(r) Lord Tenterden, C. J., in Gully v. Bishop of Exeter, 10 B. & C. 606; Chitty on Cont. 28.

(s) Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. 52; Grangiae v. Arden, 10 Johns. 293; Pitts v. Mangnn, 2 Bailey, 588; Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. 26; Frisbie v. MeCarty, 1 Stew. & P. 56; Fowler v. Stuart, 1 Mc-Cord, 504; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh, promissory note, Wright v. Wright, 54 N. Y. 437; or for a conveyance of lands to the wife, however fraudulent, if she had no knowledge of the fraud, Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U. S. 22; and equally for a promise of the wife to allow her intended husband the use of her land, on which he proceeds to make improvements, Stratton v. Stratton, 58 N. H.473. - K.

337; Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 Vt. 595. In Smith v. Smith, 7 C. & P. 401, it was held that a gift from a father to a son of a watch, chain, and seals, was valid upon delivery, and the father could not afterwards revoke the gift.

(t) Jennings v. Brown, 9 M. & W. 501.

1 The doctrine that a moral obligation is sufficient consideration to support a promise seems first to have been given much currency by Lord Mansfield, who in this connection as well as in his decision in Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1664, that a promise in writing was binding without consideration, showed a desire to restrict the importance of consideration in the law of contracts. Lord Mansfield laid down that " where a man is under a moral obligation, which no court of law or equity can enforce, and promises, the honesty and rectitude of the thing is a consideration," Hawkes v. Saunders, Cowp. 289; and accordingly held that an executor haying assets was liable to an action on a promise to pay a legacy, Atkins v. Hill, Cowp. 284; Hawkes v. Saunders, supra; and that a discharged bankrupt was liable to an action on a promise to pay a debt barred by his certificate. Trueman v. Fenton, Cowp. 544. These decisions were followed by others, at a somewhat later day, to the effect that a promise to repay the principal of a loan was binding, though the money was lent originally on usurious terms and hence was not recoverable, Barnes v. Hedley, 2 Taunt. 184; and that a promise made by a widow to repay a loan made to another at her request during her coverture and for which she had given a bond, might be enforced against her executors, though the bond, having been given during coverture, was void; Lee v Mugger-idge, 5 Taunt. 36. Later decisions showed an unwillingness to apply the doctrine of moral consideration to new cases. Binnington v. Wallis, 4 B. & Ald. 650; Littlefield v. Shee, 2 B. & Ad. 811; Meyer v. Haworth, 8 A. & E. 467; Monkman v. Shepherd-son, 11 A. & E. 411. And finally in Eastwood v. Kenvon, 11 A. & E. 438. moral consideration was expressly held insufficient to support a promise the earlier cases disapproved, and the learned reporter's note to Wennall v. Adney, 3 B. & P. 249, where the early cases are collected, referred to as stating the true principle, namely, that "an express promise . . . can only revive a precedent good consideration, which might have been enforced at law through the medium of an implied promise had it not been suspended by some positive rule of law, but can give no original right of action, if the obligation on which it is founded never could have been enforced at law, though not barred by any legal maxim or statute provision."

At the present time it may be doubted whether even this statement of the law-does not concede too much. It is certainly clear that a debt incurred during infancy

Neither the rule which so distinctly postpones * moral considerations to those which are pecuniary, nor that which seems to embrace marriage within the same cate-gory as * money, appears at first sight very creditable to the common law. There is, however, one reason which doubtless had much influence in establishing this rule; and that is, the extreme difficulty of deciding between considerations bearing a moral aspect, which were and which were not sufficient to sustain an action at law. And the rule may now be stated as follows: a moral obligation to pay money or to perform a duty is a good consideration for a promise to do so, where there was originally an obligation to pay the money or to do the duty, which was enforceable at law but for the interference of some rule of law. Thus a promise to pay a debt contracted during infancy, or barred by the Statute of Limitations or bankruptcy, is good, without other consideration than the previous legal obligation. (u)l will support a promise to pay it made after maturity, so a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute of limitations or by a discharge in bankruptcy. And so a promise to pay a bill or note though the holder has not exercised due diligence. These cases and no others are always put as illustrations of the rule quoted above. Probably it would be better to regard them as pure exceptions to an otherwise invariable rule that to constitute a good consideration there must be a detriment suffered by the promisee or a benefit received by the promisor in exchange for the promise; or to treat them as waivers of a defence, not as giving rise to an original cause of action.

(u) Earnest v. Parke, 4 Rawle, 452, Rogers v. Stephens, 2 T. R. 713; Hawkes v. Saunders, Cowp. 290; Cooke v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; Prewett v. Caruthers, 12 Sm. & M. 491; Walbridge v. Harroon, 18 Vt. 448; Patten v. Ellingwood, 32 Me.

In this country the doctrine that a moral obligation would support a promise seems never to have been generally accepted. A leading case is Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207, in which it was held that a promise by the defendant to pay for necessaries previously furnished his adult son during sickness would not sustain an action. Of similar effect are Loomis v. Newhall, 15 Pick. 159; Nine v. Starr, 8 Ore. 49. A promise by a son to pay an indebtedness of an indigent parent is equally ineffectual. Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57; Parker v. Carter, 4 Munf. 273. A promise to repay money lost in an illegal way on behalf of the defendant was held to be without consideration in Bates v. Watson, 1 Sneed, 376