(j) Thus, in Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 1, it was held, that masters and owners of vessels, who undertake to carry goods for hire, are liable as common carriers, whether the transportation be from port to port within the State, or beyond sea, at home or abroad; except so far as they are exempted by the exceptions in the contract of charter-party, or bill of lading, or by statute. See also Kemp v. Coughtry, 11 Johns. 107; Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410; Parker v. Flagg, 26 Me. 181; Hastings v. Pepper, 11 Pick. 41; Allen v. Sewall, 2 Wend. 827; s. c. 6 id. 836; McArthur v. Sears, 21 id. 190, overruling Aymar v. Astor, 6 Cowen, 266; Commander-in-Chief, 1 Wallace, 43.

(k) Harrington v. Lyles, 2 Nott & McC. 68; DeMott v. Laraway, 14 Wend. 225; Parsons v. Hardy, id. 216; Spencer v. Daggett, 2 Vt. 92.

(l) Arnold v. Halenbake, 6 Wend. 83.

(m) Gordon v. Buchanan, 6 Yerg. 71; Turney v. Wilson, 7 id. 341.

(n) Smith v. Seward, 3 Penn. St. 342; Pomeroy v. Donaldson, 6 Mo. 36; Cohen v. Hume, 1 McCord, 489; Fisher v. Clis-bee, 12 Ill. 344. See, as to the duties of ferrymen in the preparation and management of their boats, Willoughby v. Hor-ridge, 16 E. L. & E. 437; s. c. 12 C. B. 742; White v. Winnisimmet Co. 7 Cush. 166. See also Wilson v. Hamilton, 4 Ohio 8t 722; Griffith v. Cave, 22 Cal. 634.

(o) Littlejohn v. Jones, 2 McMullan, 866.

(p) This was so decided in the case of Babcock v. Herbert, 3 Ala. 392.

(q) Citizens Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat Co. 2 Story, 16.

(r) This rule seems to have been declared for the first time by the Supreme Court of New York, in the case of Caton v. Rumney, 13 Wend. 887. The same question arose again in the same court, in the case of Alexander v. Greene, 8 Hill (N. Y.), 9, and was decided the same way. And Bronson, J., thus stated the sel. (v) But it is not every ship that carries goods for another than her owner that becomes a common carrier. If the owner, or hirer, loads her with his own cargo, and finding some room to spare, receives the goods of another person to fill this room, the ship is no common carrier; nor is she, in our judgment, unless she is what is sometimes called a general ship; that is, offered to the public, as ready to take any goods of any owner to the port to which she is bound. Common carriers by land have usually, if not always, a certain distinct route, not for each particular journey merely, but for all their journeys. That is, they are established and known to the public as carrying upon such a line of transit, and upon no other. This is true also of ships belonging to an established packet line. Such ships would stand upon the same footing as ordinary carriers by land, and there seems to be no reason why the same rules of law should not apply to them. But there is considerable difference between such a ship and a general ship which is put up for a voyage which she never went before, and is never to go again. If the question were wholly unsettled, it might perhaps be doubted whether such a vessel becomes a common carrier; for if she does, it can hardly be denied that she is bound to take the goods of any one who offers them. But the distinction between a regular packet-ship and a general freighting ship for a particular voyage, does not seem to have been taken by the courts. Still, it is usual in all ships for the master to give a bill of lading for goods received, by which he engages to deliver them to *the order of the party from whom he receives them, certain risks excepted. This ancient document, in almost universal use among mercantile nations, undoubtedly determines the rights and duties of the parties, so far as it affects them. Thus, it usually excepts "the perils of the seas;" and then the ship is not responsible for a loss by one of these perils, although it could not be referred to the "act of God."(w)1 And if other exceptions were introduced,

"steamboat was hired * to take a vessel through the ice, it was, in this employment, no common carrier. (s) Nor are steam-tugs and tow-boats whose business it is to tow vessels, common carriers as to the vessels they have in tow. (ss)

In the reign of Charles II. it was decided that a ship sailing on the ocean may be a common carrier; (t) and this decision has since been repeatedly confirmed; (u) and it was also held that an action lay equally against the master and owners of the vesgrounds of the decision: "I think the defendants are not common carriers. They do not receive the property into their custody, nor do they exercise any control over it, other than such as results from the towing of the boats in which it is laden. They neither employ the master and hands of the boats towed, nor do they exercise any authority over them beyond that of occasionally requiring their aid in governing the flotilla. The goods or other property remain in the care and charge of the master and hands of the boat towed. In case of loss by fire or robbery, without any actual default on the part of the defendants, it can hardly be pretended that they would be answerable, and yet carriers must answer for such a loss." This case afterwards, however, came before the Court of Errors, and was overruled. 7 Hill (N. Y.), 533. But upon what principle of law cannot be learned from the opinions delivered. And in the more recent cases of Wells v. Steam Navigation Co. 2 Comst. 207, in the Court of Appeals in the same State, this decision of the Court of Errors is declared to be of no authority, and the former decisions of the Supreme Court are re-established. The same rule is declared in the case of Leonard v. Hendrickson, 18 Penn. St. 40. And Chambers, J., says: "The law of liability of common carriers is one of public policy, and is to be maintained. Does this policy extend to the towing of boats and rafts on navigable or other waters? This exercise of power is peculiar and limited. It is generally for short distances, under the eye and observation of the owner, who may, and often does, accompany, by himself or his agents, the property that is towed for him. If there is peril from the sudden rise of the water, or other unforeseen danger, he may terminate the conveyance at any point of safety in his opinion. The cargo on a canal boat towed is property in the care of the conductors of such boat as common carriers, of which they have the exclusive possession, and for which they are responsible, knowing its value and quality. The captain or owner of a boat undertaking to tow a loaded canal boat, we presume, neither inspects the cargo, nor overhauls it. His contract has reference to size, tonnage, and obstruction, to which the power of his boat is to be applied; and the connection of his boat by the chain or rope with the vessel and rafts to be conveyed to a fixed point, is the limited control he has over the property thus transported. It was an apt illustration of the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the court below, in saying: ' Wherein does this case differ in principle from that of a railroad company, or the State furnishing locomotive engines for drawing the cars of individuals over the road? The application of steam power to towing boats, etc., is only distinguishable from horse-power where it can be used in the extent of the power. Would it be pretended that a man who furnished horses and a driver, to tow a boat or raft, was an insurer or a common carrier for the boat to be towed and its contents?" It has been held, however, in Louisiana, that the owners of steam tow-boats are liable as common carriers. See Smith v. Fierce, 1 La. 349; Adams v. New Orleans Steam Tow-Boat Co. 11 La. 46. And Mr. Justice Kane, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in the case of Vanderslice v. Steam Tow-Boat Superior, 13 Law Rep. 309, urged very strongly the reasons for holding them so liable, but he did not decide the point. See The Broeder Trow, 20 E. L. & E. 634; and Arctic, etc Ins. Co. v. Austin, 54 Barb. 569.