18 Dunlop, 1; Tayloe v. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co. 9 How. 390; Kempner v Cohn, 47

Ark. 519; Bryant v. Booze, 55 Ga. 438; Haas v. Myers, 111 Ill.421; Kentucky Mut Ins. Co. v. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96; Hunt v. Higman, 7o Ia. 406; Ferrier v. Storer, 63 Iowa, 484; Hutcheson v. Blakeman, 3 Met. (Ky.) 80; Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md 99 . Stockham v Stockham, 32 Md. 196; Abbott v. Shepard, 48 N. H. 14; Hallock v Commercial Ins.

Thus, if A, in Boston, on the first day of January, writes to B, in Baltimore, making an offer, and this letter reaches Baltimore on the third, and B forthwith answers the letter, accepting the offer, putting the letter into the mail that day; and on the second of January A writes withdrawing the offer, and his letter of withdrawal reaches B on the fourth, there is nevertheless a contract made between the parties. If the offer was to sell goods, B, on tendering the price, may claim the goods; if the offer was to insure B's ship, B may tender the premium and demand the policy, and hold A as an insurer of his ship. And so of any other offer or proposition. (q)

Co. 2 Dutch. 268; Northampton, etc. Ins. Co. v. Tuttle, 40 N. J. L. 476; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103; Vassar v. Camp, 11 N. Y. 441; Hamilton v. Lycoming Mut. Ins. Co. 5 Pa. St. 339.

A contrary view seems to obtain in France, S.- v. F. - Langdell, Cas. Cont. 156; and in Massachusetts the case of McCulloch v. The Eagle Insurance Co. 1 Pick. 278, while not deciding that the completion of a contract by letter could never take place till the receipt of the letter of acceptance, decided that in the case then before the court the offer was revocable till the receipt of the acceptance, and the general rule was laid down: "The offer did not bind the plaintiff until it was accepted; and it could not be accepted to the knowledge of the defendant, until the letter announcing the acceptance was received, or at most until the regular time for its arrival by mail had elapsed." And see Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 173. See also British, etc. Telegraph Co. v. Colson, L. R. Ex. 108; and the dissenting opinions in Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, and Thomson v. James, supra.

As an original question it may well be questioned whether the view that the acceptance takes effect from its receipt is not the better. The so-called letter of acceptance is not simply an expression of assent to the offer, it is also performance of the consideration, constituting as it does a counter promise, and communication is essential to a promise. And even granting that the question should turn, not on when the offerer actually receives communication, but when the tangible sign has been sufficiently put in his power, the offerer should not be bound until he has or should have some control over the letter of acceptance, and he obviously has and can have no control over it while it is in course of transmission. For a careful examination of the question, see Langdell, Sum. Cont. §§ 14, 15. " The practical conclusion seems to be that every prudent man who makes an offer of any importance by letter, should expressly make it conditional on his actual receipt of an acceptance within some definite time. It would be impossible to contend that a man so doing could be bound by an acceptance which either wholly miscarried or arrived later than the specified time." Pollock, Cont. (5th ed.) 37. That such an express condition will be enforced, see Household Insurance Co. v Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216, 223,238; Haas v. Myers, 111 Ill. 421, 427, Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 173.

The letter must be posted within the time limited, if any, or otherwise within a reasonable time, and before a revocation is communicated. Stevenson v McLean, 5 Q. B. D. 346; Maclay v. Harvey, 90 Ill. 525; Abbott v. Shepard, 48 N. H. 14; Potts v. Whitehead, 8 C. E. Green, 512.

It has been generally held also that an acceptance by telegram of an offer made by letter or telegram takes effect from the time of the deposit of the acceptance at the telegraph office for transmission, at least if the acceptor was expressly or impliedly authorized to use that mode of communication. Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. D. 346; Cowan v. O'Connor, 20 Q. B. D. 640 , Minnesota Oil Co. v. Collier Lead Co. 4 Dill. 431; Haas v. Myers, 111 Ill. 421, 427; Cobb v. Foree, 38 Ill. App. 255; Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 307; Perry v. Mount Hope Iron Co. 15 R. I 380.

Merely writing a letter or telegram of acceptance will not, however, complete a contract. The acceptance must be put beyond the reach of the acceptor. Trounstine v Sellers, 35 Kan. 447.

Nor will posting a letter of acceptance unless the use of the mails is expressly or impliedly authorized as a means of communication. Henthorn v. Fraser, [1892] 2 Ch. 27; Linn v. McLean, 80 Ala. 360.

Nor unless the letter of acceptance is properly stamped and addressed. Blake v. Hamburg, etc. Ins. Co. 67 Tex. 160.

Sometimes a man makes an offer, saying if there be no answer, or none by a return mail, or by a certain time, he shall consider the offer accepted. But he has no right to impose these conditions, and silence is no acceptance of the offer (qq) 1

We have supposed these letters to be properly addressed and mailed, and to reach the proper party at a proper time. Cases undoubtedly may occur where there is delay and hinderance, and the cause of this may be the fault of the proposer, or of the acceptor, or of neither. Such cases may form exceptions to the * principle above stated and must be decided on their own facts and merits, and by rules which are specially adapted to them. But we should state as the general rule what was lately declared to be law by the House of Lords; that if the party receiving an offer by letter puts his answer of acceptance into the mail, this completes the contract, for he has done all that he could do, and is in no way responsible for the casualties of the mail service. (r)

(q) Hutcheson v. Blakeman, 3 Met. (Ky.) 80.

(qq) Felthouse v. Bindley, 31 L. J. C. 204.

(r) Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. Cas. 381. And see ante, p. *484, note 1.

1 But Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 173, approving McCulloch v Eagle Ins. Co. 1 Pick. 278, supra, decided that if an offer is made by letter in which the offerer requests an answer by telegraph "yes" or " no," without which answer by a certain date ho " shall conclude " " no," the offer is made dependent on an actual receipt of the telegram on or before that date. - K.