The manner in which an agent should sign an instrument for his principal has given rise to some controversy. There has been a tendency to discriminate in this respect; to say, for instance, that if A signs "A for B," this is the signature of A, and he is the contracting party, although he makes the contract at the instance and for the benefit of B. But if he signs "B by A," then it is the contract of B made by him through his instrument A. In the first case A is the principal; in the second, B is the principal and A his agent. But the recent cases, and the best reasons, are, for determining in each instance and with whatever technical inaccuracy the signature is made, from the facts and the evidence, that a party is an agent or a principal, in accordance with the intention of the parties to the contract; if the

75 Me. 184; Lane v. Black, 21 W. Va. 617.] words are sufficient to bear the construction. (r) But it is still requisite that the name of the principal appear as such in the signature of a deed. (s) It has been regarded as an established principle, that no person is held to be the agent of another in making a written contract, unless his agency is stated in the instrument itself, and he therein stipulates for his prin-cipal by name. (t)1 In Stackpole v. Arnold. (u) * Chief

An interesting and important question arose in Buron v. Denman, 2 Exch. 167. The defendant, a naval commander, stationed on the coast of Africa, with instructions for the suppression of the slave trade, went beyond his instructions in firing the baracoons of the plaintiff, a Spanish subject, and carrying off certain slaves of which he was there lawfully possessed. The Lords of the Admiralty and the Secretaries of State for the foreign and colonial departments, respectively, by letter, adopted and ratified what the defendant had done. Held, by Alderson, Platt, and Rolfe, BB., that such ratification was equivalent to a prior command, and rendered what otherwise would have been a trespass on the part of the defendant, an act of state for which the crown was alone responsible.

Parke, B., doubted: "I do not say that I dissent; but I express my concurrence with some doubt, because, on reflection, there appears to me a considerable distinction between the present and the ordinary case of ratification by subsequent authority between private individuals. If an individual ratifies an act done on his behalf, the nature of the act remains unchanged, it is still a mere trespass, and the party injured has his option to sue either; if the crown ratifies an act, the character of the act becomes altered, for the ratification does not give the party injured the double option of bringing his action against the agent who committed the trespass or the principal who ratified it, but a remedy against the crown only (such as it is), and actually exempts from all liability the person who commits the trespass."

(q) Newton v. Bronson, 3 Kern. 587.

1 The ratification of an unauthorized sub-agent's acts hinds the principal equally as if authorized, as in the collection of money, Strickland v. Hudson, 55 Miss. 235; but such ratification does not render the principal liable to pay for the sub-agent's services, Soman v. Brooklyn Ins. Co. 7 Mo. App. 22. See also Grace v. American Ins. Co. 16 Blatchford, 433; Danaher v. Garlock, 33 Mich. 295, as to sub-agents. - K.

Justice Parker considers this rule as applicable to every written contract. But the rule is qualified, if not contradicted, by authorities of much weight, and we do not regard it as of great force except in cases of sealed instruments. (v) Indeed, Chief Justice Parker, in the later case of New England Marine Ins. Co. v. De Wolf,(V) seems to confine it to these cases. The rule stated by Mr. Smith (2 Leading Cases, note to Thompson v. Davenport), is this: parol evidence may always be admitted to charge an unnamed principal; but not to discharge the actual signer. Good reasons may be given for this rule; but it is not sustained by all the authorities. We give in our note the cases on this subject. (x) As between an undischarged principal and

(r) See Mechanics Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326, 3,37; Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. 97; Abbey v. Chase, 6 Cush. 54; Sheldon v. Kendall, 7 Cash. 217; Wilks v. Black, 2 East, 142; Wil-burn v. Larkin, 3 Blackf. 55; Hunter v. Miller, 6 B. Mou. 612; Whitehead v. Reddick, 12 Ired. L. 95; McCall v. Clayton, 1 Busb. L. 422; Sydnor v. Hurd, 8 Tex. 98; Giddens v. Byers' Heirs, 12 id. 75; Johnson v. Smith, 21 Conn. 627; Rogers v. March, 33 Me. 106; Southern Ins. Co. v. Gray, 3 Flor. 262; Hicks v. Hinde, 9 Barb. 528; Chipman v. Foster, 119 Mass. 189; Gadd v. Houghton, 1 Ex. D. 357; Cutler v. Ashland, 121 Mass. 588; Lacy v. Dubuque Lumber Co. 43 Ia. 510. But see Moss v. Livingston, 4 Comst. 208; Lennard v. Robinson, 5 El. & Bl. 125.

(s) Bac. Abr. Leases, I. 10; Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Pet. 319, 350; Hancock v. Yunker," 83 Ill. 208; Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357; Providence v. Miller, 11 R. I. 272. See Beckham v. Drake, 9 M. & W. 79; McClure v. Herring, 70 Mo. 18; Kansas v. Hannibal, etc, R. R. Co. 77 Mo. 180.

(t) Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. 97; Magill v. Hinsdale, 6 Conn. 464; Hancock v. Fairfield, 30 Me. 299.

(u) 11 Mass. 27.

(») Evans v. Wells, 22 Wend. 324; Pinckney v. Hagadorn, 1 Duer, 89; Andrews v. Estes, 2 Fairf. 267. The undisclosed principal, however, can never come in and take advantage of a written contract entered into by his agent in a case where the latter has distinctly described himself in the writing as principal. Lucas v. De La Cour, 1 M. & Sel. 249; 2 Greenl. Evid. § 281. In Humble v. Hunter, 12 Q. B. 310, which was an action of assumpsit on a charter-party executed, not by the plaintiff, but by a third person who in the contract described himself as the "owner" of the ship, it was held, that evidence was not admissible to show that such person was the plaintiff's agent.