Sec 421

Champerty (campi partitio), which is an offence by the English common law, is an agreement for the division between the parties of a particular piece of property to be sued for by one of them.1 The offence, in other words, consists in a speculation in lawsuits, it being agreed between the parties to divide the proceeds of a suit to be brought by one of them. Should a number of parties combine in such a way, public justice, it is argued, would be imperilled by the pressure which would be thus brought to bear on behalf of the suit so supported; and the danger would in most cases be aggravated by the fact that those who had this contingent interest in the success of the suit would work out of sight, or, if seen, would not be known to be parties in interest.2 Several old English statutes make champerty and maintenance (to be presently denned) indictable; but these statutes are regarded merely as affirmations of the common law, and virtually absorbed in that law, so that with the modification of the common law the statutes have become modified.3 In Missouri the statutes are not in force, though the principle will be applied in all cases where there is a vexatious stirring up of litigation.4 The statutes are not in force in Vermont,5 in Iowa,6 in Delaware,7 in Tennessee,8 and in New Jersey.9 In New York there is a special statute limiting the rule,10 while Massachusetts and Rhode Island adopt the principle of the statutes as common law.11 - An agreement by a third party, in consideration of a share in the proceeds of the suit, to furnish information and evidence to support it, is against the policy of the law, and will not be enforced. "Besides the objection that a stranger has acquired an interest to carry on the litigation, the bargain to procure evidence for the consideration of a money payment has a direct and manifest tendency to pervert the course of justice."1 This is eminently the case with regard to speculations in real estate.2 It is otherwise, however, when a party interested makes such an agreement.3 But generally contracts for the fomenting of litigation, enabling a party unwilling himself to bear the expense of a suit to undertake it under the auspices of others, are invalid as against the policy of the law. If he be so poor that if he be not aided justice may be defeated, then it is not improper to afford him aid to vindicate his rights;4 but where he is not in such straits, and where the object of the aid is to stimulate him to a litigation which he would not otherwise encounter, then the contract is one which the courts should not enforce.8 Whether a contract is champertous is determined by the law of the place of performance.6

Champerty is illegal sharing of profits of litigation.

1 Steph. Dig. C. L. art. 141; Wh. Cr. L. 8th ed. sec 1853; see Broughton v. Mitchell, 64 Ala. 210.

2 See De Houghton v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. 164.

3 Pechell v. Watson, 8 M. & W. 691. Whether these statutes are in force in Pennsylvania is reserved in Chester Co. v. Barker, 97 Penn. St. 455. It has, however, been generally held that stat. 33 Ed. I. ch. 3 is not in force in that state. Roberts' Dig. 96; Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts, 334; Gray v. Packer, 4 W. & S. 17; 6 Penn. L. J. 309; Sharswood Leg. Ethics, 102.

4 Durke v. Harper, 2 Mo. Ap. 1; 66 Mo. 51.

5 Danforth v. Sweeter, 28 Vt. 490.

6 Wright v. Meek, 3 Greene (Iowa), 472.

7 Bayard v. McLane, 3 Har. 139.

8 Sherley v. Riggs, 11 Humph. 53.

9 Schomp v. Schenck, 40 N. J. L. 195.

10 Hassenfrats v. Kelly, 13 John. 466; Etheridge v. Cromwell, 8 Wend. 629.

11 Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415; Lathrop v. Bank, 9 Met. 489; Martin v. Clark, 8 R. I. 389.

1 Per cur. in Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369; cited Leake, 2d ed. 732; Sprye v. Porter, 7 E. & B. 58; Reynell v. Sprye, 1 D. M. G. 660; De Houghton v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. 164; Wellington v. Kelly, 84 N. Y. 543; Hollo-way v. Lowe, 7 Port. 488.

2 Whitaker v. Cone, 2 John. Ca. 58.; McGoon v. Ankeny, 11 111. 558; Dexter v. Nelson, 6 Ala. 68.

3 Wellington v. Kelly, 84 N. Y. 543; see Findon v. Parker, 11 M. & W. 675; infra, sec 422 et seq.

4 Perine v. Dunn, 3 John. Ch. 508; State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey, 379, and cases cited Wald's Pollock, 303.

5 See Leake, 2d ed. 295; Reynell v. Sprye, 1 D. M. G. 680-6; Edwards v. Parkhurst, 21 Vt. 472; Brinley v. Whiting, 5 Pick. 355; Whitaker v. Cone, 2 John. Ca. 58; Dunbar v. Mc-.

Fall, 9 Hump. 505. Under local statutes the purchase of land in suit, knowing it to be in suit, for speculative purposes, and not in pursuance of a prior business bargain, may be void; see Jackson v. Ketchum, 8 Johns. 482; Jackson v. Andrews, 7 Wend. 152. It is otherwise, as we will see, as to sales of personal property. Infra, sec 424 et seq.

6 Supra, sec 361. It is also settled in England that the participation of others, under a contract for division of the proceeds, in the furtherance of a suit, is no defence to the suit, nor ground for injunction. Leake, 2d ed. 731; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432; Elborough v. Ayres, L. R. 10 Eq. 367. In Courtright v. Burns (U. S. Cir. Ct. Mo. 1881), 14 Cent. L. J. 89, it was held that the fact of the existence of a.