1 Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R. 17 Ch. D. 454 ; 44 L. T. N. S. 562 ; Rice v. R. R., 32 Oh. St. 380 ; Pfirsching v. Falsh, 87 111. 260 ; Collins v. Underwood, 33 Ark. 265.

2 Ibid.

3 Morrell v Cowan, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 166. This topic is well discussed in Schouler on Husb. and Wife, sec 184 et seq.

1 Davies v. Jenkins, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 728. To this Mr. Wald, the American editor of Pollock on Contracts, adds, Williams v. Urmston, 35 Oh. St. 296: Cowles v. Morgan, 34 Ala. 535 ; Nunn v. Givham, 45 Ala. 375 ; Burnett v. Hawpe, 25 Grat, 481; Lincoln v. Rowe, 51 Mo. 571.

2 Wicks v. Mitchell, 9 Kan. 80, cited Wald's Pollock, 69.

3 Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 D. F. & J.; Rogers v. Ward, 8 Allen, 389. For form of decree, so as to bind personal estate, see Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Gh. 274. Mr. Pollock holds the older cases, cited in Sug. V. & P. 206, to be overruled; referring to Picard v. Hine, ut supra; Pride v. Bubb, L. R. 7 Ch. 64; He adds, "that the separate estate is regarded as a sort of artificial person created by courts of equity, and represented by the beneficial owner as an agent with full powers, somewhat in the same way as a corporation sole is represented by the person constituting it for the time being."-And in support of this view is cited by Mr. Wald, the following from Grissell in re, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 490 : " It is not the woman, as a woman, who becomes a debtor, but her engagement has made that particular part of her property which is settled to her separate use a debtor, and liable to satisfy the engagement. She herself is not a debtor, within the meaning of the bankruptcy act." To the same effect, see Bispham's Equity, sec 102.-In Mathewman's case, L. R. 3 Eq. 781, the law was stated to be that if a married woman, " having separate property, enters into a pecuniary engagement, whether by ordering goods or otherwise, which, if she were afemc sole, would constitute her a debtor, and in entering into such engagements she purports to contract, not for her husband but for herself, and on the credit of her separate estate, and it was so intended by the person with whom she is contracting, that constitutes an obligation for which the person with whom she contracts has the right to make her separate estate liable." This is adopted by Mr. Benjamin, Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 37, citing further Shattock v. Shattock, L. R. 2 Eq. 182 ; Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. Ap. 274 ; and see Butler v. Cump-ston, L. R. 7 Eq. 20. That a note given by a married woman in payment of property purchased by her is to be inferred to have been meant to bind her separate estate, see Williams v. Urmston, 35 Oh. St. 296. -In Vermont it is ruled that a married woman is only sub modo a feme sole in dealing with her separate estate; but such estate, whether real or personal, will be liable for her debts contracted in its management, and for its benefit, or for her benefit on the credit of such estate, unless the instrument creating such estate protects it from being charged with such debts. Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20 ; Priest v. Cone, 51 Vt. 495.- Such is the case in Rhode Island when she declares expressly and in writing, that her intention was to charge her separate estate, but otherwise not. Elliot v. Gower, 12 R. I. 79 ; Angell v. Cullough, 12 R. I. 47; see Schouler, Husb. and Wife, sec 246 et seq.-The English rule is stated by Mr. Bispham to be that "the separate property of a married woman being a creature of equity, it follows, that if she has the power to deal with it, she has the woman, of a formal separate instrument of indebtedness, has been held evidence of an intention on her part in this way to bind her separate estate,1 and an assignee with notice is bound by such action on her part2 But unless the consideration of the obligation passes to the married woman herself, the intention to bind her separate estate, such is the better opinion, must appear on the document, to subject her separate estate to liability for the payment.3 Whether the engagement was made in reference to the wife's separate estate, is a matter to be determined from all the circumstances of the particular case; and, as we have seen, the inference is peculiarly strong where it appears that the wife is living apart from her husother power incident to property in general, viz., the power of contracting debts to be paid out of it; and equity will lay hold of the separate estate as the only means by which those debts can be satisfied." Bispham's Eq. sec 102. This view has been accepted in numerous courts in the United States. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 119 ; Batch-elder v. Sargent, 47 N. H. 265 ; Frary v. Booth, 37 Vt. 78; Welland v. East-ham, 15 Gray, 328 ; Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 175 ; Wells v. Thorman, 37 Conn. 318; Gardner v. Gardner, 7 Paige, 112; Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265 ; Ballin v. Dillaye, 37 N. Y. 35 ; Gosman v. Cruger, 69 N. Y. 87 ; Johnson v. Cummins, 1 C. E. Green, 99 ; Van Kirk v. Skillman, 5 Vroom, 109 ; Leaycraft v. Hedden, 3 Green Ch. 512; Perkins v. Elliott, 8 C. E. Green, 529; Johnson v. Vail, 1 McCarter, N. J. 423 ; Cooke v. Husbands, 11 Md. 492 ; Buchanan v. Turner, 26 Md. 5 ; Vizon-neau v. Pegram, 2 Leigh, 183 ; Penn v. Whitehead, 17 Grat. 503 ; Greenough v. Wigginton, 2 Greene, Iowa, 435 ; Harris v. Harris, 7 Ired. Eq. 111; Coleman v. Wooley, 10 B. Mon. 320; Fears v. Brooks, 12 Ga. 200 ; Dallas v. Heard, 32 Ga. 604; Gunter v. Williams, 40 Ala. 572; Whitesides v. Cannon, 23.

