Sec 1002

The fact that a payment of a smaller sum is made in cash will add the increment of consideration which is requisite to sustain an accord and satisfaction.1 Change of place of payment, also, may have the same eftect.2

Anticipation of time or change of place may be sufficient.

American Law Journal, 186, must fall with Wentz V. De Haven. It is too clear for argument, that if a release of a debt not under seal must have a consideration to support it, then payment of part of an acknowledged indebtedness can be no consideration for a release of the remainder.

"While this is so it is equally well settled that the acceptance of a collateral thing, without regard to its value, is a good accord and satisfaction. In the absence of fraud the courts never inquire into the adequacy of the consideration, of an agreement. The promissory note of the debtor is such a collateral thing. It is a decided advantage to the creditor in two ways. First, the greater facility of a recovery upon it. It requires no evidence of consideration in the first instance. It imports prima facie a sufficient consideration. Second, it may be disposed of in the market at once before it falls due, and the bona fide purchaser of it takes it clear of all equities between the original parties. Thus the creditor may often find that such a note for part of his debt is of great and immediate advantage to him by raising the money upon it. Cumber V. Wane, 1 Strange, 426, is relied on as opposed to this. It is not stated in the facts, nor in the opinion of the court, that the note in that case was negotiable, though it is so spoken of in the argument of counsel. Indeed, Chief Justice Pratt says: 'If 5/. be (as is admitted) no satisfaction for 15/., why is a simple contract to pay 5/. a satisfaction for another simple contract of three times the value ?' not adverting to any change in the nature of the security. Mr. Smith in his note on this case remarks that ' the main point, viz., that a security of equal degree for a smaller sum, if it present no easier or better remedy, cannot be pleaded in an action for the larger one, has frequently been affirmed since the decision of Cumber V. Wane,' where he evidently confines it to the case where the new security presents no easier or better remedy. He adds 'that the doctrine laid down by Pratt, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the court, has not been to its full extent sustained.' He refers then to some subsequent determinations, among them Sibree V. Tripp, 15 Mees. & Wels. 23, in which it was held that a negotiable security may operate, if so given and taken, in satisfaction of a debt of greater amount, the circumstance of negotiability making it in fact a different thing, and more advantageous than the original debt, which was not negotiable. 1 Smith's Leading Cases, 440, 442. To the same effect is Curlewis V. Clark, 3 Exch. Rep. 375. The same principle was distinctly recognized in Savage V. Ever-man, 20 P. F. Smith, 315."

1 Supra, sec 504; Brown V. Stackpole, 9 N. H. 478; Austin V. Dorwin, 21 Vt. 39; Reed V. Bartlett, 19 Pick. 273; Brooks V. White, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 283; Rose V. Hall, 26 Conn. 392; Kellogg V. Richards, 14 Wend. 116; Milliken V. Brown, 1 Rawle, 391; Smith V. Brown, 3 Hawks, 580; Arnold V. Park, 8 Bush, 3; Spann V. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 302.

2 Jones V. Perkins, 29 Miss. 141.