Sec 881

A bill or note, not designating any time for payment, is payable on demand, but interest does not begin to run, unless expressly provided by the instrument, until demand is made.8 On the other hand, it is held that interest on a money bond not specifying re, 2 Story, 503; Salter V. Burt, 20 Wend. 205; see fully, supra, sec 575. In Wood V. Cool, 4 Met. 203, Shaw, C. J., stated the law to be in the United States, "In the absence of all proof of particular contract or special custom three days of grace are allowed on bills of exchange and promissory notes; and when it is relied upon that by special custom no grace is allowed, or any other term of grace than three days, it is an exception to the general rule, and the proof lies on the party taking it." But this does not apply to paper payable on demand, as has been just seen, nor to cheques on banks. Bowen V. Newell, 5 Sandf. 326.

Vendor must see goods are properly received by carrier.

Vendor may make carrier his agent.

Money obligations without date are payable on demand.

1 Stone V. Swift, 4 Pick. 389; Bissell V. Steel, 67 Penn. St. 443; supra, sec 793.

2 Lesassur V. The Southwestern, 2 Woods, 35; Naylor V. Dennie, 8 Pick. 199; Harris V. Pratt, 17 N. Y. 249; O'Brien V. Norris, 16 Md. 122: Loeb V. Peters, 63 Ala. 243; Skilling V. Boll-man, 73 Mo. 665.

3 Empire Trans. Co. V. Steele, 70 Penn. St. 188. 4 Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 694;.

Buckman V. Levi, 3 Camp. 414; Cothay V. Tute, 3 Camp. 129; Alexander V. Gardner, 1 Bing. N. C. 671.

5 Clarke V. Hutchins, 14 East, 475.

6 Dunlop V. Lambert, 6 Cl. & F. 600.

7 Taylor V. Cole, 111 Mass. 363; Hanauer V. Bartels, 2 Col. 514; cited Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 694; Turner V. Liverpool Docks, 6 Ex. 543.

8 Leake, 2d ed. 836; Whitlock V. Underwood, 2 B. & C. 157; Brown in any day for payment, runs from the date of the bond, which is regarded as an obligation for the payment of money on that day.1 - As will be hereafter seen, prior demand is not ordinarily necessary to constitute indebtedness;2 though it may be necessary in contracts of bailment or sale.3 Bonds, also, conditioned for payment on demand require demand.4.

Sec 882

When no time for the performance of a contract is fixed, it will be held that the performance must be at a reasonable time, taking all the circumstances of the case in consideration.5 Thus when no time is fixed for the delivery of goods sold, the character of the goods, their locality, and the locality of the parties, are to be taken into consideration.6 The fact that pay-ment is not to be made till a definite period after sale does not by itself defer the delivery till then,7 though evidence has been admitted under such a contract to the effect that delivery and payment were to be simultaneous.8 And an agreement for the sale of goods "to be delivered and paid for in fourteen days," means that payment and delivery were to be concurrent acts within the fourteen days.9 - A carrier is bound to deliver within reasonable time, taking all the circumstances of transportation into consideration.1 The test of reasonableness, when no time is fixed in the contract, has been also applied to the discharge of the cargo of a ship;2 to the providing a cargo under a charter party,3 and to the ejection of a tenant at will.4 - A contract to marry, also, without fixing the date, is a contract to marry within a reasonable time.5 - Where a debt is payable in stocks, but no time of delivery is fixed, they should be tendered at once, and if any loss occur through unreasonable delay, this loss is to fall upon the party causing the delay.6 Reasonableness, in this relation, has been said to be a question of law.7 But when the question depends on the varying circumstances of concrete cases, it is much more a question of business duty than one of law. The law stops with announcing the general rule that the time for performance must be "reasonable." But what is "reasonable" depends in part on the nature of the goods, in part on the usage of the parties, in part on the conveniences of transportation, in part on the demands of the market, conditions presenting themselves in new aspects in each case, and requiring the question in each case to be settled inductively from all the facts.1 - Parol evidence is admissible of the facts and circumstances attending the sale in order to determine what is a reasonable time;2 but not to show that a specific day was intended when this contradicts the contract, unless mutual mistake be shown.3

When no time is fixed for performance a reasonable time is implied.

1 Farquehar V. Morris, 7 T. R. 124; see supra, sec 577.

2 Supra, sec 575.

3 Supra, sec 576.

4 Supra, sec 577.

5 Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 685, 695, 701; Startup V. MacDonald, 6 M. • & G. 611; Ford V. Cotesworth, L. R. 4 Q. B. 133; Jones V. Gibbons, 8 Exch. 920; Cocker V. Hemp Co., 3 Sumner, 530; Atwood V. Clark, 2 Greenl. 249; Atkinson V. Brown, 20 Me. 67; Bailey V. Simonds, 6 N. H. 159; Russel V. Ormsbee, 10 Vt. 274; Atwood V. Cobb, 16 Pick. 227; Wheelock V. Tanner, 39 N. Y. 481; Adams V. Adams, 26 Ala. 272.

6 Ellis V. Thompson, 3 M. & W. 446; Cocker V. Hemp Co., 3 Sumner, 530; Davis V. Tallcot, 2 Kern. 184; see Atwood V. Clark, 2 Greenl. 249; Hill V. Hobart, 16 Me. 164.

7 See Spartali V. Beneoke, 10 C. B. 212.

8 Field V. Lelean, 6 H. & N. 617; Wh. on EV. sec 929, 969.

9 Godts V. Rose, 17 C. B. 229.

1 Hales V. R. R., 4 B. & S. 66; Taylor V. R. R., L. R. 1 C. P. 385. As to meaning of term " reasonable," see At-wood V. Emery, 1 C. B. N. S. 110; Toms V. Wilson, 4 B. & S. 442; Bass V. White, 65 X. Y. 565.

2 Ford V. Cotesworth, L. R. 4 Q. B. 127; and see Thiis V. Byers, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 249.

3 Adams V. Mail Co., 5 C. B. N. S. 492. For the above citations see Leake, 2d ed. 837.

4 Ellis V. Paige, 1 Pick. 43.

5 Leake, 2d ed. 838; 2 Pars. on Cont. 64; 3 Add. on Cont. 447; Cherry V. Thompson, L. R. 7 Q. B. 574; Caines V. Smith, 15 M. & W. 189; Nunan V. Bourquin, 7 Phil. 239; Wag-enseller V. Simmers, 97 Penn. St. 465. In this case Mercur, J., said: "A contract to marry without specification of a time is a contract to marry within a reasonable time. Each party has a right to a reasonable delay; but not to delay without reason or beyond reason. The age of the parties and the pecuniary ability of the man to support a family, are proper matters to consider in the reasonableness of the delay in a particular case." That a person disabling himself from marrying cannot on this ground defend himself on a suit for damages, see supra, sec 324; infra, sec 885a; and that in such case no demand is necessary, see supra, sec 575, 606.

6 Demarest V. McKee, 2 Grant (Penn.) 248.

7 2 Pars. on Cont. 661, citing Stod-den V. Harvey, Cro. Jac. 204; Atwood V. Clark, 2 Greenl. 249; Porter V. Blood, 5 Pick. 54; Murray V. Smith, 1 Hawks. 41.

Sec 882a

We have already seen4 that demand may be a condition of contracts of bailment or sale. We have now to observe that when goods are to be delivered on demand, the demand must be at the time and place designated, and, where there is no designation, at a reasonable time and place.5 The demand may be made on the debtor's agent in the debtor's absence.6 And the demand, so far as its contents are concerned, must be reasonable, and must conform to the contract.7