Mo. 457 ; Schafroth v. Ambs, 46 Mo. 114 ; Kimm v. Weipport, 46 Mo. 532 ; Lewis v. Yale, 4 Fla. 418; Miller v. Newton, 23 Cal. 554; Hutchinson v. Underwood, 27 Tex. 255. That a more restricted view is maintained in several state courts will be hereafter seen.

1 Bispham's Eq. sec 102; Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. Ap. 274; Shattock v. Shattock, L. R. 2 Eq. 182; Batchelder v. Sargent. 47 N. H. 262 ; Leaycraft v. Hedden, 3 Green, Ch. 512 ; Perkins v. Elliott, 8 C. E. Green, 529 ; Phillips v. Graves, 20 Oh. St. 371 ; Vizonneau v. Pegram, 2 Leigh, 183; Garland v. Pamplin, 32 Grat. 305; Coleman v. Wooley, 10 B. Mon. 320; Ozley v. Ikel-heimer, 26 Ala. 332; Kimm v. Weip-pert, 46 Mo. 532 ; Metropolitan Bank v. Taylor, 62 Mo. 338.

2 Warne v. Routledge, L. R. 18 Eq. 500.

3 Nourse v. Henshaw, 123 Mass. 96 ; Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265 ; 22 N. Y. 450; 68 N. Y. 329 ; Manhattan Co. v. Thompson, 58 N. Y. 80; Johnson v. Cummins, 1 C. E. Green, 97 ; Harrison v. Stewart, 3 C. E. Green, 451; Peake v. La Baw, 21 N. J. Eq. 269 ; Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. C. 437 ; see Schouler on Husb. and Wife, sec 237 et seq.

1 Picard v. Hine, L. R. 5 Ch. Ap. 274 ; Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G. F. & J. 494.

2 Imlay v. Huntington, 20 Conn. 146 ; Metcalf v. Cook, 2 R. I. 355 ; Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle, 231 ; Thomas v. Fol-well, 2 Whart. R. 11 ; Wright v. Brown, 44 Penn. St. 224; Shonk v. Brown, 61 Penn. St. 320 ; Swift v. Castle, 23 111. 209 ; Cookeson v. Toole, 59 111. 515 ; Bressler v. Kent, 61 111. 426; Hume v. Hood, 5 Grat. 374; Harris v. Harris, 7 Ired. Eq. 111 ; Ewing v. Smith, 3 Dessaus. 417 ; Reid v. Lamar, 1 Strobh. Eq. 27 ; Marshall v. Stephens, 8 Hump. 159 ; Bradford v. Greenway, 17 Ala. 797 ; Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456 ; Doty v. Mitchell, 9 Sm. & Iff. 435. "In the authorities just cited," says Mr. Bispham (Eq. 2d ed. sec 103), "it was said, that there is a manifest difference between the legal separate estate which is due to the provisions of the statute, and the equitable separate estate which is the creature of courts of equity ; and this view seems to be taken, also, by the courts in Illinois (Cookeson v. Toole, 59 111. 515 ; Bressler v. Kent, 61 111. 426; Cole v. Van Riper, 44 111. 58 ; Carpenter v. Mitchell, 50 111. 470; Rogers v. Higgins, 48 111. 211) ; and, after some fluctuation, by those in Alabama. See Short v. Battle, 52 Ala. 456 ; overruling Molton v. Martin, 43 Ala. 651 ; Glenn v. Glenn, 47.

Ala. 204, and Denechand v. Berry, 48 Ala. 591 ; see Lippincott v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 767. But a different opinion on the subject has been entertained in other states, and the general tendency of the division is, perhaps, to put estates of both kinds, so far as regards the power of the feme over them, upon the same footing. Willard v. Eastham, 15 Gray, 328 ; Yale v. Dederer, 18 N. Y. 265 ; Ballin v. Dillaye, 37 N. Y. 35 ; Peake v. La Bau, 6 C. E. Green, 282. The South Carolina rule was, however, adopted in Rhode Island (Metcalf v. Cook,2 R. 1.355); Tennessee (Marshall v. Stephens, 8 Hump. 159 ; see, however, Young v. Young, 7 Cold. 461) ; Mississippi (Doty v. Mitchell, 9 Sm. & M. 435) ; Illinois (Swift v. Castle, 23 111. 209 ; Bressler v. Kent, 61 111. 426; overruling Young v. Graff, 28 111. 20) ; and formerly in Maryland (Miller v. Williamson, 5 Md. 219 ; Tarr v. Williams, 4 Md. Ch. 68). It was also recognized, to a limited extent, in Ohio (Machir v. Burroughs, 14 Ohio, N. S. 519)."-That a married woman may bind herself by articles of partnership so far as concerns her separate estate, is argued by Mr. Pollock, citing Lind-ley on Partnership, 1, 86. That she may thus be a partner of her own husband, see Kinkead in re, 3 Biss. 405. 3 Bispham's Eq. sec 104.