The civil law division of all considerations into four species, very clearly stated by Blackstone, is logically exact and exhaustive; (n) but it has never been so far introduced into the com(k) Sehermerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. 139; Veacock v. McCall, Gilpin, 329; Emery v. Chase, 5 Greenl. 232; Howes v. Barker, 3 Johns. 506; Cutter v. Reynolds, 8 B. Mon. 596; Mitchell v. Williamson, 6 Md. 210.

(i) Maigley v. Hauer, 7 Johns. 341.

(j) Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Wms. 203; Peacock v. Monk, 1 Ves. Sen. 127; Filmer v. Gott, 7 Bro. F. C. 70.

(k) Emmons v. Littlefield, 13 Me. 233; Tyler v. Carlton, 7 Greenl. 175; Wallis v. Wallis, 4 Mass. 135, Parsons, C. J.; Quarles v. Quarles, id. 680; Wilkinson v. Scott, 17 id. 249; Hannan v. Hannan, 123 Mass. 441; Farnsworth v. Boardman, 131 Mass. 115; Hebbard v. Haughian, 70 N. Y. 54; Pray V. Rhodes, 42 Minn. 93.

(l) Orms v. Ashley, 4 Pick. 71; Ting-ley v. Cutler, 7 Conn. 291,

(m) Whitney v. Stearns, 16 Me. 394. See Sloan v. Gibson, 4 Mo. 33. Contra, Glen Cove Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrold, 20 Barb. 298.

(n) " These valuable considerations are divided by the civilians into four species: 1. Do, ut des; as when I give money or goods, on a contract, that I shall be repaid money or goods for them again. Of this kind are all loans of money upon bond or promise of repayment: and all sales of goods in which there is either an express contract to pay so much for them, or else the law implies a contract to pay so much as they are worth. 2. The second species is, Facia, ut facias, as when I agree with a man to do his work for him, if he will do mine for me; or if two persons agree to marry together, or to do any other positive acts on both sides. Or it may be to forbear on one side in consideration of something done on the other, as, that in consideration A, the tenant, will repair his house, B, the landlord, will not sue him for waste. Or it may be for mutual forbearance on both sides; as, that in consideration that A will not trade to Lisbon, B will not trade to Marseilles; so as to avoid interfering with each other. 3. The third species of consideration is, Facio, ut des, when a man agrees to perform anything for a price, either specifically mentioned, or left to the determination of the law to set a value to it. And when a servant hires himself to his master for certain wages, or an agreed sum of money, here the servant contracts to do his master's service, in order to earn that specific sum. Otherwise, if he be hired generally; for then he is under an implied contract to perform this service for what it shall be reasonably worth. 4. The fourth species is, Do, ut facias; which is the direct counterpart of the preceding. As when I agree with a servant to give him such wages upon his performing such work; which is nothing else but the last species inverted; for servus Jack, ut herus det, and herus dat, ut servus faciat." 2 Bl. Com. 444.

mon *law as to be of much practical utility in determining questions of law.

The fundamental distinction in the common law is between those cases where the consideration is a benefit to him who makes the promise, and those in which it is an injury to him who receives the promise. For it is a perfectly well-settled rule, that if a benefit accrues to him who makes the promise, or if any loss or disadvantage accrues to him to whom it is made, and accrues at the request or on the motion of the promisor, although without benefit to the promisor, in either case the consideration is sufficient to sustain assumpsit. (o) 1

Considerations at common law may be good, or valuable. The definition of Blackstone is this: "A good consideration is such as that of blood, or of natural love and affection, when a man grants an estate to a near relation; being founded on motives of generosity, prudence, and natural duty. A valuable consideration is such as money, marriage, or the like, which the law esteems an equivalent given for the grant; and is therefore founded in motives of justice." (p)2 A valuable consideration is usually in some way pecuniary, or convertible into money; marriage, which it is now settled is a valuable consideration, (q)3 is the principal exception to this.

(o) Com. Dig. Action upon the Case upon Assumpsit (B) 1; Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1670; Nerot v. Wallace,

3 T. R. 24; Bunn v. Guy, 4 East, 194; Willats v. Kennedy, 8 Bing. 5; Miller v. Drake, 1 Caines, 45; Powell v. Brown, 3 Johns. 100; Forster v. Fuller, 6 Mass. 58; Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Pet. 182; Hil-dreth v. Pinkerton Academy, 9 Foster (N. H.), 227; Haines v. Haines, 6 Md. 435.

(p) 2 Bl. Com. 297.

(q) Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cowen, 537; Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 261; Barr v. Hill, Addison, 276; Hustin v. Cantril, 11 Leigh, 136; Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348; Smith v. Allen, 5 Allen, 454.

1 Thus where a broker, relying upon a promise of his principal to indemnify him against loss, resists a call for a "margin," in accordance with the rules of the " Board of Stock Brokers," of which he is a member, and is in consequence suspended, the injury so caused is a good consideration for the promise, White v. Baxter, 71 N. Y 254; or a mortgagee waives his security in consideration of an agreement to put the mortgaged property up at auction and divide the proceeds in a certain way, Bradshaw v. McLoughlin, 39 Mich. 480. See also Conover v. Stillwell, 5 Vroom, 56"; Gordon v. Dalby, 30 Ia. 223. - K.

2 The distinction between good consideration and valuable consideration relates wholly to the transfer of property. Only a valuable consideration will support a promise. Leake, Cont. 615.

3 A woman being regarded as a purchaser for value of all property accruing to her by virtue of the marriage or an ante-nuptial agreement. Derry v. Derry, 74 Ind. 560. Thus a promise to marry, subsequently performed, is a valid consideration for a

An equitable consideration is sufficient as between the parties, although it be not valuable; but only a valuable consideration *is valid as against a third party, as a subsequent purchaser, (/•) whose debt existed when the contract was made, - an attaching creditor, or the like. It is at least true that an equitable consideration is sufficient in all conveyances by deed, and in transfers not by deed, but accompanied by immediate possession. (s) But where there is a promise, performable of course in future, and the consideration is only moral, there it might have been said formerly that the law was not positively settled. But the late cases settle the question definitively. Mr. Baron Parke has said, " a mere moral consideration is nothing." (t)1