(f) "If a coachman commonly carry goods, and take money for so doing, he will be in the same case with a common carrier, and is a carrier for that purpose, whether the goods are a passenger's or a stranger's." Per Jones, J., in Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Show. 127. See also to the same point, Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. 60; Bechman v. Shouse, 6 Rawle, 170; Clark v. Faxton, 21 Wend. 153; Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio, 145; Merwin v. Butler, 17 Conn. 138. But in Shelden v. Robinson, 7 N. H. 157, it was held, that the driver of a stage-coach, in the general employ of the proprietors of the had been paid in three instances to the conductor of a horse-railway company for carrying merchandise, this was held to be evidence to a jury that the company had assumed the business of common carriers. (ff) Perhaps the tendency * of adjudication now is, to put stage-coaches on the footing of common carriers, as to the goods or parcels they carry. (g)

They are undoubtedly common carriers of passengers on their regular route. But the rule that common carriers of passengers are not liable for injuries caused entirely without fault on their part (which is fully considered post, sect. 14th of this chapter), has been applied to stage-coaches. (gg)

In the reign of James I. the responsibilities of a common carrier of goods by land were held to be applicable to a bargeman; (h) 1 and it has been declared that there is no difference between the carrier by land and the carrier by water. (i) Perhaps this assercoach, and in the habit of transporting packages of money for a small compensation, which was uniform whatever might be the amount of the package, was a bailee for hire, answerable for ordinary negligence, and not subject to the responsibilities of a common carrier; there being no evidence to show him a common carrier, further than the fact that he took such packages of money as were offered. Parker, J., thus stated the grounds of the decision. "It has not been suggested that the proprietors are liable in this case; and the evidence does not show the defendant a common carrier; it does not show him to have exercised the business of carrying packages as a public employment, because his public employment was that of a driver of a stage-coach, in the employ of others. It does not show that he ever undertook to carry goods or money for persons generally, although he may in fact have taken all that was offered, as a matter of convenience; or that he ever held himself out as ready to engage in the transportation of whatever was requested, notwithstanding it may have been usual for him and other drivers to carry it. This was not his general employment, and there is nothing to show that he would have been liable had he refused to take this money, especially as he was in the service of another, and as such servant might have had duties to perform inconsistent with the duty of a common carrier. The amount to be paid for transportation, is also to be considered. A common carrier is an insurer, and entitled to be paid a premium for his insurance. There being no evidence that any compensation was agreed on between these parties, it is to be presumed that the usual compensation was to be paid. The plaintiff might have relied on the usage, upon a claim of payment. And as the turn was small and uniform, whatever might be the amount of money, it would seem very clear that no one committing a package of money to the defendant under such circumstances, and without any special agreement, could have considered him an insurer of safety." See also Bean v. Sturtevant, 8 N. H. 146.

(ff) Levi v. Lynn, etc R. R. Co., 11 Allen, 900.

(g) Peixotti v. McLaughlin, 1 Strob. L. 468. See also Cohen v. Frost, 2 Duer 835.

(gg) Aston v. Heavan, 1 Sneed, 220; Jones v. Boyce, 1 Starkie, 403; Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1. See a peculiar case, in which the owners of a stage-coach were held liable for the acts of ferrymen who were taking the coach across the water, McLean v. Burbank, 11 Minn. 277.

(h) Rich v. Kneeland, Cro. J. (11 Jac. 1), 330; 8. c. Hob. 17.

(i) Per Buller, J., in Proprietors of Trent Navigation Co. v. Wood, 3 Esp. 127; s. c. 4 Dougl. 287; and per Story, J., in King v. Shepherd, 3 Story, 360.

1 A lighterman letting barges to one customer at a time, under a separate agreement with each for the conveyance of goods between such points as such customer wished, was held liable for goods lost without negligence on his part, in Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson. L. R. 9 Ex. 338.

tion is too broad; but the weight of authority in this country seems to have determined that a common carrier of goods by water is responsible for all losses except for those caused by the public enemy, or by those causes provided for by express contract. (j) Canal boatmen are such carriers, (k) and cannot sell property sent by them to market without express authority from the owner. (l) So are boatmen on our rivers. (m) Ferrymen are not common carriers of goods necessarily; but generally become so by usage. (n) And this, although it be a private ferry, not established by the authority of the State. (o) And if it be a public ferry, and the tolls are regulated by law, and the ferryman is appointed by the State executive, and gives bonds with sureties, this does not prevent the liabilities of a common carrier from attaching to him. (p)

Steamboats are the most common kind of inland carriers by water at the present day; and they are undoubtedly common * carriers of goods, if they fall within the general definition. But they may be carriers of passengers only. And they may be carriers of only one particular kind of goods and merchandise. And where a limitation of their business of this kind is declared by them, and made known to a party dealing with them, their liability is limited accordingly. (q) And a steamboat which is usually a common carrier, and is employed in towing a vessel, is not, as to this, a common carrier; but is bound only to ordinary care and skill. (r) So, where such a