Where there is an authority expressly given or implied by law, it is important to determine its extent, scope, and duration. Where a principal has held one out as his general agent, or authorized parties so to regard him by continued acquiescence and confirmation, we have said that the principal cannot limit or qualify his own liability by instructions, or limitations, given by him to his agent, and nut made known in any way to parties acting with such agent. (a) And where an agent is employed to scribes himself as contracting " on account of." Gadd v. Houghton, 1 Ex. D. 357. In Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93, 98, Bradley,!., said: "'The ordinary rule undoubtedly is that if a person merely adds to the signature of his name the word ' agent,' ' trustee,' 'treasurer,' etc, without disclosing his principal, he is personally bound. The appendix is regarded as a mere descriptio personce. It does no! of itself make third persons chargeable with notice of any representative relation of the signer. But if he be in fact a mere agent, trustee, or officer of some principal, and is in the habit of expressing in that way his representative character in his dealings with a particular party, who recognizes him in that character, it would be contrary to justice and truth to construe the documents thus made and used as his personal obligations, contrary to the intent of the parties "

(za) Randal v. Snyder, 1 Laws. 163.

(zb) See Williams v. Robbins, l(j Gray, 77, and compare Means v. Swomestedt, 32 Ind. 87, with Dutton v. Marsh, L. R. 6 Q. B. 361.

(a) Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38; Whitehead v. Tuckett, 15 East, 400; Commercial Bank v. Kortright, 22 Wend.

348; Munn v. Commission Co. 15 Johns. 44; Hatch v. Taylor, 10 N. H. 538; Lob-dell v. Baker, 1 Met. 193; Nickson v. Brohan, 10 Mod. 109; Runquist v. Ditch-ell, 3 Esp. 04; Precious v. Abel, 1 Esp. 350; Howard v. Howard, 11 How. Pr. 80; Lloyd v. West Branch Hank, 15 Penn. St. 172; Chouteaux v. Leach, 18 Penn. St.

And it is generally admitted that parol evidence is admissible, where from the instrument itself it is doubtful whether the obligation is that of the principal or of the agent, although the courts differ as to what constitutes Bach ambiguity. Bean v. Pioneer Mining Co. 66 Cal. 451; Burgess v. Fairbanks, 83 Cal. 215; Scanlan v. Keith, 102 Ill. 634; Lacy v. Dubuque Lumber Co. 43 Ia. 510; Rendell v. Harriman, 75 Me. 497; Haile v. Peirce, 32 Md. 327; Hardy v. Pileher, 57 Miss. 18; Klosterman v. Loos, transact some specific business, and only that, yet he binds his principal by such subordinate acts as are necessary to, or are usually and properly done in connection with the principal act, or to carry the same into effect. (b) 1 And he has a * reasonable discretion as to the execution of his authority. Thus, an agent employed by government to collect debts may, in the exercise of this discretion, give the debtor reasonable indulgence as to the time of payment. (c) But no officer of the United States can enter into a submission to arbitration which shall bind them, unless authorized by an act of Congress. (d) 2 But an agent is not at liberty to exercise this discretion in the choice of a mode of performing the duty imposed upon him, if some one mode, and that only, is fixed either by usage or by the orders of his principal, if he is a general agent; or if he is a particular agent, by his principal's orders alone; for then he must adopt that very mode and no other. (e) An authority to sell does not carry with it authority to sell on credit, unless such be the usage of the trade; but if there be such usage, then the agent may sell on credit unless specially instructed and required to Bell only for cash. (g)1 And if he sells for credit, having no authority to do so, he becomes personally responsible to his principal or the whole debt. (h) So is he also if * he blends the accounts of his principal with his own, or takes a note payable to himself. (i) If an agent to whom goods are intrusted for a particular purpose, sell the same to a person, or in a manner not within the scope of his authority, the principal may disaffirm the sale and recover the goods of the vendee, if he have not justified the vendee in believing that the agent had such authority. (k) Even a general agent, appointed and authorized to transact business in the most general terms, cannot bind his principal in

58 Mo. 290; Kelly v. Thuey, 102 Mo. 522. 528; Kean v. Davis, 21 N. .J. 1.. 683: Newman v. Greeff, mi N. Y. 663; Walker v. Christian, 21 Gratt. 291; Devendorf v. West Va. etc. Co. 17 W. Va. 135.

224. - E converse, it would seem that a third party dealing with an agent cannot have the benefit against the principal of a private arrangement between the latter and the agent, of which such third party neither knew nor was entitled to know. See Acey v. Fernie, 7 M. & W. 15]. (b) Tredwen v. Bourne, 6 M. & W. 461; Lord Ellenborough, Helyear v. Hawke, 5 Esp. 75; Withington v. Herring, 5 Bing. 442; Goodson v. Brooke, 4 Camp. 163 , Barnett v. Lambert, 15 M. & W. 489; Denman v. Bloomer, 11 Ill. 177; Franklin v. Ezell, 1 Sneed, 497. So where the government is the principal and a statute the letter of authority. United States v. Wyngall, 5 Hill (N. Y.), 16.- If a party authorizes a broker to buy shares for him in a particular market, where the usage is, that when a purchaser does not pay for his shares within a given time, the vendor, giving the purchaser notice, may resell and charge him with the difference; and the broker, acting under the authority, buys at such market in his own name; such broker, if compelled to pay a difference on the shares through neglect of his principal to supply funds, may sue the principal for money paid to his use. Pollock v. Stables, 12 Q. B. 765; Bayliffe v. Butter-worth, 1 Exch. 425. See, on the limitation of general powers, Blum v. Robertson, 24 Cal. 127.

(c) United States v. Hudson, 3 McLean, 156.

(d) United States v. Ames, 1 Woodb. & M. 76, 89.