil, or the fact of being an inhabitant; but it is far from being conclusive. A seaman on a long voyage, and a soldier in actual service, may be respectively inhabitants of a place though not personally present there for years. It depends, therefore, upon many other considerations, besides actual presence. Where an old resident and inhabitant, having a domicil from his birth in a particular place, goes to another place or country, the great question whether he has changed his domicil, or whether he has ceased to be an inhabitant of one place and become an inhabitant of another, will depend mainly upon the question, to be determined from all the circumstances, whether the new residence is temporary or permanent; whether it is occasional, for the purpose of a visit, or of accomplishing a temporary object; or whether it is for the purpose of continued residence and abode until some new resolution be taken to remove. If the departure from one's fixed and settled abode is for a purpose in its nature temporary, whether it be business or pleasure, accompanied with an intent of returning and resuming the former place of abode as soon as such purpose is accomplished; in general, such a person continues to be an inhabitant at such place of abode, for all purposes of enjoying civil and political privileges, and of being subject to civil duties." The learned Chief Justice then remarks, that the facts in the present case are considered by the court as indicating only a casual and temporary departure of the plaintiff from his place of permanent residence; that Paris was his place of temporary and not of permanent abode ; and that he did not relinquish his domicil, or cease to be an inhabitant of Boston. The case is distinguished from the case of Thorndike v. The City of Boston, by the different intent of the parties upon their departure.