1 When a plaintiff sues for failure to furnish him employment, proof that he has obtained it from other sources is proper in reduction of damages. Owen v Union Match Co 48 Mich 348. - K.

2 The measure of damages in an action for the conversion of goods delivered by a carrier to an unauthorized person, who paid the freight, is the market value of the goods, less the freight with interest from the date of the conversion. Forbes v. Boston, it R. Co. 133 Mass. 154. See also ante, * 184, n. 1. - K.

But from the elements which make up the actual loss are to be eliminated those causes of loss which spring, not merely from the plaintiff's conduct, but also from his omission to do what he might by reasonable endeavors have done, to lessen the loss. * For if when a carrier breaks his contract to carry goods, the owner can, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, obtain other means of conveyance, he is bound to obtain and use them, and cannot recover more than the loss occasioned by the extra expense, trouble, and delay, (x) So if a party contracts to furnish a certain quantity of cargo, and fails to deliver the entire quantity, the carrier is bound to receive goods from third persons, if offered, sufficient to make up the deficiency, even at a reduced rate of compensation, if offered at the current prices; and place the net earnings of the goods thus substituted to the credit of the person who originally agreed to furnish the whole cargo, (y) If the owner of goods has received injury by the negligence of the carrier, the acceptance of the goods is no bar to the action, but may be considered in mitigation of damages, (z) held, by a majority of the court, that in such case* the invoice price is to be the measure of damages, unless the carrier be guilty of fraud or fault; but Oakley, J., gave a very able dissenting opinion in favor of the rule as laid down above. Where the goods are injured or destroyed, the rule of damages is the value of' the goods at the place to which thev were to be carried, less the freight. Whether a railroad company, receiving goods directed to a point beyond the terminus of their route, is liable for such damages at the point to which the goods were directed, quart. The Mich., Ac. R. R. Co. v. Caster el als 13 Ind. 164.

(v) Brackett v. M'Nair, 14 Johns 170; O'Conner v Forster, 10 Watts, 418. But see Smith v. Richardson, 3 Caines. 219. In Adams Express Co. v. Egbert, .36 Pa. 360, it was held, that the measure of damages for a common carrier's negligence in failing to deliver an architect's plans in season to compete for a premium, was, not the value of the time and labor expended upon the plans by the architect, but the value of his chance of obtaining the premium; and in the absence of proof of any probability that he would nave taken the premium, he could only recover nominal damages.

(w) Watkinson v Laughton, 8 Johns. 213. In Black v. Baxendale, I Exch. 410, it was held, that the necessary expenses to which the owner is pat in consequence of the carrier's delay to fulfil his contract, are recoverable'as damages.

(x) O'Conuer p. Forster, 10 Watts, 418.

(y) Heckscher v. McCrea, 24 Wend. 304. See also Shannon v. Comstock, 21 Wend. 457; Costigan v. M. & H. R R. Co. 2 Denio, 609 •, Walworth v. Pool, 4 Eng. 394 ; Robinson v. Noble, 8 Pet 181.

(z) Bowman v Teall, 23 Wend. 306. In Cranwell v. Ship Fanny Fosdick, 15 La. An. 436, which was an action for damages by an owner of flour injured by being stowed on ship-board with coal-oil, the odor of the oil having affected the flour, the court held that the force of evidence may justify a jury in believing that the life thus lost was of pecuniary value to the plaintiff; and it is for the jury to estimate this value, (aa)1 But where a mother (entitled only to the services of her child during his minority) brought this action, the father being dead, it was held that her mental suffering, and the chances of his ability and willingness to support her when he was of sufficient age, were too vague to be taken into consideration, (ab)

In this action, as well as in some others, the question has arisen, whether the value of the goods to be taken as a measure, is that value which could be realized in open market, without reference to the true worth of the thing. If some wild speculation, or the prevalence of a gross error, has given to certain articles, for a brief time, a value altogether in excess of their natural value, and the fault of the defendant has prevented the plaintiff from obtaining this price by selling at the highest point of the market, can the defendant show, in mitigation of damages, the utter unreasonableness of such a price, and its brief duration? The answer, both of reason and of authority, seems to be, that the plaintiff cannot avail himself of any acts on his part of a fraudulent character, while he is entitled to compensation for his actual loss of any price he might have honestly obtained, (a)

By recent statutes in many States, an action may be brought by the representatives of a person who has been killed by the default of another. Several actions of this kind have been brought against railroad companies. It would seem that slight a custom could not be recognized In opposition to positive law.

(a) Smith v. Griffith, 8 Hill, 333. This was an action against common carriers, for injury to a quantity of mulberry trees, in consequence of delaying to transport them. After the plaintiff had given evidence of their market value at the time the injury occurred, the defendant offered to prove that at that time the market value was factitious; that, from subsequent experiments, this kind of trees had been ascertained to be of no intrinsic value; that they were not worth cultivating for the purpose of raising silk-worms, and that, if as much had been known of them, when the injury occurred, as at the time of the trial, they could have been bought at a very low price. This evidence was held inadmissible, Cowen, J., dissenting. Nel son, C. J., said: "Assuming that there is no defect in the quality of the article, the fair test of its value, and consequently of the Ioss to the owner, if it has been destroyed, is the price at the time in the market. This makes him whole, because the fund recovered enables him to go into the market and supply himself again with the goods of which he has been deprived. The objection to the evidence offered, is, that it proposed to take into consideration the fluctuations of the market value long subsequent to the time when the injury happened; thereby making the measure of damages depend upon the accidental fall of prices at some future period, which might or might not occur; and if it did, the loss might or might not have fallen upon the plaintiff; as, for aught the court or jury could know, he may have parted with the property before depreciation. ... I admit that a mere speculating price of the article, got up by the contrivance of a few interested dealers, to control the market for their own private ends, is not the true test. The law, in regulating the measure of damages, contemplates a range of the entire market, ana the average of prices, as thus found, running through a reasonable period of time. Neither a sudden and transient inflation or depression of prices should control the question. These are often accidental, produced by interested and illegitimate combinations, for temporary, special, and selfish objects, independent of the influences of lawful commerce, -a forced and violent perversion of the laws of trade, not within the contemplation of the regular dealer, and not deserving to be regarded as a proper basis upon which to determine the value, when the fact becomes material in the administration of justice." For farther authorities as to damages in actions against carriers, see Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 72: Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 N. Y. 217; Pearson v. Dnane, 4 Wallace, 605, New Orleans R. R Co. v Moore, 40 Miss. 39; Woodger v. Great Western R. R. Co. Law Rep. 2 C. P. 318; Kountz v Kirk-patrick, 72 Pa. 376.