7 Greenl. 76. The rule before adverted to as to entire performance is not binding upon persons under the age of twenty-one years, and although they engage to work a specified time, and for a specified sum, they may nevertheless leave when they please, and recover upon a quantum meruit for what their services are really worth. Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332; Judkins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38; Bishop v. Shepherd, 23 Pick. 492; Vent v. Osgood, 19 id. 572; Thomas v. Dike, 11 Vt. 273; Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 110; Whitmarsh v. Hall, 3 Denio, 375; deducting, it seems, any damage to his employer by such violation of the contract. Thomas v. Bike, 11 Vt. 273; Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 832; Judkins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38. But see contra, Whitmarsh v. Hall, 3 Denio, 375, where the subject was fully considered, and Jewett, J., observed upon this point: "It is insisted on the part of the defendants that the justice erred in rejecting the evidence offered by them, on the ground that, although the plaintiff was an infant, and had a right to avoid his contract and recover the value of his services, yet that the defendants were entitled, if they had sustained an injury by such avoidance, to have a proper allowance therefor made against such value. In other words, it is claimed that the defendants are entitled, as a set-off against the value of the plaintiff's services, to such sum as is equal to the amount of the injury sustained by them, by the avoidance of the contract by the plaintiff, which in effect would charge the infant with the performance of his contract, or with damages for its violation. The proposition is not sustained by any elementary principle known to the law, and I do not find that it has been recognized by any adjudged case, unless by that of Moses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332. In that case the plaintiff, an infant, had made a special agreement to labor for the defendant a certain time for certain wages, and before the time expired left his service voluntarily, without cause. It was held, that he might recover on a quantum meruit for the services performed, and if his employer was injured by the sudden termination of the contract without notice, a deduction should be made on that account. The learned judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: ' We think the special contract being avoided, an indebitatus assumpsit upon a quantum meruit lies, as it would if no contract had been made; and no injustice will be done, because the jury will give no more than, under all circumstances, the services were worth, making any allowance for any disappointment, amounting to an injury, which the defendant in such case would sustain by the avoidance of the contract.' With great respect, I am unable to yield my assent to the soundness of the qualification annexed to the proposition. I think that the infant plaintiff, in such an action, is entitled, by well-settled principles of law, to recover such sum for his services as he would be entitled to if there had been no express contract made. A recovery is allowed upon the assumption that there is no express contract at all." But in the case of Moulton v. Trask, 9 Met. 577, decided since Whitmarsh v. Hall, it was held, that where a minor makes a contract, either absolute or conditional, to labor for a year, for one hundred dollars, and his employer, without sufficient cause, discharges him before the year expires, indebitatus assumpsit may be maintained for the minor's wages for the time during which he labored; and his employer is bound to pay at the rate of one hundred dollars a year, deducting any loss that he may have sustained from the minor's unfaithfulness, or occasional absence without leave. See also ante, vol. i. p. * 315, note (l) (h) Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cowen, 63; Swanzey v. Moore, 22 El. 63; Hansell v. Erickson, 28 Ill 257. See ante, p. *33, note (b).

(i) Hair v. Bell, 6 Vt. 35; Mullen v. Gilkinson, 19 id. 503. See also De Camp v. Stevens, 4 Blackf. 24. In this case a person contracted to work for a year, at a certain sum per month; but after working three months and ten days, he left his employer, and sued him for the work thus done. It was proved that the defendant had manifested a disposition to get the plaintiff to leave him, and had said, after the plaintiff was gone, that he was glad of it, as the plaintiff was worth nothing. Held, that the action was not sustained.

(j) Dickey v. Linscot, 20 Me. 453; Fenton v. Clark, 11 Vt. 557. In this case, Bennett, J., in giving the opinion of a majority of the court, observed: "In the case before the court, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant to labor personally for him for four months, at ten dollars per month, and by the terms of the contract was to receive no pay till he had worked the four months. These services being of a personal character, the contract could not be performed by another, and as the plaintiff was disabled to perform it himself, by reason of sickness, which was the act of God, upon the authority of the foregoing cases, the contract was discharged. The inquiry then arises, What is the result? It appears to me apparent that the plaintiff must, at least, after the expiration of the four months be permitted to recover as upon a quantum meruit, pro rata, for the services rendered. Common justice requires this, and I should be sorry to find that it was not tolerated by the principles of the common law. To hold, in a case like this, where the plaintiff has been discharged of his contract by the act of God, that there can be no apportionment, upon the technical ground that the contract is entire, and its performance a condition precedent, is, to my mind, leaving the substance and adhering to the shadow." Redfield, J., dissented. See also Seaver v. Morse, 20 Vt. 620. In this case the plaintiff, having contracted to labor for the defendant six months, at a specified price for the term, was taken unwell, and left the defendant's service, and was so unwell for about a month that he was unable to perform the full labor of a man, and then he recovered his health, but did not return to the defendant's employment. It was held, that he was entitled to recover for his services, upon a quantum meruit, for the time he labored. And it was also held, that, if this were not so, an offer by the defendant, after the plaintiff had left his service, to pay the plaintiff the amount due to him, at the rate of compensation fixed by the original contract, was a waiver of all claim of forfeiture. To the same effect is Fuller v. Brown, 11 Met. 440, where a special agreement was made by A and B that A should work for B, and that, if he should be dissatisfied, and wished to leave the service, he should give B four weeks' notice, and work for him four weeks after the notice, and then receive his pay. After A had begun to work under this agreement, he became sick and unable to work, and left B without giving four weeks' notice, and remained sick for several weeks. Held, that this agreement as to notice applied to a voluntary leaving of the service by A, and not to a leaving by reason of his sickness and inability to continue therein; and that he was entitled to recover a proper compensation for the work which he had done. And see Fahy v. North, 19 Barb. 341.