Sec 13

Can a proposer bind himself to keep open a proposal until a specific date, so that an acceptance any time within that date would be good ? That he can is affirmed by leading authorities in the Roman law;7 and there is strong reason on principle to hold, that, if such a proposal is communicated to a specific party, with the knowledge of the proposer, and the party addressed has the matter under consideration, the proposer cannot, being advised of this fact, withdraw the offer within the period limited. The person addressed may have several other opportunities of the same kind open to him-there may, for instance, be several houses offered to him for rent; and an inquirer of this class has usually such an option. One is offered to him at a designated rent, a fixed period being given to him in which he is to make up his mind. Trusting to this, he declines others. The very fact of his entertaining the offer, involving a suspension, no matter how slight, of his inquiries in other quarters, is a sufficient consideration to bind the party making to him the proposal.1 To the same effect is an illustration given by Mr. Bell.2 "If, for example, a merchant propose to sell to another a cargo of sngar or of tobacco, and agree to give him a certain time to determine whether he will buy the goods or not, engaging not to dispose of them till the time has elapsed, and in the mean while he dispose of them, and disappoint the person to whom the promise has been made, who may have rejected an advantageous offer from another dealer, it seems unjust that, for the disappointment thus occasioned, there should be no remedy."3 But wherever there is a wrong there is a remedy ; and we are entitled to hold, on principle, that when a proposal, to be good for a specific period, is thus acted on, to the proposer's knowledge, by the party to whom it is addressed, it cannot be revoked within that period. To this conclusion several adjudications in this country tend.4 On the other hand, Mr. Benjamin5 says: "Even when on making the offer the proposer expressly promises to allow a certain time to the other party for acceptance, the offer may nevertheless be retracted in the interval, if no consideration has been given for the promise."6 By Mr. Pollock, also, we are told Proposer may bind himself to keep open a proposal to a specified date.

1 Pollock, ut supra, citing Dickinson v. Dodds, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 475 ; Anson, 24 ; Blades v. Free, 9 B. & C. 117; Cam-panari v. Woodburn, 15 C. B. 400 ; Lee v. Griflin, 1 B. & S. 272 ; Frith p. Lawrence, 1 Paige, 434 : Pratt v. Trustees, 93 111. 475. That a subscription to a charity is revoked by subscriber's death, see infra, sec 528. In Dickinson v. Dodds, ut supra, Mellish, L. J., said: "It is admitted law, that, if a man who makes an offer dies, the offer cannot be accepted after he is dead ; and see Meynell v. Surtees, 25 L.

J. C. 260. The conflict in the analogous cases of death of principal, after agency is instituted, is discussed in Wh. on Ag. sec 101.

2 Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103.

3 Warner v. Humphries, 2 M. & G. 853.

4 Pollock, 3d. ed. 37, citing Bram-well, L. J., in Drew v. Nunn, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 669.

5 Infra, sec 117 a.

6 Beach v. Church, 96 111. 177. 7 Toullier, Droit Civ. No. 30; Van-gerow, sec 603 ; Windscheid, sec 305.

1 Infra, sec 493 et seq.

2 Bell on Sales, quoted Story on Cont. sec 496.

3 Mr. Bell proceeds to say : "The only answer to this in the English law appears to be, that no one is entitled to rely on a unilateral engagement gratuitously made and without consideration. But one cannot help feeling that a rule so different from what commonly happens in the intercourse of life raises that inconsistency between law and justice which is sometimes complained of." As will be seen, however, the English rule is not settled to the extent supposed by Mr. Bell. And the engagement is not without consideration when the party receiving the promise suspends, no matter to how slight a degree, his inquiries elsewhere. Infra, sec 505.

4 Violett v. Patton, 5 Cranch, 142;.

Appleton v. Chase, 19 Me. 74; Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 384 ; Boston & Me. R. R. Co. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 225 ; Brooks v. Ball, 18 Johns. 337; Willetts v. Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 45. To the same effect is Story on Cont. sec 496 ; Metcalf on Cont. 19-21; 2 Kent Com. 477 n. d.; Wald's notes to Pollock, 8-9 ; 1 Duer on Ins. 118.

5 Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 41.

6 To this point the American editor cites Craig v. Harper, 3 Cush. 158; Boston, etc. R. R. v. Bartlett, 3 Cush. 224; Hochster v. Baruch, 5 Daly, 440 ; Burton v. Shotwell, 13 Bush. 271; Falls v. Gaither, 9 Port. 605 ; Eskridge v. Glover, 5 St. & P. 264. In Eskridge v. Glover, 5 St. & P. 264, there was a proposal by A. to B. to exchange horses with a specific sum to be given to B. to make the matter even, with the privilege to B. to decide upon the proposal that "even if he (the proposer) purports to give a definite time for acceptance, he is free to withdraw his proposal before that time has elapsed. He is not bound to keep it open unless there is a distinct collateral contract to that effect, founded on a distinct consideration."1 But the authorities cited by Mr. Pollock do not justify this broad assertion; and it is, in fact, much modified in a note on the same page of the second edition of his work, where he tells us "that an action would lie for a breach of promise to keep the offer," which would not be the case if the party were not in some sense bound by his promise.2 So far as concerns Mr. Benjamin's summary, it by a certain day. It was held that under this agreement A. had the right to recede before the day designated. And see Beckwith v. Cheever, 21 N. H. 41; Faulkner v. Hebard, 26 Vt. 452.

1 Pollock, 3d ed. 23, citing Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653 ; Great North. R. R. v. Witham, L. R. 9 C. P. 16 ; Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 E. & B. 678; Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111 ; Routledge v. Grant, 4Bing. 653 ; Dickinsons. Dodds, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 463 ; Eskridge v. Glover, 5 St. & P. 264.