The court has had the advantage of seeing the witnesses upon the stand with reference to this matter, and has no hesitancy in arriving at the conclusion of fact which it does upon this particular matter.

It is quite apparent to the court that the enhancement of the value of this real estate has considerable to do with the conduct of both parties in the case. In fact it is quite apparent to the court that real estate men are very anxious to have Mr. Lyle put in position so that he can transfer the property to them, and the same situation exists with reference to Mr. Munson. However that may be, this case is not to be determined upon the question of whether or not the real estate has enhanced in value, but as to the rights of the parties, irrespective of the value of the land, and irrespective of whether or not real estate men are anxious to buy it from whichever party is successful in the case.

The plaintiff contends that there was an oral contract, and that it has substantiated that oral contract by a preponderance of the evidence in the case; that that oral contract has been partly performed, and that that oral contract consisted of an agreement between Mr. Lyle and Mr. Munson whereby Mr. Lyle agreed, or whereby Mr. Munson agreed at any time within a period of two years to sell this property to Mr. Lyle for the sum of thirty-five hundred dollars, and that in addition to that he agreed that he should have the right to remain upon the premises, as his tenant, for the period of two years, at a stipulated rental of three hundred dollars per year.

The court cannot come to the conclusion that the plaintiff in this case has shown such a contract as would entitle it to a specific performance, by the decree of the court. From the testimony of the witnesses, from the opportunity the court has had of seeing the witnesses upon the stand, and observing their conduct and observing the manner in which they gave their testimony, I am now satisfied that the minds of the parties met in such a contract as would be certain and definite to the extent that the court at this time would be warranted in decreeing a specific performance of this particular contract. Mr. Munson testified that he had no agreement with him whereby he was to convey it to him at any time during the two years of his occupancy of the premises. I believe Mr. Munson's testimony, I am satisfied that that was his idea of the situation. If that was not the idea of the plaintiff, the minds of the parties did not seem to meet on any particular contract which permitted the plaintiff at any time during the period of two years to pay thirty-five hundred dollars and that Mr. Munson, the defendant, would deed the place to him.

A contract, to be specifically performed, must be definite, must be certain. The rights of the party who is asking that the contract be specifically performed must have been in some way seriously interfered with. I am not satisfied that this man went into possession of the place with the idea that he was going to purchase it. His apparent idea in entering possession of the place was as a renter. He was a renter in the city. It may have placed him a little closer to his work that he was doing. But his principal motive in going into possession of the place was his idea of occupying the premises as a renter, is the opinion of the court from the evidence in the case.

The court therefore finds that there is no written contract as binding upon the parties. That there was no oral contract made between the parties to warrant the court in granting the relief asked for by the plaintiff, viz., a specific performance, and the defendant will prepare a decree in the case dismissing the bill of complaint filed by the plaintiff with taxable costs to be awarded to the defendant.

Mr. Lamson: May we include in that the interpleader bill that was filed here by Mr. Harris? Mr. Harris has interpleaded; it has been tried out by the same statement of facts here.

The Court: I don't know about that. What about that?

Mr. Lamson: An interpleader bill, where they allege the same things, practically, as the others, only they include the fact that they may be protected by the decree of this court as to the specific performance of the contract. Their rights stand or fall on the main case, as I understand it.

The Court: You mean, Mr. Harris has interpleaded here?

Mr. Lamson: Yes; an interpleader's bill on the part of Mr. Harris, where he interpleads and-

The Court: Who is his attorney?

Mr. Robert H. Cook: I am. Cook & Cook.

The Court: It may all be dismissed, all of them under the decree of the court. The relief is denied.

Mr. Robert Cook: We move the court for the right to have a decree entered in favor of the plaintiffs in this case along the line of Mr. Mun-son's testimony, which the court found to be correct, viz.: That the payment was to be made at the end of the two years.

The Court: No, I don't think that to be the fact, Mr. Cook.

Mr. Cook: That was stated in the opinion, may it please the court.

The Court: No; I said that was his idea of it. In order to make a contract the minds of the parties must meet. He thought it was to be paid at the end of two years, and the other man didn't. Your request will be denied.

(h) Decree of the Court.-(Caption.) At a session of said court held at the Court House of the City of Saginaw in said county on the 27th day of October, 1919.

Present: Hon. Ernest A. Snow, Circuit Judge.

This cause came on be heard on the 9th day of October, 1919, upon a bill of complaint filed therein by said plaintiff, and upon bill of complaint filed therein by the intervenors, and issue therein being formed by answers of said defendant, and proofs having been taken in open court by stipulation of parties; the said plaintiff and intervenors, being represented by Cook & Cook, as their attorneys, and said defendant by Walter J. Lamson and Bird J. Vincent, as his attorneys, and after listening to said proofs and argument of the respective attorneys, and upon due consideration thereof, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, and this court, by virtue of the authority therein vested, doth order, adjudge and decree as follows: