(s) Steam Navigation Co. v. Dan-dridge, 8 Gill & J. 248, 320.

(ss) Brown v. Clegg, 63 Penn. St. 51.

(t) Morse v. Slue, 1 Vent. 190, 238.

(u) Boucher v. Lawson, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 84, 194; Boson p. Sandford, 1 Show. 29,101; Goff v. Clinkard, cited in Dale v. Hall, 1 Wils. 282. See also the cases cited ante, p. * 169, note (j).

(v) See also to this point, Boson v. Sandford, 1 Show. 29, 101.

(w) As to what losses come within the exception of "perils of the sea," see the following cases. Williams v. Grant, 1 Conn. 487; McArthnr v. Sears, 21 Wend. 190; Plaisted v. B. & K. Steam

Navigation Co. 27 Me. 132; The Brig Casco, Davies, 184; Gordon v. Buchanan, 5 Yerg. 71; Turney v. Wilson, 7 Yerg. 340; Bailer v. Fisher, 3 Esp. 67; The Schooner Reedside, 2 Sumner, 567; King v. Shepherd, 3 Story, 349; Whitesides v. Thurlkill, 12 Sm. & M. 599; The Rebecca, they would limit the liability accordingly. So also if a ship is hired by a charter-party, to carry goods for the hirers on a certain voyage, or a certain time, and upon certain terms, this charter determines the relation of the parties, and their rights and responsibilities, and not the law of common carriers.

1 As to "thieves," "barratry," or "damage," capable of being covered by insurance, see Taylor v. Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. L. R. 9 Q. B. 546, and Spinetti v. Atlas Steamship Co. 80 N. Y. 71.

Railroad companies have carried goods but for a short period; but wherever they are established they supersede almost all other modes of conveyance; they exist expressly to carry goods and passengers; their termini and routes are definitely fixed; they advertise for freight, offering to the public the terms on which they will receive it.1 It seems strange that a doubt whether they were common carriers could ever have existed; that they are, is, however, abundantly settled by authority. (x) And receivers of railroad companies, if liable as carriers in their own State, may be sued as such in another State. (xx) And trustees for mortgage bondholders, when in possession and running the railroad, are liable as common carriers. (xy)

It has been said that there is no difference between railroads and common highways, as to the care necessary in the construction and management of vehicles used upon them. (y)

Owners * of cars are liable as common carriers, although the State owns and manages the railroads. (z)

There are some peculiarities in the law which regulates the liabilities of railroad companies, which we shall speak of hereafter.

Ware, 188, 210; Van Syckel v. The Ewing, Crabbe, 405; The Newark, 1 Blatchf. C. C. 203; Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 272; Rich v. Lambert, 12 How. 347. As to rata, Laveroni v. Drury, 16 E. L. & E. 510; s. c. 8 Exch. 166. As to the exception of loss by "robbers," or "dangers of the roads," see De Rothschild v. R. M. Steam Packet Co. 14 E. L. & E. 827; s. c. 7 Exch. 734. See post, chapter on the Law of Shipping.

(x) Thomas v. Boston & P. R. R. Co. 10 Met. 472; Pickford v. Grand Junction R. R. Co. 8 M. & W. 372; Norway Plains Co. v. B. & M. R. R. Co. 1 Gray, 263. They are not common carriers of goods by their passenger trains, and evidence of one or two instances in which they have so carried will not prove that they intended to hold themselves out as such carriers, but the presumption will be that the goods were carried in this manner for temporary convenience only. Elkins v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co. 2 Foster (N. H.), 275.

(xx) Paige v. Smith, 99 Mass. 395. (xy) Rogers v. Wheeler, 2 Lans. 486. (y) Beers v. Housatonic R. R. Co. 19 Conn. 566.

(z) Peters v. Rylands, 20 Penn. St. 497. See also Schopman v. B. & W. R. R. Co. 9 Cush. 24. See post, p. * 250.

1 That railroad companies are carriers for hire, and, being engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest, are, unless protected by their charters, subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight, see Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155. Rae v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 14 Fed. Rep. 401, decided that a State may require a railroad to draw cars of other corporations at reasonable times and for reasonable compensation.

Still more recently telegraph companies have been established, and are now very largely employed for the conveyance of messages. Communication by telegraph is so peculiar in its nature, that it must be governed by peculiar laws, nor can they exist as a system until that be created by statutory provisions, or by adjudication. We give the principles and cases which relate to this subject in the chapter on the Law of Telegraphs.