2 See discussion, supra, sec 13. In Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681, the proposal was, "We now offer you 800 tods of weather fleeces," etc., "receiving your answer in course of post." Here the proposal designated the post as the channel of communication. The proposal was misdirected, and hence was late in its arrival; but the plaintiffs, to whom it was addressed, immediately on receiving it, sent an acceptance by post. It was held that this acceptance bound the defendant (the proposer), though he had sold the goods to another party between the date of the receiving of the proposal by the plaintiff and the date of his reception of their acceptance. To the position that the contract is not complete till the acceptance is received, the court replied: " If that were so, no contract could ever be completed by the post. For if the defendants were not bound by their offer when accepted by the plaintiffs till the answer was received, then the plaintiffs ought not to be bound till after they had received the notification that the defendants had received their offer and assented to it; and so it might go on ad infinitum. The defendants must be regarded in law as making, during every instant of time their letter was travelling, the same identical offer to the plantiff; and then the contract is completed by the acceptance of it by the latter." The position that an acceptance duly posted binds the proposer from the date of posting was afterwards affirmed in the house of lords in Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H. L. C. 381, a case in which the proposal did not designate the time and mode of acceptance. The acceptance was posted on the same day the proposal was received, though not in time for the first mail that might have been caught; and the letter containing the acceptance was delayed so that it did not arrive until the afternoon of the day in the morning of which it might have been received. It was held that the acceptance bound the proposer, though he had between the forwarding and reception of the letter disposed of the goods. That the acceptance, if thus forwarded promptly, binds has been decided in several subsequent cases. ' Infra, sec 20 ; Duncan v. Topham, 8 C. B. 225 ; Kennedy v. Lee, 3 Meriv. 452 ; Stocken v. Collin, 7 M. & W. 515 ; Townsend's case, L. R. 13 Eq. 148; Wall's case, L. R. 15 Eq. 18; Household Ins. Co. v. Grant, L. R. 4 Ex. D. 216 ; 27 W. R. 858; 41 L. T. N. S. 298; 19 Am. L. Reg. 298 (qualifying Brit. & Am. Tel. Co. v. Colson, L. R. 6 Ex. 118) ; Harris's case, L. R. 7 Ch. 587; Brogden v. R. R., L. R. 2 Ap. Ca. 691. In Household Ins. Co. v. Grant, ut supra, it was held that non-delivery of the letter did not vacate the contract if posted within a reasonable time ;1 and, a fortiori, there is no contract when the acceptance is not posted, but is negligently the letter was mailed. The same rule is adopted in Scotland: Thomson v. James, 18 Dnnlop, 1.

In this country, this is, in most jurisdictions, the law in cases in which the acceptance is forwarded without delay. Tayloe v. Ins. Co., 9 How. 390; Minnesota Oil Co. v. Lead Co., 4 Dill. 431; Beckwith v. Cheever, 1 Foster, N. H. 41 ; Abbott v. Sheppard, 48 N. H. 14; Averill v. Hedge, 12 Conn. 436 ; Vassar v. Camp, 14 Barb. 341 ; s. c. 11 N. Y. 441 ; Clark v. Dales, 20 Barb. 42 ; Bris-ban v. Boyd, 4 Paige, 17; Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103; Trevor v. Wood, 36 N. Y. 309 ; Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362 ; Potts v. Whitehead, 5 C. E. Green, 58; Hallock v. Ins. Co., 2 Dutch. 268; Hamilton v. Ins. Co., 5 Barr, 339 ; Wheat v. Cross, 31 Md. 99 ; Stockham v. Stockham, 32 Md. 196; Chiles v. Nelson, 7 Dana, 282; Hut-cheson v. Blakeman, 3 Met. (Ky.) 80; Cornwells v. Krengel, 41 111. 394 ; Levy v. Cohen, 4 Ga. 1; Bryant v. Boose, 55 Ga. 438 ; Falls v. Gaither, 9 Port. 605 ; Winston v. Stodder, 8 Mart. 95 ; Mal-pica v. McKown, 1 La. R. 248; Lung-strass v. Ins. Co., 48 Mo. 201.

In Massachusetts, however, it is held that an acceptance by post must, in order to bind, be delivered to the proposer. McCulloch v. Ins. Co., 1 Pick. 278. (But see Mclntyre v. Parks, 3 Met. 207.) As also dissenting from English rule, see Gillespie p. Edmonston, 11 Humph. 553. McCulloch v. Ins. Co., however, has not been elsewhere followed. The learned editor of the 3d Am. ed. of Benj. on Sales, sec 75, says: "The principle of McCulloch v. Ins. Co. is certainly most positively controverted by the recent cases of Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 344, and Stevenson v. McLean, L. R. 5 Q. B. D. 346," and the case is declared in Hallock v. Ins. Co., 2 Dutch. 268, " to be against the whole current of authorities." On the other hand McCulloch v. Ins. Co. is supported with much acuteness by Prof. Langdell (Cas. Cont. ii. 994). In Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 175, McCulloch v. Ins. Co. is referred to, and the fact that the case is not generally followed is admitted. Gray, C. J., then goes on to say : " But this case does not require a consideration of the general question ; for, in any view, the party making the offer may always, if he chooses, render the formation of the contract which he proposes dependent upon the actual communication to himself of the acceptance." The question was the subject of elaborate discussion in Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, L. R. 4 Ex. D. 216, Court of App. (July, 1879), where it was held by Thesiger and Baggallay, L. JJ. (Bramwell, L. J., diss.)) that the contract binds as soon as a letter of acceptance, properly directed to the proposer, has been posted within reasonable time after receiving the proposal, the post being the ordinary and natural mode of communication in such cases ; and that this rule obtains even where the letter never reaches its destination (see note to 32 Am. Rep. 40). In Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 344 (cited supra, sec 11), Lindley, J., said: "It may be taken as now settled that where an offer is made and accepted by letters sent through the post, the contract is complete the mo.

1 Supra, sec 9 ; Maclay v. Harvey, 90 111. 525.