The principle, that questions which have been distinctly settled by litigation shall not be again litigated, has been in many cases extended to foreign judgments; and, although the whole law on this subject is not perhaps definitely settled, (p) it may be considered as the rule, both in England and in this country, that a question settled abroad, by courts of competent jurisdiction, between actual parties, after trial, will not be opened at home. (q) 2 It will be presumed, that all the defences which the losing party has, were made, and were insufficient. But it may be said, that the foreign judgment will not be entitled to this respect, when it appears that the foreign law, or foreign process on which the foreign judgment rested, conflicts with reason and justice; (r) or that the foreign court, in deciding a question depending • 607 * more or less upon the law of that other country in which the foreign judgment comes under consideration, is found to have mistaken the law of that country. (s)1 And it is obviously essential to the application of the general rule, that the foreign judgment be de6nite, exact, final, and conclusive, in the court and country in which it was rendered. (t) Nor can it be necessary to say, that if the foreign judgment can be shown to have been obtained by, or to be founded upon fraud, it can have no force.

(oo) See on this subject, Hood v. Hood, 11 Allen, 196; Kirrigan v. Kirrigan, 2 M'Carter, 146; Weatherbee v. Weatherbee, 20 Wis. 499; Winship v. Winship, 1 Green, 107.

(op) Cochrane, petitioner, 10 Allen, 276.

(p) Smith v. Nicolls, 7 Scott, 147,167.

(q) Henderson v. Henderson, 6 Q.B. 288; Smith v. Lewis, 3 Johns. 157; Emory v. Greenough, 3 Dall. 369, 372, n. In Burrows v. Jemino, Stra. 733, a foreign decree avoiding the acceptance of a bill of exchange, was held good.

(r) Henderson v. Henderson, 6 Q. B. 288, 298; Vallee v. Dumergue, 4 Exch.

1 A divorce by a State court having jurisdiction will be upheld unless set aside by the same court. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217. If a husband has a domicil in one State and the wife in another, the courts of either have jurisdiction concerning the party resident, Wright v. Wright, 24 Mich. 180; Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651; but if neither party has a domicil in the State, the courts of which grant a divorce, it is void, Sewall v. Sewall, 122 Mass. 156; Hood v. 8tate, 56 Ind. 263; Gettys v. Gettys, 3 Lea, 260; Litowich v. Litowich, 19 Kan. 451; a residence for the mere purpose of suing for a divorce being insufficient, Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 46 la, 437. See Eaton v. Eaton, 122 Mass. 276. A divorce against one domiciled in another State, no process being served or notice given, is of no effect out of the State in which it is granted, Doughty v. Doughty, 1 Stewart, 581. See People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78. Where there is no proof that a husband, seeking a divorce in another State, went there for that purpose, where the wife is served with notice, and appears by counsel, and where she subsequently, in a release reciting the divorce, gives up every claim against him, she cannot treat his subsequent marriage as a violation of his marital obligations to her. Loud v. Loud, 129 Mass. 14.

2 Ellis v. M'Henry, L. R. 6 C. P. 228.

On the general ground stated above, a collection by a foreign attachment or trustee process, in a foreign country, is a bar. (u) So the pendency of a foreign attachment or trustee process in a foreign country may be pleaded in abatement. (v) But

200; Reynolds v. Fenton, 3 C. B. 1S7; Cowan v. Braidwood, 12 Scott, N. R. 138; Ferguson v. Mahon, 11 A. & E. 170; Alivon v. Furnival, 1 Cromp. M. & R. 277.

(s) Novelli v. Rossi, 2 B & Ad. 757.

(t) Sadler v. Robins, 1 Camp. 253; Maule v. Murray, 7 T. R. 470.

(u) Holmes v. Remsen, 4 Johns. Ch. 460, 20 Johns. 220; M 'Daniel v. Hughes, 8 East, 367; Philips v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. 402. In Hull v. Blake, 13 Mass. 153, in an action by the indorsee of a promissory note against the maker, the defendant pleaded in bar a judgment rendered against him by a county court in the State of Georgia, having jurisdiction of the cause, as the garnishee or trustee of the promisee, the defendant having in the said cause disclosed the said notes, the action, in which said judgment was rendered, having been commenced after the actual indorsement of the note to the present plaintiff; and the plea was holden to be a good bar. And see Gould v. Webb, 4 Ellis & B. 933, 30 Eng. L. & Eq. 331, which was an action of assumpsit to recover damages for the breach of a special contract, made by defendant to pay plaintiff a certain salary as European correspondent of a newspaper called the "New York Courier and Enquirer." The declaration also contained the common counts. The defendant, among other things, pleaded as to £50, part of the plaintiff's demand in the money counts, that an action had been brought against the plaintiff in the Supreme Court of

New York, for a sum exceeding £50; that process duly issued out of said court, and executed on the defendant, the said sum of £50, due and owing from defendant to plaintiff, was attached in defendant's hands according to the laws of said State, to satisfy the demand in the action; that judgment was afterwards recovered in the said court, and execution was issued to the Sheriff of New York, whereupon the defendant was obliged by the laws of the State to pay, and did pay over to the sheriff, the value, of the said sum of £50, deducting the necessary expenses of the attachment. The plea further alleged, that the defendant and the plaintiff were citizens of the said State, and the defendant was resident there, and subject to the jurisdiction and process of the said court; and that by the laws of the State the defendant was discharged and acquitted of the said sum of £50. Held, upon demurrer, that the plea was sufficient, and a good defence pro tanto. See also the reporter's learned note to Andrews v. Heriot, 4 Cowen, 521; Bank of North America v. Wheeler, 28 Conn. 433.