Sec 115

The same right passes to the administrators and heirs of a party claimed to be a lunatic3

Sec 116

On the guardian, curator, committee, or assignee of a person found to be a lunatic the duty is incumbent of testing the question of the validity of his prior business transactions. And by such official representative the lunatic's contracts may be ratified or annulled; the guardian or curator (as the case may be) being entitled to bring suit to recover back property which the lunatic had sold, but which he had not the capacity to convey.4

Sec 117

The fact that one party to an executed contract was insane at the time of its execution cannot be set up by the other party in bar to a suit brought against him to comply with the conditions undertaken by him, if these conditions are not dependent on acts which the plaintiff is incapable of performing.5

Sec 117a

Following the distinction already noticed between "void" and "voidable" transactions,6 we must hold that, when a person at the time absolutely without capacity to contract makes an apparent contract, such apparent contract is void; and so when the mind of one contracting party is fixed on a different object from that of the other contracting party.7 It is otherwise, however, when one of the contracting parties is not absolutely without capacity to contract, and does contract as to a matter within the range of his capacity. Supposing that he should subsequently turn out to have been "insane" at the time of such contract, and may even have been so judicially pronounced, yet, on his restoration to sanity, such contract binds him if not repudiated by him when brought before him for ratification.1 The question, however, may after all be one merely as to the meaning of the words. A person who has recovered from an attack of insanity continues to enjoy the fruits of a bargain made by him when at least partially insane. He does not repudiate the contract, and, as he does not, his action may be called non-repudiation. Yet it is none the less ratification, though he has not said one word in affirmance of the bargain. For ratification in this, as in the parallel case of infancy, is a matter of induction from all the circumstances of the particular case.2

And so of his administrators.

And so of his guardian or assignee.

Other contracting parties cannot avoid.

Non-repudiation may be ratification.

1 Beavan v. McDonnell, 9 Excb. 309. As to divisible considerations, see infra, sec 511.

2 Turner v. Rusk, 53 Md. 65. As to ratification, see infra, sec 117 a. As to distinction between "void" and "voidable" contracts, see supra, sec 28, 56.

3 Beverley's case, 4 Rep. 123 6; Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 451 ; Lazell v. Pennick, 1 Tyler, 247.

4 McCrillis v. Bartlett, 8 N. H. 569 ; Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray, 279. In Baker v. Baker, L. R. 5 P. 142, it was held that the committee of the estate of a lunatic was the proper party to sue for a divorce on account of the adultery of the lunatic's wife.

5 Allen v. Berryhili, 27 Iowa, 534.

6 Supra, sec 28, 56.

7 Supra, sec 4; infra, sec 177.