(m) Judd v. Day, 50 Ia. 247; Troun-stine v. Sellers. 35 Kan. 447; Peree v. Turner, 10 Me. 185; Park v. Whitney, 148 Mass. 278; Stone v. Harmon. 31 Minn. 512; Beckwith v. Cheever, 21 N. H. 41; Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Dane, 43 N. Y. 240; Keck v. McKinley, 98 Pa. 616.

But the proposer may himself determine how long the offer shall continue. He may say, I will give you an hour, or until this time to-morrow, or next week, to make up your mind. Then the party to whom the proposition is made knows how long the offer is to continue. He may avail himself of the hour, the day, or the week given for inquiry or consideration, or making the necessary arrangements; and if within the prescribed time he expresses his assent (supposing the proposition not in the mean time withdrawn), he completes the contract as effectually as if he had answered in the same way at the first moment after the offer was made (n).1

It seems irrational to say that the proposer is not bound by receiving such delayed assent, although it is given within the specified time, because no consideration had been paid him for the delay, and for the continuance of the offer. If it were said that where one makes an offer, and the other instantly accepts, the offerer nevertheless is not bound, because there is no consideration, then it might be said consistently that he is not bound by an answer made within a time specified by him. But no one * doubts that the offerer is bound by an instantaneous acceptance, although he received no consideration for the offer. And what difference can it make, as to the consideration or the want of it, whether the acceptance follows the offer in a second, or in a minute or two, or in a longer, but still reasonable time, or in a still longer time limited and specified by the proposer himself. All these cases stand on the same footing in respect to consideration.

Undoubtedly, if the offerer gives a day for acceptance, without consideration for the delay, he may at any time within that day, before acceptance, recall his offer. So he may if he gives no time. If he makes an offer, and instantly recalls it before acceptance, although the other party was prepared to accept it the next instant, the offer is effectually withdrawn. But acceptance before withdrawal binds the parties, if made while the offer continues; and the offer does continue in all cases, either a reasonable time (and that only), or the time fixed by the party himself.2

(n) Wright v. Bigg, 15 Beav. 592

1 Longworth v. Mitchell, 26 Ohio St. 334. See also Smith v. Weaver, 90 Ill 392. - An offer by mail stating, in terms, "You will confer a favor by giving me your answer by return mail," is released by a failure to answer by that mail. Carr v. Duval, 14 Pet. 77, 82; Maclay v Harvey, 90 Ill. 525. - K.

2 Revocation of an offer is ordinarily and properly made by communication from the party making the offer to the party receiving it. Whether anything less than this

It may be said, that whether the offer be made for a time certain or not, the intention or understanding of the parties is to govern. If the proposer fixes a time he expresses his intention, and the other party knows precisely what it is. If no definite time is stated, then the inquiry as to a reasonable time resolves itself into an inquiry as to what time it is rational to suppose that the parties contemplated; and the law will decide this to be that time which as rational men they ought to have understood each other to have had in mind. (o)

We hold this to be the true principle, and to be capable of universal application. Thus, where many subscribe for a common result on a certain condition, the first question may be as to the consideration; and this we have already discussed. And it would be another question how long the parties are bound by the promise contained in such subscription. If no time be agreed on, and there be no express withdrawal, then the law must choose between the period of legal presumption, which * would generally be twenty years, and the principle of reasonable time; and the first alternative would be very unreasonable, and might be very oppressive. The court will is sufficient has been in some doubt. In some of the older cases it is intimated that a sale to a third party of the property to which the offer referred would of itself amount to a revocation. Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T. R. 653, per Buller, J.; Routledge v. Grant, 4 Bing. 653. But it may now be considered settled that as a rule there can be no revocation without the knowledge of the party to whom the offer was made. Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, 5 C. P. D. 344; Stevenson v. McLean, 5 Q. B. D. 346; Henthorn v. Fraser, [1892] 2 Ch. 27; Tayloer. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co. 9 How. 390; Kempner v. Cohn, 47 Ark 519; Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99. Though it has been held that an offer of reward made by public advertisement may be withdrawn in the same way, and that ignorance of the withdrawal is immaterial. Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73.

(o) Moxley v. Moxley's Adm'r, 2 Met. (Ky.) 309.

How far knowledge not acquired from the offerer himself that he had changed his mind or had dealt with the property in a manner incousistent with a longer continuance of the offer would operate as a revocation is not yet wholly clear. < in principle it seems that as an offer or acceptance must be made from one party to the other, and evidence that their actions in dealing with third parties showed a willingness or unwillingness to contract would not be received, so the revocation of an offer should only be accomplished by communication from one party to the other. It has, however, been decided that knowledge, even though received by chance from a stranger, that the offerer has sold to another the property to which the offer relates puts an end to the offer. Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463; Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21.

Death of the offerer terminates an offer. Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463, 475 , Pratt v. Trustees of Baptist Soc. of Elgin, 93 Ill. 475; Wallace v. Townsend, 43 Ohio St. 537; Helfenstein's Est., 77 Pa. 328; Reimensnyder v. Gans, 110 Pa St. 17; Foust v. Board of Publication, 8 Lea, 552. So insanity of the offerer. The Palo Alto, 2 Ware, 343; Beach v First M. E. Church, 96 Ill. 177. And see Drew v Nairn, 4 Q. B. D. 661. Likewise death or insanity of the person to whom the offer is made, making acceptance of the offer by that person impossible, in effect puts an end to the offer. In re Cheshire Banking Co. 32 Ch. D. 301; Mactier v Frith, 6 Wend 103; Leake, Cont. (3d ed.) 31 look into all the circumstances of each case, and inquire what the parties actually understood or intended, or, regarding them as rational men, what they must be supposed to have intended. And it seems difficult to reject this rule, without holding principles which would lead to the conclusion that one who offers goods to another, and, receiving no answer, sells them to a third person a year after, may still be held by him to whom the offer was first made, if he shall then see fit to accept the offer; a conclusion so wholly unreasonable as to be impossible.