Sec 505

It is frequently stated that detriment to the promisee is as good a consideration as is benefit to the promisor, and that either benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee will be a sufficient consideration.1 - But this is not strictly accurate. While a detriment to the promisee is a sufficient consideration without benefit to the promisor, benefit to the promisor is not a sufficient consideration without detriment to the promisee. If I receive a benefit, for instance, this does not subject me to suit from a party who has done nothing to procure me the benefit, no matter how solemnly he may have bound himself to aid me in obtaining this benefit. Detriment to the promisee of some kind there must be to sustain the promise; though this detriment may consist of rights surrendered as well as of work done or money or goods parted with. The promise, in fact, is conditioned on this detriment, and unless the detriment is suffered, the promise is not operative. This condition may be contingent, when not until the contingency occurs (e.g., the work done, or the goods transferred, or the service performed) does the promise bind.2 - The condition may be a contingent surrender of a right by the promisee.3 Hence it has been held that a promise by the heir-at-law of a dying relative, to pay a designated person a certain sum out of the estate, supposing there is no will, binds the party making the promise;4 and a resignation, also, by a pastor of his office is a consideration for a promise to give him certain aid on his resignation.5 Hence, also, a note given to a literary institution in consideration of its assuming additional liabili-ties is a sufficient consideration.6 The loss or inconvenience to the promisee, however, must be incurred at the request of the promisor; a promise by way of indemnity for a past loss is without consideration.1 - As illustrations of the principle before us may be noticed guarantees. In contracts of this class it is enough to establish the binding character of the contract of guarantee if the person to whom the guarantee is given suffers inconvenience, as an inducement to the surety to become guarantee for the principal debtor.2 - The abandonment of any right by the promisee, no matter how slight or how disputable, is a sufficient consideration for a promise by the promisor.3 - When a bona fide abandonment of a right is shown, the courts will not undertake to determine the value of the right abandoned. It will form, no matter how slight, a consideration for a promise unless the transaction was so preposterous as to indicate fraud.4 The sale of ancient lights and of rights of way, at high prices, though of little value to the owner, illustrates the position above given that a surrender of a right, or a detriment, as it is called, is a good consideration. In conformity with this view it was held in Michigan, in 1880, that when D. a debtor, and M. a party holding a mortgage on D.'s property, agreed with S., a subsequent mortgagee, that the property should be put up at auction to satisfy the latter's claims, there was a sufficient consideration to support the agreement in the waiver of mortgage security it involved.5 - An unconscionable agreement, however, by which a preposterous sum is required for the surrender of a right, will not be sustained.6 - Under the same head may fall the reconstruction of an agreement by which new terms are imposed. The promisee's abandonment of the old terms are the consideration for the adoption of the new.1 It is otherwise when the old agreement has been absolutely done away with, and when after an entire vacating of the old agreement a new agreement is established on a new consideration. To make such new agreement binding the new consideration must be proved. Hence, renewing a broken contract of marriage requires as strong proof as did the original contract.2 - Of surrender of rights, the most extreme illustration that can be taken is that given in an early English case in which it was held that parting with the possession of goods and placing them in the hands of another is a sufficient consideration for a promise by the latter to deliver them safely.3 To sustain such a consideration, however, it must be something appreciable on which the minds of the party are fixed. It must be, "if you will carry the goods I will surrender possession of them to you." This would be a surrender of a right.4 The surrender, also, of a right incident to the depositing of a sum of money by the plaintiff in the defendant's hands is a sufficient consideration for a promise to keep it safely and return it.5 sec 506. In all cases where a consideration is required, a party suing on a contract, as we will hereafter see more fully,6 must show that the consideration flowed from him. Consideration means something which is of some value in the eye of the law, moving from the plaintiff; it may be some benefit to the defendant, but it must be some detriment to the plaintiff, and it must move from the plaintiff,7 and this is tantamount to saying Detriment or loss of rights by promisee is a sufficient consideration.

1 Nerot v. Wallace, 3 T. R. 24; Bailey v. Croft, 4 Taunt. 611; Bunn v. Gay, 4 East, 190; Thomas v. Thomas,.

2 Q. B. 851; Towsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 182; Chick v. Trevett, 20 Me. 462; Foster v. Phaley, 35 Vt. 303; Forster p. Fuller, 6 Mass. 58; Powell v. Brown,.

3 Johns. 100; Miller v. Drake, 1 Caines, 45; Seaman v. Seaman, 12 Wend. 381; White v. Baxter, 71 N. Y. 254; Lewis v. Seabury, 74 N. Y. 409; Conover v. Stillwell, 34 N. J. L. 54; Bradshaw v.

McLaughlin, 39 Mich. 480; Watkins v. Turner, 34 Ark. 663; infra, sec 1002.

2 Supra, sec 24; infra, sec 545 et seq.; Hilton v. Southwick, 17 Me. 305; Ethe-ridge v. Thompson, 7 Ired. 127.

3 Infra, sec 579; Richardson v. Gosser, 26 Penn. St. 355.

4 Parker a. Urie, 21 Penn. St. 305.

5 Worrell v. Presb. Ch., 8 C. E. Green, 96.

6 Simpson College v. Bryan, 50 Iowa, 293; infra, sec 528.