I. That the lease or agreement in writing, bearing date the 7th day of April, 1919, marked Exhibit "A" in said plaintiff's bill of complaint, was made and executed by the parties thereto on Sunday, the 6th day of April, 1919, and was never subsequently ratified or confirmed by said defendant on any secular day, and is therefore, without binding effect upon either party thereto, is null and void.

II. That the claimed oral contract made between said plaintiff Lyle and said defendant was void under the statute of frauds of this state, and that there was not such a part performance of said oral agreement, and not such a meeting of the minds of the parties in the terms of such oral agreement that will justify a court of equity in enforcing the performance thereof.

III. That the interest in the property mentioned in said bill of said intervening plaintiffs is dependent upon the rights of the plaintiff, William Lyle, to obtain the performance of said alleged oral contract, and they do not appear to have any equities independent thereof, and their bill of complaint is dismissed with cost to be taxed against them, according to the rules and practice of this court.

IV. The clerk of this court is ordered to pay to said defendant the sum of one hundred fifty ($150.00) dollars, paid by said plaintiff, William Lyle, in court for the rent of said premises due on August 1st, 1919, and to take his receipt therefor.

V. The injunction issued by this court against said defendant restraining him from selling, assigning, mortgaging, or otherwise disposing of the land mentioned in said bill is hereby dissolved, and the bill of complaint of said plaintiff, William Lyle, and his amendments thereto are dismissed with costs to be taxed against him according to the rules and practice of this court.

ERNEST A. SNOW, Dated October 27, 1919. Circuit Judge.

(i) Authorities Cited by Plaintiff.-Brief for the Plaintiff.

Even if the writ of contract was actually executed on Sunday, equity will refuse to permit defendant to take advantage of that fact because of his own unconscionable conduct.

1. To deny the contract would be a fraud upon the plaintiff.

Equity will enforce a promise where a fraudulent omission to have it reduced to writing has lead to an irretrievable change of position, citing Lamb v. Hinman, 46 Mich. 112, on the proposition that the court had confidence in the testimony of witnesses who testified to the execution of the lease on Sunday, witnesses personally known to the court and in whom the court has confidence with respect to their veracity, counsel for plaintiff cites Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2569, and 16 Cyc. 51, as authority that no personal knowledge or acquaintance with witnesses the court may have gained outside of the courtroom could, under the established rules of evidence, be permitted to influence it.

Plaintiff also cites Bushman v. Faltis, 184 Mich. 172, as to the validity of the option of purchase; Pearson v. Gardner, 202 Mich. 360, Meyer v. Haddon, 148 Mich. 488, on part performance.

Under the principle that equity will enforce a promise where a fraudulent omission to have it reduced to writing has led to an irretrievable change of position, counsel cites Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., 4th Ed., Sec. 2253; Pete v. Pete, 77 Cal. 106, 11 Am. St. Rep. 244; Story's Eq. Jur., 768; Atherly on Marriage, 85; Green v. Green, 34 Kan. 740, 55 Am. Rep. 256.

2. Equity will relieve against a mistake of law accompanied by unequitable conduct on the part of one knowing and taking advantage of the mistake, citing Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., Sec. 847; Carpenter v. Detroit Forging

Co., 191 Mich. 45 (see cases there cited); Berry v. Whitney, 40 Mich. 65; South Carolina v. Gilbreth, 208 Fed. 899, at page 923; Bispham's Eq., par. 185; Faxon v. Baldwin, 114 N. W. 40; quoting also from 2 Warvelle on Vendors, par. 780, as follows:

"But where there has been a mistake on one side and fraud upon the other, where the guilty party, though not mistaken himself, well understood the other party's error, and knowing the same executed the contract intending to reap advantage from such error, while the mistake is unilateral, yet the fraud of the other party will justify equitable intervention equally as though such guilty party had made affirmative representations to induce the error."

In Haviland v. Willetts, 141 N. Y. 35, 35 N. E. 958, it appeared that plaintiff supposed that one of the legacies in his wife's will went to the children of the beneficiary when in reality plaintiff was entitled under the law to a share in it. Plaintiff released his right in the estate for a sum much less than it was actually worth to one who knew his legal rights and although defendant's counsel had explained the situation to plaintiff in techincal language and where it did not appear that plaintiff understood his rights, the court held that he might on that showing, have the instrument set aside. The court said:

"It is equally well settled that where there is a mistake of law on one side, and either positive fraud on the other, or inequitalbe, unfair, and deceptive conduct, which tends to confirm the mistake and cancel the truth, it is the right and duty of equity to award relief. All the cases which deny a remedy for mere mistake of law on one side are careful to add the qualification that there must be no improper conduct on the other."

Silliman v. Wing, 7 Hill 159; Flynn v. Hurd, 22 N. E. 1109; Vander-beck v. City of Rochester, 25 N. E. 408.

3. To permit defendant to deny the contract would be against public policy.

In the application of the laws, a court of equity will not permit them to be made instruments of fraud and will refuse to permit a party to take advantage of them when because of his own inequitable conduct to do so would be clearly against public policy.

Cardwell v. Kelly, 95 Va. 570, 28 S. E. 953; Clarke v. Littlepage, 4th Rand. (Va.) 368; Ten Eyck v. R. R. Co., 114 Mich. 494.

(j) Brief for Defendant.-The acts of part performance in this case were clearly insufficient.

Beemer v. Hughes, 179 Mich. 110.

1. A contract made on Sunday is illegal and void although dated on another day. International Text Book v. Ohl, 150 Mich. 132; Acme Elec. Co. v. VanDerbeck, 127 Mich. 345; Harvey v. Petrie, 100 Mich. 192; Ar-buckle v. Reaume, 96 Mich. 243; Adams v. Hamell, 2 Doug. 73.

2. The fact that the vendee entered into possession and made improvements thereon and payments on the purchase price will not validate such a contract. Berston v. Gilbert, 180 Mich. 643.