1 A servant may be discharged for habits of intoxication. McCormick v. Demary, 10 Neb. 515.

(e) Hochster v. De Latour, 2 E. L. & B. L. 678. (f) The King v. St. John, Devizes, 9 B. & C. 896. The wilful disobedience, on the part of the servant, of any lawful order of the master, is a good cause of discharge. Spain v. Arnott, 2 Stark. 256; Callo v. Brouncker, 4 C. & P. 518; Amor v. Fearon, 9 A. & E. 548. See also Fillieul v. Armstrong, 7 A. & E. 557. In the case of Turner v. Mason, 14 M. & W. 112, an action of assumpsit was brought for the wrongful dismissal of a domestic servant, without a month's notice, or payment of a month's wages. Plea, that the plaintiff requested the defendant to give her leave to absent herself from his service during the night, that he refused such leave, and forbade her from so absenting herself, and that against his will she nevertheless absented herself for the night, and until the following day, whereupon he discharged her. Replication, that when the plaintiff requested the defendant to give her leave to absent herself from his service, her mother had been seized with sudden and violent sickness and was in imminent danger of death, and believing herself likely to die, requested the plaintiff to visit her to see her before her death, whereupon the plaintiff requested the defendant to give her leave to absent herself for that purpose, she not being likely thereby to cause any injury or hindrance to his domestic affairs, and not intending to be thereby guilty of any improper omission or unreasonable delay of her duties; and because the defendant wrongfully and unjustly forbade her from so absenting herself for the purpose of visiting her mother, etc., she left his house and service, and absented herself for that purpose for the time mentioned in the plea, the same being a reasonable time in that behalf, and she not causing thereby any hindrance to his domestic affairs, nor being thereby guilty of any improper omission or unreasonable delay of her duties, as she lawfully might, etc. Held, on demurrer, that the plea was good, as showing a dismissal for disobedience to a lawful order of the master, and that the replication was bad, as showing no sufficient excuse for such disobedience. So where the servant assaulted his employer's servant maid, with intent to commit a rape upon her. Atkin v. Acton, 4 C. & P. 208. Or commits any crime, though the same be not immediately injurious to his employer. Libhart v. Wood, 1 W. & S. 265. So where an unmarried female servant be* If the contract be for a time certain, and the servant leave without cause before the time expires, it has been held in many cases, in England and in this country, that he has no claim for the services he has rendered. (g) Some of these comes pregnant. Rex v. Brampton, Caldecot, 11, 14. So using abusive language to his employer. Byrd v. Boyd, 4 McCord, 246. Or quarrels with a fellow-clerk, in the store in the presence of ladies, and draws a revolver. Kearney v. Holmes, 6 La. An. 373. Or is guilty of any misconduct, inconsistent with the relation of master and servant. Singer v. McCormick, 4 W. & S. 265. As if the servant set up a claim to be a partner with his employer. Amor v. Fearon, 9 A. & E. 548. Or conduct so as materially to injure his employer's business. Lacy v. Osbaldiston,8 Car. & K. 80. Or is guilty of repeated intoxication; semble, Wise v. Wilson, 1 Car. & K. 662. And see further Lomax v. Aiding, 28 E. L. & E. 543; b. c. 10 Exch. 734.

(q) If this question is to be governed solely by the number of authorities, it would seem to be at rest, for it is supported by the following adjudged cases: Cutter v. Powell, 6 T. R. 320; Lilley v. Elwin, 11 Q. B. 755; Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267; McMillan v. Vanderlip, 12 Johns. 165; Jennings v. Camp, 13 id. 94; Reab v. Moor, 19 id. 337; Waddington v. Oliver, 5 B. & P. 61; Ellis v. Hamlen, 3 Taunt. 52; Marsh v. Rulesson, 1 Wend. 514; Miller v. Goddard, 34 Me. 102; Faxon v. Mansfield, 2 Mass. 147 ; Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cowen, 68; Ketchum v. Evert-son, 13 Johns. 365 ; Sickles v. Pattison, 14 Wend. 257; Weeks v. Leighton, 5 N. H. 343; Olmstead v. Beale, 19 Pick. 528; Thayer v. Wadsworth, id. 349; St Albans Steamboat Co. v. Wilkins, 8 Vt. 54; Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Met. 286; Hunt v. Otis Man. Co. 4 id. 465; Winn v. Southgate, 17 Vt. 855; Sutton v. Tyrell, 12 id. 79; Ripley v. Chipman, 13 id. 268; Coe v. Smith, 1 Cart. (Ind.) 267; Swift v. Williams, 2 Cart (Ind.) 865; Hawkins v. Gilbert, 19 Ala. 54. Nor does it make any difference in this respect whether the wages are estimated at a gross sum, or are to be calculated according to a certain rate per week or month, or are payable at certain stipulated times, provided the servant agree for a definite and whole term; such an arrangement being perfectly consistent with the entirety of the contract. Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Met. 286. The law on this point was fully affirmed in the case of Winn v. Southgate, 17 Vt. 355. It was there held, that if one contract to labor for another for a specified term, and leave the service of his employer before the expiration of the term, without any cause, attributable either to the employer or to the act of Providence, he cannot recover any compensation for the portion of the term during which he in fact labors. And it makes no difference that the employer, before the expiration of the term, permitted the plaintiff to be absent from. his employment for a few weeks upon a journey, - the plaintiff having, after his return, again resumed labor for his employer, under the contract. Nor does it make any difference, that the plaintiff ceased laboring for his employer, under the belief that, according to the legal method of computing time under similar contracts, he had continued laboring as long as could be required of him. Nor that the employer, during the term, has from time to tune made payments to the plaintiff for his labor. But if, in such case, the defendant has made payments to the plaintiff upon the contract, during the term, and the plaintiff, having commenced an action of book account to recover for his services, is defeated, upon the ground that he left the service of the defendant without legal cause, before the expiration of the term, the defendant can have no recovery against the plaintiff for the amount of payments thus made. See also Rice v. The Dwight Man. Co. 2 Cush. 80, where it is again held, that if A enter into the service of B upon an agreement to labor for him a year, and leave at the end of six months, A can maintain no action for the services so rendered; but if B then promise A to pay him for the six months' labor, upon the performance of any additional service, however slight, or the doing of some act by A, to his personal inconvenience, though of no value to B, and such service is rendered, or act done, this will so far operate as a waiver of the original contract that an action may be maintained by it for the six months' Labor. That an offer to pay, by the employer, is a waiver of all forfeiture, see also Seaver v. Morse, 20 Vt. 620. So where the employer gives the laborer a note, before the time for which he was hired has elapsed, for the amount of wages already earned, he cannot resist payment thereof by showing that the payee left his service before the expiration of the time for which he was originally hired. Thorpe v. White, 13 Johns. 53. See also Hayden v. Madison, cases are of * great severity; as where the hiring was for a year, and after ten months and a half the servant went away, saying he would work no more for that master, and after two days returned and offered to fulfil his contract, and the master refused to receive him, it was held that the servant could recover no wages for the time he had worked. (h) The ground taken in these cases, * and on which they all seemed to rest, is the entirety of the contract, which is supposed to prevent any apportionment of the wages. And it has been held, that the servant cannot recover if he left because the master required of him services different from those specified in the contract, if he made no objection thereto. (i) But if prevented from performing the stipulated amount of labor by sickness, or similar inability, he may recover pay for what he has done on a quantum meruit. (j) The case of Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481, (k) resists the