Sec 77

A married woman, who has a separate estate, is, in England, capable in equity of binding such estate under certain limitations. These limitations are thus condensed by Mr. Pollock from recent English adjudications.-1. "Not only the bonds, bills, and promissory notes of married women, but also their general engagements, may affect their separate estate ;"2 and property settled to a married woman's separate use for her life, with power to dispose of it by deed or will, is for this purpose her separate estate, her power, however, being limited by the instrument creating it.3-2. To make a general engagement thus binding on her separate estate, it must appear "that the engagement was made with reference to and upon the faith and credit of that estate."4 And the intention to charge makes with him a joint promissory note,1 or gives her note in payment of her husband's debt.2 But on such engagements, a married woman cannot be personally sued. The remedy is in rem against the separate estate.3 The execution by a married band, receiving no maintenance from him.1 In some jurisdictions in the United States, however, a married woman, on whom a separate estate has been settled, has no power over such estate beyond what is given to her by the instrument creating it, and this instrument is to be so construed as to give her no power of disposal beyond what its terms expressly specify.2 - By a clause forbidding the anticipation of income, a married woman may have a separate income so secured to her as to be protected against her own debts.3 - A clause prohibiting anticipation or alienation takes away the power of disposition in advance; and creditors are restricted to dividends and profits already accrued.1 And the restraint against alienation protects even against liability for fraudulent acts.2 - A gift to the separate use of a married woman now gives her, in England, the same power of alienation as she would have if she were single.3

Woman with separate estate may bind such estate.

1 Glover v. Drury Lane, 2 Chit. R. 117 ; Winslow v. Croker, 17 Me. 29 ; Howes v. Bigelow, 13 Mass. 384 ; Washburn v. Hale, 10 Pick. 429 ; Morgan v. Bank, 14 Conn. 99 ; Hyde v. Stone, 9 Cow. 230.

2 Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 D. F. J. 514 ; aff. in London, etc. Bank of Australia v. Lempriere, L. R. 4 P. C. 572.

3 Mayd v. Field, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 587; Godfrey v. Harben, L. R. 13 Ch. D. 216 ; Davies v. Jenkins, L. R. 6 C. D. 728; Poole's Est., L. R. 6 C. D. 739 ; see, to same affect in this country, Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 ; Stephen v. Beall, 22 Wall. 329 ; Heburn v. Warner, 112 Mass. 271 ; Insurance Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y. 613 ; McVey v. Cantrell, 70 N. Y. 295; Maurer's App., 86 Penn. St. 380 ; Phillips v. Graves, 20 Oh. St. 371; Patrick v. Littell, 36 Oh. St. 79 ; Whitesides v. Cannon, 23 Mo. 457 ; Davis v. Smith, Sup. Ct. Mo. 1881; Hooton v. Ransom, 6 Mo. Ap. 19 ; Burnett v. Hawpe, 25.

Grat. 481; Harshberger v. Alger, 81 Grat. 52 ; and cases cited in Wald's Pollock, 69, and Story's Eq. sec 1397. In Robinson v. Pickering, 44 L. T. R. N. S. 165, L. R. 16 Ch. D. 660, it was ruled that an ad interim injunction by a creditor will not be granted to restrain a married woman from dealing with her separate property until judgment. See London Law Times, 10th April (p. 412) and 15th May (p. 38), 1880 ; 2d April (p. 382), 1881.

4 Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 D. F. J. 515 ; London Bank of Australia v. Lempriere, L. R. 4 P. C. 572 ; see Conn v. Conn, 1 Md. Ch. 212; Burch v. Breckenridge, 16 B. Mon. 482. In Patrick v. Littell, 36 Oh. St. 79, it was held that an agreement by a married woman to pay for services to be rendered in procuring a loan of money to remove a mortgage on her real estate binds her separate estate.-Boynton, J. said; "She" (theplaintiff), "being the owner of a separate estate, which 101 her separate estate must distinctly appear ; and the trust establishing the separate estate should be so guarded as to carry out the purpose for which it was created.1-3. Debts contracted by a married woman, living apart from her husband, are presumed to have been intended by her to be charged to her separate estate ;2 and the same presumption exists when a married woman gives a guarantee of her husband's debt,3 or was heavily incumbered by mortgage, engaged the defendants in error, her husband joining, to secure for her a loan of $10,000 to enable her to remove the mortgage from her estate. She agreed to pay an attorney's fee for making an examination of her title, and a commission of $100 to the defendants for securing the loan. The services stipulated for were fully performed, the defendants paying $50 from their own funds to the attorney making the abstract of title. The plaintiff refused to accept the loan, or to pay for the services rendered in procuring it. We have no hesitancy in pronouncing the agreement made to be one not only having direct reference to Mrs. Patrick's separate estate, but made for its benefit. The object was to remove an existing incumbrance upon the property, and it was to accomplish this object that the services of the defendants were engaged. The fact that the loan was to be secured by a new mortgage upon the same property affects the question but very little. She was to get rid of a mortgage debt then due and pressing, by substituting another there for, to become due ten years thereafter. The question is, whether an intention upon the part of Mrs. Patrick to charge her separate estate with payment for the services rendered, and money paid by defendants, for the benefit of such estate, will be implied from the character of the transaction and the nature of the engagement entered into. The principles announced in previous adjudications of this court require an affirmative answer to this question. 20 Ohio St. 371; 35 ib. 270; ib. 296. Holding the separate estate of Mrs. Patrick liable to the defendants' demand, we are also of the opinion that a personal judgment against her was proper." Her obligation is one upon which, were she sole, she would be liable at law. It is a contract or obligation upon which, under sec 28 of the Code, as amended March 30, 1874, she might have been sued alone ; and being of that character, the statute requires the like judgment to be rendered and enforced, in all respects, as if she were unmarried. 71 Ohio Laws, 47. It was one of the objects of this section, as thus amended, to so far modify the disabilities of coverture as to authorize a personal judgment to be rendered against a married woman, where such judgment would have been proper had she remained unmarried.".