Sec 496

"When a gratuitous promise has been finally executed by a gift, then the party making the gift (though it is otherwise as to his creditors, supposing the transaction to be fraudulent) cannot recall it. Thus, a parent cannot recover back an article given by him to a child,2 and a gift binding the donor may be made of a chattel already in donee's hands if acceptance be shown.3 Gifts inter vivos,"when made perfect by delivery of the things given, are executed contracts;"4 and the donor cannot disturb the donee's possession after the gift is perfected by delivery and acceptance.5 But. delivery and acceptance (in all cases where there is not a valid transfer by deed) are necessary to perfect a gift of chattels,6 even though the donee may have been in possession at the time as a bailee;7 though, as has been just seen, if acceptance be shown, and there be an intention to transfer the property, the gift may bind.1

Executed gift cannot be recalled.

Penn. St. 348; Jones v. Jones, 12 Ind. 389; Lawton v. Buckingham, 15 Iowa, 22; Jeter v. Tucker, 1 S. C. 246; Johnson v. Boyles, 26 Ala. 576; Bennett v. Solomon, 6 Cal. 134.

1 Good v. Good, 9 Watts, 567; S. C, 3 W. & S. 472; Mack's Appeal, 68 Penn. St. 231; Burkholder v. Plank, 69 Penn. St. 225.

2 Infra, sec 538, 751; Smith v. Smith, 7 C. & P. 401; Bromley v. Brunton, L. R. 6 Eq. 275; Faxon v. Durant, 9 Met. 339; Rockwood v. Wiggin, 16 Gray, 402; Noble v. Smith, 2 John. 52; Bond v. Bunting, 78 Penn. St. 210; Picot v. Sanderson, 1 Dev. 309; University v. McNair, 2 Ire. Eq. 605; Matthews v. Smith, 67 N. C. 374; West v. Cavins, 74 Ind. 265. See supra, sec 377.

3 Shower v. Pilck, 4 Ex. 478; Wing v. Merchant, 57 Me. 383; Champney v. Blanchard, 39 N. Y. 111; Huntington v. Gilmore, 14 Barb. 243; Ham v. Van Orden, 84 N. Y. 257.

4 Wilde, J., Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick. 264; Ham v. Van Orden, 84 N. Y. 257.

5 Jones v. Lock, L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 28; Richardson 0. Richardson, L. R. 3 Eq. 686; Sheedy v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472; Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. R. 52; Picot v. Sanderson, 1 Dev. N. C. 309.

6 1 Ch. on Con. 11th Am. ed. 60; Ward v. Audland, 16 M. & W. 862; Irons v. Smallpiece, 2 B. & Ald. 551; Hanson v. Millett, 55 Me. 184; Brown v. Brown, 23 Barb. 565; Withers v. Weaver, 10 Barr, 391; Kidder v. Kidder, 33 Penn. St. 268; Trough's Est., 75 Penn. St. 115; Zimmerman v. Streeper, 75 Penn. St. 147; Adams v. Hayes, 2 Ired. L. 366; Sims v. Sims, 2 Ala. 117.

7 Shower v. Pilck, 4 Exch. 478; Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422.

Sec 497

According to Blackstone, "a good consideration is such as that of blood, or of natural love and affection, when a man grants an estate to a near relation, being founded on motives of generosity, prudence, and natural duty. A valuable consideration is such as money, marriage, or the like, which the law esteems an equivalent for the grant; and is, therefore, founded in motives of justice."2 But this distinction is merely speculative. A promise based on a merely good "consideration will not be enforced against creditors, nor, in equity, against the party himself, unless there be a sealed obligation amounting to a gift."3 A " good" consideration, therefore, is virtually no consideration, so far as concerns creditors, though it may be sustained, when executed, as a family arrangement between the parties, or by solemnization through a sealed obligation.4 A deed in consideration of marriage, as we will hereafter see, is made on a valuable consideration, and is therefore good against creditors.5