(n) Pierce v, Whitney, 29 Me. 188.

for delay, would excuse or waive demand and notice. (o) The absconding or absence beyond reach of the party to be notified. (p)1 or ignorance of his residence. (q) or the death or sufficient illness of the party bound to give notice, or any sufficient accident or obstruction, will excuse the want of notice. But nothing of this kind is a sufficient excuse, provided the notice could have been given by great diligence and earnest endeavor, for so much is required by the law. (r) * Nor will the holder's inability to learn the proper place for giving notice, though an excuse for him, be available to another indorser who possesses the necessary information. (s)

A conveyance of all the property of the maker to the indorser, and an acceptance by him, would be regarded as waiving his right to notice. (t) It might, however, be questioned whether it would have this effect, if made after the maturity of the note, and without mention of it. (u)

It may not be certain, whether the giving of full security to the indorser by the maker, would necessarily operate as a waiver.

(o) Ridgeway v. Day, 13 Penn. St. 208; Clayton v. Phipps, 14 Mo. 399.

(p) Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 2 Esp. 516, 1 B. & P. 652; Bowes v. Howe, 5 Taunt. 30. And see Crosse v. Smith, 1 M. & Sel. 145; Bruce v. Lytle, 13 Barb. 163. - So war between one country and the country where the note is payable excuses immediate notice; but notice should be given within reasonable time after peace. Hop-kirk v. Page, 2 Brock. 20; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438; Scholefield v. Eichelberger, 7 Pet. 586. •

(q) Hunt v. Maybee, 3 Seld. 266; Porter v. Judson, 1 Gray, 175.

(r) A party is bound to use reasonable, but not excessive, diligence. Sussex Bank v. Baldwin, 2 Harrison, 487; Bank of Utica v. Bender, 21 Wend. 643; Clark v. Bigelow, 16 Me. 246; Roberts v. Mason, 1 Ala. (n. s.) 373; Preston v. Daysson, 7 La. 7; Runyon v. Montfort, 1 Busb. L. 371; Manchester Bank v. Fellows, 8 Foster (N. H.) 302. - If due diligence be used it will be sufficient, although notice should be sent to the wrong place. Burmester v.

Barron, 9 E. L. & E. 402; Nichol v. Bate, 7 Yerg. 305; Barr v. Marsh, 9 id. 253, Phipps v. Chase, 6 Met. 491; Barker v. Clarke, 20 Me. 156. And where a party is ignorant of the address of the person liable upon a bill or note, it is sufficient if he use reasonable diligence to ascertain it, and after having ascertained it, sends a notice forthwith. Dixon v. Johnson, 29 E. L. & E. 504.

(s) Beale v. Parrish, 20 N. Y. 407. But see Cosgrave v. Boyle, 6 Can. Sup. Ct. 165.

(t) This seems, upon the whole, to be settled by authority. See Corney v. Da Costa, 1 Esp. 302; "Barton v. Baker, 1 S. & R. 334; Kramer v. Sandford, 4 Watts & S. 328; Bond v. Farnham, 5 Mass. 170; Bank of South Carolina v. Myers, Bailey, 412; Barrett v. Charleston Bank, 2 McMullan, 191; Stephenson v. Primrose, 8 Port. Ala. 155; Perry v. Green, 4 Harr. 61; Vreeland v. Hyde, 2 Hale, 429; Seacord v. Miller, 3 Kern. 55; Benedict v. Caffee, 5 Duer, 226.

(u) Walters v. Munroe, 17 Md. 154.

1 Notice to the person named in a will as executor of the non-payment of a promissory note indorsed by his testator, which became payable after the will was offered for probate and letters testamentary applied for, and before the executor named declined to accept the trust, is sufficient to charge the estate; but such notice, if the note matured after the executor had renounced the trust, and a special administrator had been appointed, is not sufficient, although no public notice of the latter's appointment had been ordered or given. Goodnow v. Warren, 122 Mass. 79. - K.

We should say it would not, because the maker might intend only to secure the indorser, if he he legally held. (v)

It is a well-settled rule, that where there has been no demand or notice, the party entitled to it waives this defence, by a promise to pay, made with a full knowledge of the circumstances and of his defence.(vv) And such a promise, made with full knowledge of the absence of demand or notice, operated as a waiver, although the promisor did not know that demand of the note was necessary to hold him. (vw)

No mere probability that the note or bill will not be paid excuses demand, and it is even held that the certainty of nonpayment does not.(w) And if an indorser adds to his name the word "surety," this is said only to give him the right of a surety in addition to that of an indorser. (x)

If there be joint indorsers (not partners) notice should be given to each; and it is held that neglect to give notice to either one discharges all. (yy)

In general, the notice must be given within a reasonable time; and what this time is, is a question of law for the court, (z) and each case will be judged by its circumstances. * It is so important that the rights and duties of all persons interested in negotiable paper should be as exactly defined and as certainly known as possible, that there is now a positive rule of law on the subject; and this, as gathered from the usage in commercial places, and the weight of authorities is, that notice of non-payment may be given to parties liable to pay, on the same day on which payment has been refused; (a) either personally or by mail, as may be proper under the circumstances; and that notice should be given as soon as on the day following that on which payment has been refused; (b) 1 or by the mail of the same day, or by the next mail afterwards, provided no convenient or usual means intervene. Where there is but one mail departing upon the day succeeding the default, notice must be sent thereby unless it depart before ordinary business hours on that day. (c) But if there be more than one mail it is considered that it is sufficient if the notice be deposited in time to go by any mail of that day. (d) In London, [or other city where letters are delivered by a carrier,] it may be sent by penny-post to parties residing there.2