Sec 40

The better opinion is that an infant's contract of partnership is only voidable; and hence, if the partnership be continued by him without disaffirmance, when he arrives at full age, it binds him both as to his partners,4 and as to third parties, so far as concerns debts thus impliedly ratified by him.5 And to repudiate a partnership entered into during minority, prompt action on arriving at full age is necessary, as otherwise the partnership may be affirmed and ratified.6 The same rule applies to the liability of an infant shareholder. 'On the whole," says Mr. Pollock, "it is clear on the authorities (notwithstanding a few expressions to the contrary), that both the transfer of shares to an infant and the obligations incident to his holding the shares are not void, but only voidable."1 And even under the English statute, providing that all contracts made during infancy shall be void, it has been held that an infant partner who does not avoid a partnership at full age is, as between himself and his partners, bound by the terms of the partnership without any formal ratification; and "a court of equity," adds Mr. Pollock, "taking the partnership accounts, would, it is apprehended, apply the same rule to the time of his minority as to the time after his full age."2

Contracts of agency not necessarily void.

Nor partnerships.

1 Saunders v. Marr, 1 H. Bl. 75.

"Hardy v. Waters, 38 Me. 450; Towle v. Dresser, 73 Me. -; Whitney v. Dutch, 14 Mass. 457 ; Keegan v. Cox, 116 Mass. 289 ; Lawrence v. McArter, 10 Ohio, 37 ; Pyle v. Cravens, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 17.

3 See Elwell's Leading Cases, p. 45. That an appointment by an infant of an attorney in fact is void, see Story, Agency, sec 463 ; note to Tucker v. More-land, 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 4th ed. 244; Thomas v. Roberts, 16 M. & W. 778 ;.

Waples v. Hastings, 3 Harring. 403; Pickler v. State, 18 Ind. 266. That a warrant of attorney by an infant to confess judgment is void, see Saunder-son v. Marr, 1 H. Bl. 75 ; Oliver v. Woodroffe, 4 M. & W. 650 ; Carnahan v. Alderslice, 4 Harring. 99.

4 Moley v. Brine, 120 Mass. 324.

5 Pollock on Cont. 3d Eng. ed. 55 ; Lindley on Partnership, i. 82-84; Goode v. Harrison, 5 B. & Ald. 147 Miller v. Sims, 2 Hill, S. C. 479.

6 Goode v. Harrison, ul supra.

Sec 41

The mere fact that a contract is for suretyship does not necessarily avoid it.3 Hence an infant's recognizance may be only voidable.4 But ordinarily a contract of suretyship by an infant from which he can derive no substantial benefit will be held invalid.5

Sec 42

An infant's contract of labor may in like manner be affirmed and continued when he is of full age.6 He may, however, avoid the contract and recover the value of his services on a count for work and labor done, making allowance for any legitimate set-ofts.7 If a Nor are contracts of suretyship.

Nor contracts for labor.

1 Pollock on Cont. 3d Eng. ed. 56, citing Lumsden's case, L. R. 4 Ch. 31 ; Gooch's case, L. R. 8 Ch. 266: see Leeds R. R. v. Fearnley, 4 Exch. 26 ; Northwest R. R. v. McMichael, 5 Exch. 123; Birkenhead R. R. v. Pilcher, 5 Exch. 121. Infra, sec 49.

2 Pollock on Cont. 3d. Eng. ed. 61.

3 Cockshott v. Bennett, 2 T. R. 763 ; Owen v. Long, 112 Mass. 403 ; Curtin v. Patton, 11 S. & R. 30 ; Hinely v. Margaritz, 3 Barr, 428; Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148; Williams v. Harrison, 11 S. C. 412; see Allen v. Miner, 2 Call, 70. As holding such contracts to be void see Maples v. Wight-man, 4 Conn. 376 ; Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. 41, 62.

4 Patchin v. Cromach, 13 Vt. 330.

5 See Lumsden's case, L. R. 4 Ch. Ap. 31 ; Maples v. Wightman, 4 Conn. 376. The confusion arising from the ambiguous use of the terms "void" and "voidable" in this relation is illustrated in Curtin v. Patton, 11 S. & R. 311. In that case, Duncan, J., usually a careful as well as exact writer, after speaking of an infant's contract of suretyship as " absolutely void," goes on to speak of acts by which it is " confirmed." That an infant's contract of suretyship may be ratified, see Brandt on Suretyship, sec 3.

6 Thomas v. Dike, 11 Vt; 273; Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332 ; Houston R. R. v. Miller, 51 Tex. 270. For analogous cases, see infra, sec 711.

7 1 Ch. on Con. 11th Am. ed. 200 ; Judkins v.Walker, 17 Me. 38 ; Thomas v. Dike, 11 Vt. 278 ; Moses v. Steven?, 2 Pick. 332 ; Vent v. Osgood, 19 Pick. 572; Bishop v. Shepherd, 23 Pick. 492; Peters v. Lord, 18 Conn. 337; Whitmarsh v. Hall, 3 Denio, 375; Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill, 110; Francis v. Felmit, 4 Dev. & B. 498 ; Van Pelt v. Corwine, 6 Ind. 363. See, however, as holding otherwise, Weeks contract for labor is beneficial, in the main, to the infant, it may be sustained, even though such a contract gives the master a power of dismissing or of imposing penalties upon the infant.1 On the other hand, a contract binding the infant to serve at all times, but leaving the master at liberty to dismiss him at any time, will be held invalid as against the infant.2 Statutory contracts of apprenticeship and enlistment bind infants when the statutory directions are pursued, though it is otherwise as to ordinary covenants of iudenture, which may be disaffirmed by them on arriving at full age.3 The parent, however, is bound absolutely by the covenants, if duly executed by him, the right to avoid being limited to the infant, subject to statutory restrictions.4.