Sec 885

When goods are to be delivered within a certain period, the vendor may deliver on the last day of that period, at the latest business hour, though the purchaser will not be obliged to attend at his store at an unreasonable hour for the purpose of receiving the goods.7 - As a general rule, the performance of a business contract When time is fixed for performance, full limit allowed.

Last business hour permissible may be delayed to the last business hour of the day;1 that of a personal service at any hour before midnight.2

1 Russell V. Ormsbee, 10 Vt. 274.

2 See infra, sec 895.

3 Leake, 2d ed. 834; Leftley V. Mills, 4 T. R. 170; Burbridge V. Manners, 3 Camp. 193.

4 Harris V. Blen, 16 Me. 175; see Oatman V. Walker, 33 Me. 67; Erskine V. Erskine, 13 N. H. 436; as to meaning of month, see infra, sec 896.

5 Startup V. MacDonald, 6 M. & G. 593; see infra, sec 895.

6 Conawingo Co. V. Cunningham, 75 Penn. St. 138; Cleveland V. Sterrett, 70 Penn. St. 204.

7 Infra, sec 980; Startup V. McDonald,.

6 M. & G. 593. See Leigh V. Paterson, 8 Taunt. 540, in which it was held that where the delivery was to be in "all December," the vendor had the whole month in which to deliver, and that the damages on non-delivery were to be assessed at the value of the goods on the last day of the month. In Sweet V. Harding, 19 Vt. 587, a separation of grain payable "in January," was held too late when made in the evening of the last day of January, though in the place designated, the purchaser not being notified.

1 Savary V. Goe, 3 Wash. C. C. 140; Aldrich V. Albee, 1 Greenl. 120; Tier-nan V. Napier, 5 Yerg. 410. See infra, sec 980.

2 Thomas V. Hayden, cited 19 Vt. 589; but see Sweet V. Harding, 19 Vt. 587.

In Startup V. Macdonald, 6 M. & G. 625, Parke, B., said: "Where a thing is to be done anywhere, a tender at a convenient time before midnight is sufficient; where the tender is to be done in a particular place, and where the law implies a duty on the party to whom the thing is to be done to attend, that attendance is to be by daylight, and a convenient time before sunset."

In Croninger V. Crocker, 62 N. Y. 151, the agreement was to furnish hogs to be delivered ' 'the first half of August, 1871, to be weighed at G.'s scales near B. It was held that the delivery was to be at the scales, and might be deferred until the 16th of August, down to the noon of which day the hogs should be kept at the scales; and that it was not enough for the hogs to be at the scales a part of the forenoon of that day."

In Bass V. White, 65 N. Y. 565, the price of a load of coal was to be paid on receipt of a bill of lading, which was presented in New York on Saturday, five minutes before three o'clock. Some discussion arose as to a set-off, by which the parties were detained until after three o'clock. The plaintiffs then offered a cheque for the purchase-money, which the defendants declined to take, on the ground that it was too late for banking hours. It was held that the plaintiffs' tender on the succeeding Monday morning was in time.

And see infra, sec 980.

That fractions of a day will be recognized in cases where this is required by substantial justice was ruled by the supreme court of the United States in 1882, in Louisville V. Savings Bank, 13 Rep. 193; and it was consequently held that the second section of article fourteen of the Illinois constitution, prohibiting railroad donations by municipalities, which went into operation on July 2, 1870, did not invalidate municipal bonds issued on behalf of a railroad corporation, pursuant to an election held on that day at an hour prior to the closing of the polls of the general election at which the people of the state voted on the adoption of the constitution; the bonds, so issued, to be applied in discharge of a donation voted in 1868 to be paid by special tax. In the opinion of the court, Harlan, J., adopted the following from Lawrence, J., in Grosvenor V. Magill, 37 Ill. 240: " It is true that for many purposes the law knows no division of a day; but whenever it becomes important to the ends of justice, or in order to decide upon conflicting interests, the law will look into fractions of a day as readily as into the fractions of any other unit of time. 2 Blackst. Com. 140, notes. The rule is purely one of convenience, which must give way whenever the rights of parties require it. There is no indivisible unity about a day which forbids us, in legal proceedings, to consider its component hours, any more than about a month, which restrains us from regarding its constituent days. The law is not made of such unreasonable and arbitrary rules." "The views expressed in the last case," continues Harlan, J., "are consistent with sound reason and public policy. They accord with our own judgment, and are in line with the settled course of decisions in other courts. Arnold V. United States, 9 Craneh, 119; Richardson's case, 2 Story, 571; Lapeyre V. United States, 17 Wall. 198; United States V. Norton, 97 U. S. 170; Burgess V. Salmon, ib. 381; Kennedy V. Palmer, 6 Gray, 316; People V. Clark, 1 Cal. 406; Roe dem. Wrangham V. Hersey, 3 Wils. 274; Combe V. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1423. 1434."