In England, a domestic servant who is turned away without notice, and without fault, is entitled to one month's wages although there be no agreement to that effect. (a) We are

(a) Robinson v. Hindman, 3 Esp. 235. And this is on the ground that a general hiring, that is to say, a hiring without any engagement as to the duration of the service, is presumed to be a hiring for a year, and it will be construed in a court of law to be a hiring on the terms that either party might determine the engagement upon giving a month's notice, and the law implies a promise by the master to pay a month's wages, if he dismiss his servant without cause, without giving such notice. See Fawcett v. Cash, 5 B. & Ad. 904 \ Lilley v. Elwin, 11 Q. B. 754; Nowlan v. Ablett, 2 C. M. & R. 54; Beeston v. Collyer, 4 Bing. 309; s. c. 2 C. 4 P. 607; Spain 0. Arnott, 2 Stark. 257; Huttman v. Boulnois, 2 C. & P. 511; Holcroft v. Barber, 1 Car. & K. 4; Baxter v. Nurse, 1 Car. & K. 10. But this presumption of a yearly hiring may be rebutted by evidence showing that such was not the intention of the parties. Bayley v. Rimmell, 1M.4W. 506. This was an action by an assistant surgeon against his employer, to recover the amount of salary due him in that capacity. The plaintiff claimed for salary for a hundred and sixty-one days, at the rate of £200 per annum, and he so described his claim in the particulars of his demand annexed to the record. No specific contract of hiring was proved, but evidence was given of the service. It appeared that after the plaintiff had been some time in the defendant's employment, he was taken ill, and went to a hospital, where he remained three months. He did not return to his employment, nor did the defendant request him to do so.

It appeared that the plaintiff had been paid different sums of money, but not at any fixed or definite periods. It was submitted, that upon this evidence it must be taken to be a general hiring, and that in legal estimation that was a hiring for a year, and therefore that no wages were recoverable, as the year's service had not been performed. Sed non allocatur; and Parke, B., in giving the opinion of the court, observed: "Admitting that there was some evidence of a hiring, and agreeing in the proposition that a general hiring, if unexplained, is to be taken to be a hiring for a year, I think there is abundant evidence in this case to show that there was no hiring for a year. It appears that payments were made, but they were not made according to the yearly amount, nor at any definite periods of the year. The parties separated in the middle of the year, and neither did the plaintiff return, nor did the defendant require him to return and complete the service. If, indeed, the jury ought to have found whether this was a yearly hiring, the learned judge should have been required to leave that question to them; but there is really nothing to show that the compensation was to be paid at the end of the year." The presumption of a yearly hiring is not a presumption of law, but of fact merely. Cresswell, J., in Baxter v. Nurse, 6 Man. & G. 935, 941, and the presumption of a yearly hiring does not arise, where the services of the servant are expressed to be at the will of either party; as where a boy was hired by a farmer, for his meat and clothes, "so long as he had a not * aware that a similar rule exists in this country; but where the wages are payable at definite periods, as by the week or by the month, the contract for each period would perhaps be considered as so far entire, that a servant leaving without cause after the month had commenced, could not recover wages for his services within that month; and a master turning off his servant without cause would be bound to pay him his wages through the month. This, however, may be doubted, unless there was some agreement expressed or distinctly inferable from the contract, or a custom or usage were proved which the parties might be considered as having contemplated. (b) 1 It has mind to stop." Rex v. Christ's Parish in York, 3 B. & C. 459. See also Rex v. Great Borden, 7 B. & C. 249. As to what words are sufficient to constitute a yearly hiring, see Emmens v. Elderton, 26 E. L. & E. 1. There was formerly a doubt whether a contract to serve during life was valid, but it seems that such contract is not itself illegal. Lord Abinger, in Wallis v. Day, 2 M. & W. 281. See further, 1 BL Com. 425, n. (1), (Christian's ed.).

(b) In England this doctrine rests on the ground that the parties may make the contract with reference to general usage, which thereby becomes a part of the contract. See Turner v. Robinson, 5 B. & Ad. 789; Ridgway v. Hungerford Market Co., 3 A. & E. 171. In this country it has been held, that a contract to work "for eight months for $104, or $13 a month," was so far an entire contract, that if the plaintiff left without cause before the eight months, he could not recover for any part of the time; and although he had worked more than a month, he was not allowed to recover for a month, since there was no provision that he should be paid monthly. Reab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337. So, where the plaintiff agreed to work for the defendant "seven months at $12 per month," it was held that this was an entire contract; that $84 were to be paid at the end of the seven months, and not $12 at the end of each month; and that if the plaintiff left without good cause, before the seven months were expired, he could not recover anything for his services, although the defendant had paid a part during the continuance of the service. Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Met. 286. In this case, Hubbard, J., said: "In regard to the contract itself, which was an agreement to work for the defendant for seven months, at twelve dollars per month, we are of opinion that it was an entire one, and that the plaintiff, having left the defendant's service before the time expired, cannot recover for the partial service performed; and that it differs not in principle from the adjudged cases of Stark v. Parker, 2 Pick. 267; Olmstead v. Beale, 19 Pick. 528; and Thayer v. Wadsworth, 19 Pick. 349; which we are unwilling to disturb, upon mere verbal differences between the contracts in those cases and in this, which do not affect its spirit. The plaintiff has argued that it was a contract for seven months, at twelve dollars per month, to be paid at the end of each month. But however reasonable such a contract might be, it is not, we think, the contract which is proved. There is no time fixed for the payment, and the law therefore fixes the time; and that is, in a case like this, the period when the service is performed. It is one bargain; performance on one part and payment on the other; and not performance and full payment for the part performed. The rate per month is stated, as is common in such contracts, as fixing the rate of payment, in case the contract should be given up by consent, or death or other casualty should determine it before its expiration,