Sec 889

The parties may, also, by agreement provide that, unless an article be delivered or labor done by a specific time, there shall be no compensation; and, when the time goes to the substance of the contract, this is a bar to the suit.4 Contracts for developing mines, in which the value of the contract depends upon prompt action, are illustrations of the rule that time may become essential, from the circumstances of the case.5

Forfeiture may be fixed by agreement.

Benedict V. Lynch, 1 Johns. Ch. 375; Huffmann V. Hummer, 17 N. J. Eq. 263; Stow V. Russel, 36 Ill. 18; Bomier V. Caldwell, 8 Mich. 463; Steele V. Branch, 40 Cal. 3.

1 Leake, 2d ed. 846; Bisph. Eq. 2d ed. sec 393; Seton V. Slade, 7 Ves. 274, and note9 to same in 2 Wh. & Tud. L. C.; Parkin V. Sherold, 16 BeaV. 59; Webb V. Hughes, L. R. 10 Eq. 281; Patrick V. Milner, L. R. 2 C. P. D. 342; Barnard V. Lee, 97 Mass. 94; Ives V. Armstrong, 5 R. I. 567; King V. Ruckman, 5 C. E. Green, 316; S. C, 6 C. E. Green, 599; Patchin V. Lam-born, 31 Penn. St. 314; Stow V. Russell, 36 Ill. 18. Otherwise in cases of wilful neglect. Banks V. Haskie, 45 Md. 209; Prestman V. Silljacks, 14 Rep. 331.

2 Seton V. Slade, 7 Ves. 274; Roberts V. Berry, 3 D. M. & G. 284. See generally Snowman V. Harford, 55 Me. 197; Edgerton V. Peckham, 11 Paige, 352; Tiernan V. Roland, 15 Penn. St. 429.

3 Bispham's Eq. sec 364, 389; Seton V. Slade, 7 Ves. 273; Egmont V. Smith, L. R. 6 Oh. D. 475; Malin V. Malin, 1 Wend. 625; King V. Ruckman, 6 C. E. Green, 599; Brewer V. Fleming, 51 Penn. St. 113; Napin V. Darlington, 70 Penn. St. 64.

4 Ripley V. Maclure, 4 Ex. 345; Westerman V. Means, 12 Penn. St. 97; Barnard V. Lee, 97 Mass. 94; Wiswall V. McGown, 2 Barb. 270; Kemp V. Humphreys, 13 Ill. 573.

5 Bisph. Eq. 2d ed. sec 393; Macbryde V. Weekes, 22 BeaV. 533; Parker V. Frith, 1 Sim. & St. 199, n.

Sec 890

A party who has himself encouraged delay, or who has been otherwise negligent, cannot inflict on another a forfeiture consequent on the latter failing to come up to time.1 The extension of negotiations by one party beyond the time fixed precludes him from taking advantage of the delay of the other party, so far as that delay is not excessive.2 Thus, in a case in Connecticut in 1880, a purchaser of land at $700, having failed to pay at the date stipulated, afterwards made payments from time to time, which were accepted by the vendor without objection, until nearly a year after the date, when only ten dollars remained due, which sum was then tendered but refused. It was held that it was then too late for the vendor to refuse specific performance on the ground that time was of the essence of the contract.3 On the other hand, a party who delusively institutes a negotiation which he intends to be fruitless cannot set up the negotiation as precluding the other party from insisting on his rights.4 And, when negotiations have ceased, they cannot be set up as excusing either party from the liabilities imposed on him, though a party may by delay, after the closing of negotiations, preclude himself from claiming specific performance.5