Sec 202a

The conclusions above stated may be sustained on the ground of estoppel. "When the mistake is that of one party alone, it must be borne in mind that the general rule of law is, that whatever a man's real intention may be, if he manifests an intention to another party, so as to induce the latter to act upon it in making a contract, he will be estopped from denying that the intention as manifested was his real intention."4 In other words, supposing that there is no fraud or imposition, a party is estopped from denying his expressions were correct. A unilateral mistake of expression, therefore, of one party, cannot be set up by him as a ground for rescinding a contract or for resisting his enforcement, when his language was accepted by the other party in its natural sense.5. But when the blunder made by the proposer is obvious, an acceptor will not be permitted, by catching it up, to take an unfair advantage. The defendant, for instance, sent a written memorandum, offering to sell certain property for 1100£., he meaning to have written 1200l., as appeared by a hurried calculation of items made by him on a separate piece of paper which he retained. On receiving the acceptance, he at once saw the error, and notified the other party, who knew the actual value of the property. Specific performance was refused,6 and the case is subsequently stated by James, L. J., as one "where a person snapped at an offer which he must have perfectly well known to he made by mistake."1

Party estopped from denying that his expressions were correct.

1 lb.sec 1044.

2 Daniel's Trusts in re, L. R. 1 Ch. D. 375 ; Bird's Trusts in re, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 214; Greenwood v. Greenwood, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 954 ; Redfern v. Bryn-ing, L. R. 6 Ch. D. 133; see infra, sec 629 et seq., 634.

3 Infra, sec 205 ; Nowlin v. Pyne, 47 Iowa, 293. As to ciphers and abbreviations, see infra, sec 634 ; as to terms of art, infra, sec 630.

4 Benj. on Sales, 3d Am. ed. sec 56, 780. citing Lord Wensleydale in Freeman v. Cooke, 2 Ex. 654; Doe v. Oliver, 2 Smith's L. C. 671; Cornish v. Abing-ton, 4 H. & R. 549 ; Van Toll v. R. R., 12 C. B. N. S. 75 ; and see supra, sec 196 ; Bigelow on Est., 3d ed. 530-544; and as to negligence, infra, sec 1043 et seq.

5 Ibid., 2 Ch. Cont., 11th Am. ed. 1022-23; Wh. on Ev. sec 1085-7; Zuchtmann v. Roberts, 109 Mass. 53. That false representations may be estoppels, see infra, sec 234.

6 Webster v. Cecil, 30 Beav. 62.

Sec 203

It may be, and often is, that time is inserted in a contract, not for the purpose of binding the parties to it arbitrarily and irrevocably, but in order to fix a date. In such cases it is admissible to show by parol what was the time actually intended.2 And even where no such evidence is adduced, a court of equity will refuse to permit a forfeiture of rights to take place in consequence of want of punctuality of performance, but will regard a performance at a subsequent date, provided the terms be reasonable, as a fulfilment of the duty.3 But it is practicable to make time the essence of a contract, in which case, if it is intentionally so fixed, it cannot be varied by parol, or its obligatory force weakened by construction.4-As will be hereafter seen, when no time is fixed for performance, a reasonable time is implied ;5 when a time is designated, the full limit is to be allowed;6 a promisor disabling himself may make himself liable to suit before day fixed ;7 "forthwith" and similar terms are to be construed according to context;8 a dilatory party cannot exact a forfeiture for lapse of time,9and a nominal date is presumed to be right until the contrary is proved.10

Mistake in the expression of time may be corrected.

1 Tamplin v. James, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 221, cited Pollock, 3d ed. 450. And see supra, sec 196, infra, sec 754, to the effect that negligent error does not necessarily estop. As to fraudulent estoppel, see infra, sec 234.

A late German commentator (Thon, Rechtsnorm, p. 367), in speaking of the undesigned efficacy of words, says: "It is as it is in fairy tales. Only he who knows the magical word can call the spirit. If the spirit is to be evoked, the catch-word must be uttered. But the spirit also appears to one who utters the catch-word improvidently." -I may not intend to bind myself, but bind myself I do if I utter words by which another is led to do acts to his detriment.

2 Wh. on Ev. sec 969, 977,1015, 1026 ; infra, sec 881 et seq.

3 Infra, sec 882 ; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265 ; Lennon v. Napper, 2 Sch. & L. 684; Parkin v. Thorold, 16 Beav. 59 ; Taylor v. Longworth, 14 Pet. 172; Barnard v. Lee, 97 Mass. 92 ; and other cases cited infra, sec 882 et seq., and Wald's Pollock, 444.

4 Infra, sec 887 ; Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 265 ; Parkin v. Thorold, 16 Beav. 59 ; Taylor v. Longworth, 14 Pet. 172.

5 Infra, sec 882.

6 Infra, sec 884.

7 Infra, sec 885 a; see sec 606, 712.

8 Infra, sec 886.

9 Infra, sec 890.

10 Infra, sec 893.