(v) The cases on this subject are numerous and obscure. 3 Kent, Com. 113, and Story, Prom. Notes, § 357, and on Bills, § 374, would seem to hold the taking of security a waiver of the notice. But it is held otherwise in Creamer v. Perry, 17 Pick. 332; Woodman v. Eastman, 10 N. H. 359; Holland v. Turner, 10 Conn. 308; Taylor v. French, 4 E. D. Smith, 458; Kramer v. Sandford, 4 Watts & S. 328; Seacord v. Miller, 3 Kern. 55; Moore v. Coffield, 1 Dev. 247 , Denny v. Palmer, 610; Dufour v. Morse, 9 La. 333. The subject of this and the two preceding notes is fully considered and the authorities examined in 1 Pars. Notes & Bills, 560-575.

(vv) Salisbury v. Reniek, 44 Mo. 554.

(vw) Matthews v. Allen, 16 Gray, 594. See p. * 434, note, post.

(w) Gray v. Bell, 2 Rich. L. 67.

(x) Bradford v. Corey, 5 Barb. 461; Campbell v. Knapp, 15 Penn. St. 27.

(yy) People's Bank v. Keech, 26 Md. 521.

(z) Hussey v. Freeman, 10 Mass. 84; Nash v. Harrington, 2 Aik. 9; Haddock v. Murray, 1 N. H. 140; Sussex Bank v. Baldwin,2 Harrison, 488; Bank of Utica v. Bender, 21 Wend. 643; Remer v. Downer, 23 id. 620; Bennett v. Young, 18 Penn. St. 261; Smith v. Fisher, 24 Penn. St. 222. - It seems to be in some respects partly a question of law and partly of fact. See Taylor v. Bryden, 8 Johns. 173; Ferris v. Saxton, i Southard, 1; Scott v. Alexander, 1 Wash. (Va.) Dodge v. Bank of Kentucky, 2 A. K. Marsh. 610.

(a) Burbridge v. Manners, 3 Camp. 193; Bussard v. Levering, 6 Wheat, 102; Corp v. McComb, 1 Johns, Cas. 328; Fanners' Bank v. Duvall, 7 G. &. 79; Smith d. Little, 10 N. H. 526: McClane v. Pitch, 4 B. Mon. 599; Coleman v. Carpenter, 9 Barr, 178.

The notice should be properly addressed. Where an indorser added to his indorsement his street and number, it was held that the notice should be so addressed. (dd)

If the parties live in the same town or city, [and letters are not delivered by carriers,] the notice should be personal, or left at the residence or place of business of the party, and if sent through the mail, it is sufficient only if in fact received in due season. (e) By "parties" in this rule, is meant the party to be notified, and the party who is to give the notice, and this last is the bank or notary holding the * paper as agent, and not the owner. (/) In general, a personal notice is good, if given anywhere, (g) unless the reception of notice is an official act, requiring an official place. (h)

(b) If the parties reside in the same town, notice given at any time on the next day after the default is sufficient. Grand Bank v. Blanchard, 23 Pick. 305; Remington v. Harrington, 8 Ohio, 507; Whittlesey v. Dean, 2 Aik. 263.

(c) Lennox v. Roberts, 2 Wheat. 373; Seventh Ward Bank v. Hanrick, 2 Story, 416; Davis v. Hanly, 7 Eng. (Ark.) 647; Lawson v. Farmers' Bank, 1 Ohio St. 207; Hartford Bank v. Stedman, 3 Conn. 489; Howard v. Ives, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 263; Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 449; Mitchell v. Degraud, 1 Mason, 176; United States v. Barker, 4 Wash. C. C. 465; Chick v. Pillsbury, 24 Me. 458; Downs v. Planters' Bank, l Sm. & M. 261; Mitchell v. Cross, 2 R. I. 437; Burgess v. Vreeland, 4 N. J. 71; Stephenson v. Dickson, 24 Penn. St. 148. See Gladwell v. Turner, L. R. 5 Ex 59.

(d) Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 449; Housatonic Bank v. Laflin, 5 Cush. 550; Story on Prom. Notes, § 324; Carter v. Burley, 9 N. H. 558.

(dd) Bartlett v. Robinson, 9 Bosw. 305, 39 N. Y. 187.

(e) Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248; Hyslop v. Jones, 3 McLean, 96; Foster v. Sineath, 2 Rich. L. 338; Van Vechten v. Pruyn, 3 Kern. 549. But by statute it is sufficient, in New York, if the notice be put in the mail. See, as interesting cases on the requisites of notice, Walker v. Stetson, 14 Ohio (U. S.), 89, and Palmer v. Whitney, 21 Ind. 58.

(f) Bowling v. Harrison, 6 How. 248; Burbank v. Beach, 15 Barb. 326; Green v. Fouley. 20 Ala. 322; Manchester Bank v. Fellows, 8 Foster (N. H.), 302.

1 If mail communication is stopped by war, posting a notice is insufficient. Farmers' Bank v. Gunnell, 26 Gratt. 131; Lapeyre v. Robertson, 20 La. An. 399.

2 Stocken v. Collin, 7 M. & W. 515; Walters v. Brown, 15 Md. 285; Peirce v. Pendar, 5 Met 352, 356; Gist v. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 307; Shoemaker v. Mechanics' Bank, 59 Pa. 79.

If the parties do not live in the same town, then it may be sent to the post-office nearest to the residence of the party to be notified, (i)1 or it may he sent to the post-office where the party usually receives his letters, although not his actual place of residence; (j) or to the post-office at the place of the party's residence, though he usually receives his letters at a nearer office in another town; (A') or to the place of his actual residence at the time, although the party has his domicile elsewhere. (kk) If the sender knows that the other party usually receives his letters at another office, he may send notice there. (l) And if the indorser has changed his residence, and the change is unknown to the party sending notice, he may send the notice to his former residence. (m) So he may send it to any place designated by

(g) Hyslop v. Jones, 3 McLean, 96. See Bartlett v. Hawley, 120 Mass. 92.

(h) Seneca Bank v. Neass, 5 Denio, 329.

(0 Scott v. Lifford, 9 East, 347; Dun-lap v. Thompson, 5 Yerg. 67; Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Fla. 302. - But in Peirce v. Pendar, 5 Met. 352, it was held, that when both parties resided in the same town, notice could not be given through the post-office, and Shaw, C. J., thus remarked upon this point: "The only remaining question then is, whether notice by the post-office was sufficient. The general rule certainly is, that when the indorser resides in the same place with the party who is to give the notice, the notice must be given to the party personally, or at his domicile or place of business. Perhaps a different rule may prevail in London, where a penny-post is established and regulated by law, by whom litters are to be delivered to the party addressed, or at his place of domicile or business, on the same day they are deposited. And perhaps the same rule might not apply, where the party to whom notice is to be given lives in the same town, if it be at a distinct village or settlement where a town is large, and there are several postoffices in different parts of it. But of this we give no opinion. In the present case the defendant had his residence and ]>lace of business in the city of Bangor, and the only notice given him was by a letter, addressed to him at Bangor, and deposited in the post-office at that place. And we are of opinion that this was insufficient to charge him as indorser." In Green v. Farley, 20 Ala. 322, where both indorser and holder resided in Montgomery, but the acceptor resided in Mobile, and the note was there protested, it was held that notice to the indorser sent by the notary through the post-office was sufficient. And see Bell v. Hagerstown Bank, 7 Gill, 216; Morton v. Westcott, 8 Cash. 425.