Sec 48a

We may, therefore, hold that where an infant repudiates, on arriving at age, a contract by which he has obtained assets he has in infancy wasted, he cannot be made to pay an equivalent for such assets; while, on the other hand, if he retains the assets, but disaffirms and repudiates the contract, the other contracting party can reclaim these assets, though he can sustain no action against the infant for any deterioration they may have suffered inhe infant's hands.4 In case, however, the goods have been wasted or parted with by the infant, no action can be maintained against him for not redelivering them to the vendor.1

Other party can reclaim on rescinded contract.

12 Com. 240.

2 Cope v. Overton, 10 Bing. 252; 3 Moore & S. 738.

3Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102; Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill, 110. In Ruchizky v. De Haven, 97 Penn. St. 202, it was held that an infant' executors could recover from stock-brokers money advanced by him to them on a gambling stock speculation which they engaged in on his account. The court said that "if the parties had been sui juris, the contract having been fully executed, we would not interfere to help either party. But such is not the case; for, as we have said, Ruchizky was a minor, and hence was entitled to legal protection and guardianship. It is said they knew not that he was a minor; but what does that matter? He was, nevertheless, an infant, and their want of knowledge did not make him sui juris. . . . The defendants have endeavored to interpose for their protection the doctrine that where an infant has executed a contract, and has enjoyed the benefit of it, and afterwards, on arriving at age, seeks to avoid it, he must first restore the consideration he received ; that he cannot have the benefit on the one side without restoring the equivalent on the other. The rule may, and certainly does, apply in certain cases, but, as a general rule, it is unsound. Its application was refused in Shaw v. Boyd, 5 S. & R. 309 ; and as was said by Mr. Justice Bailies, in Abell v Warren, 4 Vt. 149, 'If this be true, then the privilege of infants is not worth possessing.' But all this is foreign to the case in hand, for we have here a contract condemned by public policy-a contract that is not merely voidable, but void ab initio. It follows that nothing can be imposed on the infant as a condition of rescission.".

4Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 525 ; Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441; Price v. Fnrman, 27 Vt. 268 ; Whitcomb v. Jos-lyn, 51 Vt. 79 ; Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359 ; Kitchen v. Lee, 11 Paige, 107; Henry v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526; Strain v. Wright, 7 Ga. 568; Jefford v.

Sec 49

An infant who takes property on which are certain burdens, cannot enjoy the property relieved from the burden. An infant lessee, for instance, who holds until he is of full age, becomes then liable for back arrears, though accumulated during his minority.2 And an infant stockholder in a railway company who holds his shares, enjoying the benefits attached to them, is bound, if he does not throw them up when of full age, to meet any obligations growing out of the property so held.3