2 See also Meier v. Penn. R. Co. 64 Penn. St. 225.

(oo) Hanley v. Harlem R. R. Co. 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 359.

degree of speed; (p) and to have servants and agents competent for their several employments; and for the default of his servants or agents, in any of the above particulars, or generally, in any other points of duty, the carrier is directly responsible, (q) l as well as for any circumstance tion for an injury received by the plaintiff by the breaking down of a bridge over which he was passing in a passenger train. It appeared at the trial that the services of an eminent engineer had been engaged in the construction of the work. Williams, J., before whom the cause was tried, told the jury that the question was, whether the bridge was constructed and maintained with sufficient care and skill, and of reasonably proper strength with regard to the purposes for which it was made; and that, if they should think not, and that the accident was attributable to any such deficiency, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover. The counsel for the defendants objected, that the defendants would not be liable unless they had been guilty of negligence either in constructing or maintaining the bridge. His lordship, however, left the question to the jury, subject to his previous direction. Upon an application to the Court of Exchequer for a new trial, Pollock, C. B., said: "It does not at present distinctly appear whether or not the attention of the jury was directed to the proposition, that if a party in the same situation as that in which the defendants are, employ a person who is fully competent to the work, and the best method is adopted and the best materials are used, such party is not liable for the accident. If the jury have been directed in conformity with this rule, there is no ground for the present application. It cannot be contended that the defendants are not responsible for the accident merely on the ground that they have employed a competent person to construct the bridge. Upon this point we will consult our learned brother." On a subsequent day the Chief Baron said, that they had consulted the learned judge, who reported to them that he had directed the jury in conformity with the above proposition, and that therefore there would be no rule. This case, however, shows that it would not be sufficient to exempt a coach proprietor from liability, that he had employed a skilful workman to construct his coach; it must appear that it was actually constructed with all possible care and skill. - So a passenger carrier will be held to the greatest vigilance in examining and inspecting his vehicles from time to time. Thus, in Bremner v. Williams, 1 C. ft P. 414, it was ruled by Best, C. J., that a coach proprietor ought to examine the sufficiency of his coach previous to each journey; and if he does not, and by the insecurity of the coach a passenger is injured, an action is maintainable against the coach proprietor for negligence, though the coach had been examined previous to the second journey before the accident; and though it had been repaired at the coach-maker's only three or four days before. And see New Jersey Railroad Company v. Kennard, 21 Penn. St. 208.

(p) See Mayor v. Humphries, 1 C. ft P. 251; Carpue v. L. ft B. Railway Co. 5 Q. B. 747. See also the charge of Best, C. J., to the grand jury, 8 C. ft P. 694, note (b).

(q) The owner is liable for an accident which happens from the driver's intoxication; but not if from his physical disability, arising without his fault, from extreme and unusual cold, which rendered him incapable for the time of doing his duty. Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181. See also McKinney v. Neil, 1 McLean, 560; Peck v. Neal, 3 id. 24. The rule stated in the text received a very strong application in the case of McElroy v. Nashua & Lowell R. R. Corporation, 4 Cush. 400. It was an action on the case to recover damages of the defendants, for an injury alleged to have been sustained by the female plaintiff, while riding as a passenger in the defendants' cars from Lowell to Nashua. The alleged injury happened in consequence of the careless management of a switch, by which the Concord Railroad connected with and entered upon the defendants' road. The switch was provided by the proprietors of the Concord Railroad, and attended by one of their servants, at their expense. It was held, that the defendants were liable. And Shaw, C. J., said: "The court are of opinion, upon the facts agreed, that the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs of aggravation which attended * the wrong. A passenger may be ejected from a car for non-payment of fare, or other sufficient reason; and it is held, that, if so ejected for nonpayment, he cannot by climbing into the car and tendering his fare acquire a right to be carried. (qq) For whatever reason a passenger is expelled from a railroad car, care must be taken not to injure him; but if one attempts wrongfully to enter a car, force may be used to prevent him. (qr) It has indeed been held, that to eject a passenger from a railroad car while in motion, is so far like an attempt to take life, as to justify the same resistance on the part of a passenger. And though he is still liable to ejection in a proper manner for refusing to pay fare, his resistance to the attempt to expel him without stopping the car, does not present a case of concurrent negligence on his part. The carrier of passengers, in any way, is always bound to give them a sufficient opportunity to alight. (qs) If a railroad company carries a passenger in a caboose attached to a freight car, and he pays the usual fare, he has all the rights of an ordinary passenger. (qt) 1 In some States, as in Illinois, a railroad company is prohibited by statute from ejecting passengers, for non-payment of fare, excepting at a station.

1 Thus a carrier is liable for the malicious assault of its servant on a passenger, Stewart v. Brooklyn, etc. R. R. 90 N. Y. 588; although accused of stealing the passenger's watch, Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Flexman, 103 Ill. 546.