An analogous and closely connected question has arisen, where the proposition and the reply are both made by letter. And as we think, it must be governed by the same principles. It is unquestionably true as a general proposition, that a contract cannot bind the party proposing it, and indeed that there is no contract, until the acceptance of the offer by the party receiving it is in some way, actually or constructively, communicated to the party making the offer. (oo) We consider that an offer by letter is a continuing offer until the letter be received, and for a reasonable time thereafter, during which the party to whom it is addressed may accept the offer, and communciate the fact of his acceptance. We hold also that this offer may be withdrawn by the maker at any moment; and that it is withdrawn as soon as a notice of such withdrawal reaches the party to whom the offer is made, and not before. (p)1 If, therefore, that party accepts

(oo) The general principle is asserted in Hebb's case, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 9.

(p) Notwithstanding the case of Mc-Culloch v. Eagle Ins. Co. 1 Pick. 278, we deem the rule of the text to be the law in England, and in this country; although further adjudication may be necessary to define these rules and determine all their consequences. It was first laid down in England in Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681, in 1818. The case of Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653, was there relied upon by counsel, but the court said, "that if that were so, no contract could ever be completed by the post. For if the defendants were not bound by their offer when accepted by the plaintiffs, till the answer was received, then the plaintiffs ought not to be bound till after they had received the notification that the defendants had received their answer and assented to it. And so it might go on ad infinitum. The defendants must be considered in law as making, during every instant of the time their letter was travelling, the same identical offer to the plaintiffs, and then the contract is completed by the acceptance of it by the latter. Then as to the delay in notifying the acceptance, that arises entirely from the mistake of the defendants, and it therefore must be taken as against them, that the plaintiff's answer was received in course of post." See also Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv. 441. And in the case of Potter v. Sanders, 6 Hare, 1, decided in 1846, a purchaser offered a price for an estate, and the vendor, by a letter sent by post, and received by the purchaser the day after it was put into the post-office, accepted the offer. Held, that the vendor was bound by the contract from the time when he posted the letter, although it was not received by the purchaser until the following day. And this rule was adopted by the House of Lords in the still later case of Dunlop v. Hig-gins, 1 H. L. Cas. 381. It was there laid down, that a letter offering a contract does not bind the party to whom it is addressed to return an answer by the very

1 See ante, p. *481, note 1.

*the offer before such withdrawal, the bargain is com- * pleted; there is then a contract founded upon mutual assent. And an acceptance having this effect is made, and is communicated under the rule already stated, when the party receiving the offer puts into the mail his answer accepting it. (pp) 1 next post after its delivery, or to lose the benefit of the contract, but an answer, posted on the day of receiving the offer is sufficient; that the contract is accepted l>v the posting of a letter declaring its acceptance; that a person putting into the post a letter declaring his acceptance of a contract offered, has done all that is necessary for him to do, and is not answerable for casualties occurring at the post-office. See also Stocken v. Collen, 7 M. & W. 515; Beckwith v. Cheever, 1 Foster (N. H ), 41; Brisban v. Boyd, 4 Paige, 17; Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 436; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103; Vassar v. Camp, 14 Barb). 341; s. c. 1 Kern. 441; Clark v. Dales, 20 Barb. 42; Levy v. Cohen, 4 Ga. 1; Elia-son v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 228; Chiles v. Nelson, 7 Dana, 281; Falls v. Gaither, 9 Port. (Ala.) 605; Hamilton v. Lycoming Mutual Ins. Co. 5 Pa. St. 339, where the case of McCulloch v. Eagle Insurance Co. is ably examined.

(pp) The case of Tayloe, v. Merehante' Fire Ins. Co. 9 How. 890, is a strong case on this subject. It was there held, that where there was a correspondence relating to the insurance of a house against tire, the insurance company making known the terms upon which they were willing to insure, the contract was complete when the insured placed a letter in the post-office accepting the terms; and the house having been burned down while the letter of acceptance was in progress by the mail, the company were held responsible. See also the Palo Alto, Davies, 344. In the case of Duncan v. Topham, 8 C. B. 225, the same principle was adopted, and the con-tract was said to be closed by mailing the letter of acceptance, although it never reached its destination. All these cases and some others are fully considered in 2 Parsons, Marit. Law, p. 22, note 4.

1 The earliest case in which the question is at all considered when a contract made through the mail is completed by acceptance is Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv. 441, 455 Lord Eldon there said: " I have always understood the law of the court to be, with reference to this sort of contract, that if a person communicates his acceptance of an offer within a reasonable time after the offer being made, and if, within a reasonable time of the acceptance being communicated, no variation has been made by either party in the terms of the offer so made and accepted, the acceptance must be taken as simultaneous with the offer, and both together as constituting such an agreement as the court will execute." A few years later the case of Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681, was decided. The only question really involved in that case was whether the acceptance was within a reasonable time. It was argued, however, by counsel, that a sale made by the offerer while the letter of acceptance was in the post had revoked the offer. To meet this point the court held in words often quoted, that the contract was complete before the sale, namely, when the letter of acceptance was mailed " For if the defendants were not bound by their offer when accepted by the plaintiffs till the answer was received, then the plaintiffs ought not to be bound till after they had received the notification that the defendants had received their answer and assented to it. And so it might go on ad infinitum." The language in both these cases evidently is based on the idea, now discredited, that it is the mental consensus of two parties at the same moment which constitutes a contract, but the rule laid down in Adams p. Lindsell, that a contract is complete when the letter of acceptance is mailed, has been adopted in numerous cases in England, Scotland, and this country, and is adhered to even though the letter of acceptance is never received. Potter v Sanders. 6 Hare, 1 , Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. C 381; Duncan v. Topham, 8 C. B. 225; Harris's case, L. R 7 Ch. 587; Wall's case, L. R. 15 Eq. 18; Household Fire Ens. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216; (overruling Reidpath's case, L. R. 11 Eq. 86, and British, etc. Telegraph Co v. Colson, L. R. 6 Ex. 108); Henthorn v. Fraser, [1892] 2 Ch. 27; Thomson v. James,