Sec 77a

When a married woman contracts for remuneration for her own services, she is, as is said, the meritorious cause of action, and she may sue on the contract, the coverture being no defence on the merits, though in some jurisdictions it may be necessary on technical grounds to join the husband in the suit.4 It is also "settled law that a married woman, though incapable of making a contract, is capable of having a chose, in action conferred upon her, which will survive to her on the death of her husband, unless he shall have interfered by doing some act to reduce it into possession."5 And while a married woman cannot, at common law, sue for the value of goods supplied by her, or for money lent by her, all chattels in her possession being the personal property of her husband,6 she may sue for money received by a third party to her use, which money has not been reduced in her husband's possession.7 But reduction into possession by the husband divests her of her interest. Thus, even where the husband opens an account with a banker in his wife's name, the money deposited remains his property.8 And when an account is opened by the husband in his own and his wife's names, with authority to the wife to draw, the balance on his death remains his property.9

May contract for services, but not for goods or money.

1 Butler v. Cumpston, L. R. 7 Eq. 16 ; Roberts v. Watkins, 46 L. J. Q. B. 552 ; Leake, 2d ed. 557.

2 Arnold V. Woodhams, L. R. 16 Eq. 29 ; Thomas v. Price, 46 L. J. C. 761; Stanley v. Stanley, L. R. 7 C. D. 589.

3 Jessel, M. R., Cooper v. Macdonald, L. R. 7 Ch. D. 293.

4 Leake, 2d ed. 560; Weller v. Baker, 2 Wils. 423 ; Bendix v. Wakeman, 12.

M. & W. 97 ; Guyard v. Sutton, 3 C. B. 153.

5 Per cur. in Dalton v. R. R., 13 C. B. 474.

6 King v. Basingham, 8 Mod. 199 ; Bird v. Peagram, 13 C. B. 639.

7 Fleet v. Perrine, L. R. 4 Q. B. 500; Jones v. Cuthbertson, L. R. 8 Q. B. 504.

8 Lloyd v. Pughe, L. R. 8 Ch. 88.

9 Marshal v. Crutwell, L. R. 20 Eq. 328.

Sec 78

It has been argued, that if a married woman make an engagement expressly in reference to a separate estate hereafter to be acquired, this engagement binds such estate, at least by estoppel; and if she is capable of binding her separate estate, by engagement, to be enforced in equity, it is also argued that she cannot be denied this capacity in reference to an estate to which she is entitled, but on which she has not yet entered.1 But the better view is that she cannot, by mere estoppel, unless there be fraud, convey that which she could not pass by deed.2 And it is now settled by the court of appeal in England, that a married woman's covenant, purporting to bind any separate estate to which she was entitled at the time, does not bind after-acquired separate estate; and a judgment on such covenant binds only so much of the separate estate to which she was entitled at the date of the covenant, as is in existence belonging to her at the date of the judgment.3