carry * them the whole route; (m) to demand no more than the usual and established compensation; to treat all his passengers alike;1 * to behave to all with civility and propriety; (n) to provide suitable carriages and means of transport; (o) 2 and to keep the roads in good condition

Amherst, and onward to Francestown. A third person ran a coach to and from Nashua and Lowell, and the defendant agreed with the proprietor of the coach connecting with his line, that he would not receive passengers who came from Lowell to Nashua in the coach of such third person on the same day that they applied for passage to places above Nashua. The plaintiff was notified at Lowell of this arrangement, but notwithstanding came from Lowell to Nashua in that coach, and then demanded a passage in the defendant's coach to Amherst, tendering the regular fare. Held, that the defendant was bound to receive him, there being sufficient room, and no evidence that the plaintiff was an unfit person to be admitted, or that he had any design of injuring the defendant's business.

(m) Dudley v. Smith, 1 Camp. 167. In this case the plaintiff took a seat on the outside of the defendant's coach, to be conveyed from a place called the Red Lion, in the Strand, to Chelsea. It appeared that she was so conveyed safely as far as the Cross Keys Inn, at Chelsea, where the coach was accustomed to stop. When the coach arrived before the gateway of this inn, leading to the stable-yard, the coachman requested the plaintiff to alight there, as the passage into the yard was very awkward. She said, as the road was dirty, she would rather be driven into the yard. He then advised her to stoop, and drove on. The consequence was, that she was struck violently on the shoulders and back by a low archway in the passage, by which she was severely injured. It appeared in evidence that the archway was only twelve inches higher than the top of the coach. Upon this evidence, Lord Ellen-borough, in summing up to the jury, said: "The defendant was bound to carry the plaintiff from the usual place of taking up to the usual place of setting down. As coach-owner, therefore, he was answerable for the negligent acts of his servant, till the plaintiff was set down at the usual place for passengers alighting at Chelsea. This appears, for the inside passengers at least, to have been the yard. If the coachman had said to her, 'the others will be safe in proceeding, but you must go down here, as you cannot remain upon the coach without danger to your life,' she could only have blamed her own imprudence for what followed. But he should have given her the materials to judge, if he was to leave her to make her election. He told her the passage was awkward, whereas, according to the evidence, it was impracticable. See also Massiter v. Cooper, 4 Esp. 260. In Coppin v. Braithwaite, 8 Jur. 876, it is said to have been ruled by Rolfe, B., at Nisi Prius, that a carrier having received a pickpocket, as a passenger, on board his vessel and taken his fare, he cannot put him on shore at an intermediate place, so long as he is not guilty of any impropriety. But see the preceding note. - In Ker v. Mountain, 1 Esp. 27, it was ruled by Lord Kenyon, that if a person engages a seat in a stagecoach, and pays at the same time only a deposit, as half the fare, for example, and is not at the inn ready to take his seat when the coach is setting off, the proprietor of the coach is at liberty to fill up his place with another passenger; but if, at the time of engaging his seat, he pays the whole of the fare, in such case the proprietor cannot dispose of his place, but he may take it at any stage of the journey that he thinks fit

(n) Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 242.

(o) Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79; Curtis v. Drinkwater, 2 B. & Ad. 169; Bremner v. Williams, 1 C. & P. 414; Israel v. Clark, 4 Esp. 259; Crofts v. Water-house, 3 Bing. 319; Sharp v. Grey, 9 Bing. 457. An opinion seems to be intimated in several of the cases that the carrier is bound to warrant the sufficiency of his coach. Thus, in Israel v. Clark, 4 Esp. 259, Lord Ellenborough is reported to have said, that carriers were bound by law to provide sufficient carriages for the where the carrier owns them;(oo) to maintain a reasonable safe conveyance of the public who had occasion to travel by them; and that at all events he should expect a clear land-worthiness in the carriage to be established. So in Bremner v. Williams, 1 C. & P. 414, Best, C. J., says, he considers that every coach proprietor warrants to the public that his stage-coach is equal to the journey it undertakes. And finally, in Sharp v. Grey. 9 Bing. 457, Bo-sanquet, J., says, that if a coach, when it starts upon its Journey, is not roadworthyt the proprietor is liable for the consequences, upon the same principle as a ship-owner who furnishes a vessel which is not seaworthy. And in Bennett v. The P. & 0. Steamboat Company, 0 C. B. 775, 782, upon Sharp v. Grey being cited by Sir John Jervis, Attorney-General, who decided, in substance, that a coach proprietor is bound to use all ordinary care and diligence to provide a safe vehicle, Cressweil, J., interrupting him, said : "It goes a little further than that; it lays down that he is bound at all events to provide a sound coach." But the contrary was ruled in Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79, by Sir James Mansfield, who held, that only the same measure of diligence was required of a passenger carrier, in the construction and care of his coach, as in all other matters appertaining to the conveyance of his passengers. See the case stated, with the learned judge's opinion, ante, p. * 219, note (b). And the doctrine of this case was clearly established as the law in this country, by the case of Ingalls v. Bills, 9 Met. 1. That was an action to recover damages for an injury received by the plaintiff from a defect in the defendants coach. The defendants introduced evidence tending to prove that they had taken all possible care, and incurred extraordinary expense, in order that the coach should be of the best materials and workmanship; that, at the time of the accident, the coach, so far as could be discovered from the most careful inspection and examination externally, was strong, sound, and sufficient for the journey; and that they had uniformly exercised the utmost vigilance and care to preserve and keep the same in a safe and roadworthy condition. But the evidence further tended to prove that there was an internal defect or flaw in the iron of the axle-tree, at the place where it was broken, about three eighths of an inch in length, and wide enough to insert the point of a fine needle or pin; which defect or flaw appeared to have arisen from the forging of the iron, and which might have been the cause of the breaking; that the said defect was entirely surrounded by sound iron one quarter of an inch thick; and that the flaw or defect could not possibly have been discovered by inspection and examination externally. The learned judge, before whom the cause was tried, instructed the jury that the defendants were bound by law, and an implied promise on their part, to provide a coach, not only apparently, but really, road-worthy; that they were liable for any injury that might arise to a passenger from a defect in the original construction of the coach, although the imperfection was not visible, and could not be discovered upon inspection and examination. The defendant excepted, and moved for a new trial, which was granted. Hubbard, J., after a very thorough and able examination of the cases, concluded his opinion thus: "The result to which we have arrived, from the examination of the case before us, is this : That carriers of passengers for hire are bound to use the utmost care and diligence in the providing of safe, sufficient, and suitable coaches, harnesses, horses, and coachmen, in order to prevent those injuries which human care and foresight can guard against; and that if an accident happens from a defect in the coach, which might have been discovered and remedied upon the most careful and thorough examination of the coach, such accident must be ascribed to negligence, for which the owner is liable in case of injury to a passenger happening by reason of such accident. On the other hand, where the accident arises from a hidden and internal defect, which a careful and thorough examination would not disclose, and which could not be guarded against by the exercise of a sound judgment and the most vigilant oversight, then the proprietor is not liable for the injury, but the misfortune must be borne by the sufferer, as one of that class of injuries for which the law can afford no redress in the form of a pecuniary recompense." Such also would seem, from the case of Grote v. The C. & H. Railway Company, 2 Exch. 251, to be the doctrine now held in England. That was an action against a railway company to recover compensa1 A State statute which seeks to compel passenger carriers between different States to carry colored and white persons in the same cabin is unconstitutional so far as it applies to such carriers. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485.