Sec 1065

In the constitutions of several states, it is provided that in all charters granted by the state the right of repeal or of amendment is reserved; and a clause to this effect is now included in most cases in charters granted in states in which no such constitutional restriction obtains. In some states such reservations are part of the general system of legislation, in subordination to which all charters are issued.2 When such limitations exist, they control all charters granted while they are in force.3

Charters subject to reservations.

1 Supra, sec 442,453 6.

2 See Beer Co. V. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Stanley V. Stanley, 26 Me. 191; Jones Man. Co. V. Com., 69 Penn. St. 137; State V. Greer, 9 Mo. Ap. 219. See for an examination of such exceptions, Greenwood V. R. R., Sup. Ct. U. S. 1882, 25 Alb. L. J. 448.

3 Harper V. Ampt, 32 Ohio St. 291.

By the code of Georgia, private corporations are subject to be changed, modified, or destroyed, at the will of the legislature, except so far as forbidden by law, and in all cases of private charters granted after the adoption of the code, the state reserves the right to withdraw the franchise unless such right be expressly negatived in the charter. Some time after this code took effect, two railroad corporations created prior to that date, each of which enjoyed by its charter a limited exemption from taxation, were consolidated by virtue of an act of the state legislature, which authorized a consolidation of the stock of the two companies, conferred upon the consolidated company full corporate powers, and continued to it the franchises and privileges and immunities which the companies had held by their original charters. It was held by the supreme court of the United States (1) that by the consolidation the original companies were dissolved and a new corporation was created, which became subject to the provision of the code; (2) that a subsequent legislative act taxing the property of such new corporation as other property in the state sec 1066. Grants to municipal corporations, and to other public corporations for public purposes, may be revoked as not contracts within the sense of the limitation.1 It is otherwise as to grants of private property, or private franchises, or private trusts.2 The distinction is, that while property transferred to a municipal corporation cannot be recalled by the state, the mode of the public use of such property can be controlled by legislation, and to this control are subjected all franchises given to a municipal corporation for public use.3

Sec 1067

How far, under the limitation before us, taken in connection with the authority given to congress to enact a bankrupt law, the states can by general legislation relieve creditors from the payment of debts, is a question which it is not within the range of the present work to discuss in detail. At present it must be sufficient to say that it is within the constitutional power of the states to pass exemption laws, exempting specific property from execution, provided this does not materially impair the remedy;4 laws modifying the effect of antecedent mechanics' liens, leaving the debt open to suit at common law;5 laws modifying the appraising of property on foreclosure of antecedent mortgages;6 laws modifying process for antecedent debts, e. g., abolishing imprisonment for debt;7 and laws which take away specific remedies, leaving other adequate remedies in force.8 But a statute providing that a sale shall not be was taxed was not in conflict with the constitutional limitation protecting contracts. Atlantic & Gulf R. R. Co. V. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359.

Grants to municipal corporations may be revoked.

Laws modifying remedies are constitutional.

1 Terrett V. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; People V. Morris, 13 Wend. 325; Trustees V. Tatman, 13 Ill. 27; Mills V. Williams, 11 Ired. 558; Wallace V. Sharon, 84 N. C. 164.

2 Terrett V. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Pawlet V. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; Bailey V. New York, 3 Hill, N. Y. 531; Fort Plain, etc. Co. V. Smith, 30 N. Y. 44.

3 East Hartford V. Bridge Co., 10 How. 511; S. C, 17 Conn. 79.

4 Morse V. Goold, 1 Kern. 281; Rockwell V. Hubbell, 2 Doug. 197; Taylor V. Stockwell, 66 Ind. 505; see Tarpley V. Hamer, 9 Sm. & M. 310.

5 Templeton V. Home, 82 Ill. 491.

6 Jones V. Davis, 6 Neb. 33.

7 Penniman in re, 103 U. S. 714; S. C, 11 R. I. 333; Sturges V. Crowin-8hield,4 Wheat.122; Beers V. Haughton, 9 Pet. 359; Ware V. Miller, 9 S. C. 13.

8 Jackson V. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 288; Bronson V. Kinzie, 1 How. 315; Mc-Cracken V. Hayward, 2 How. 608; Tennessee V. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69; Memphis, etc. R. R. V. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337; made under an execution unless the property levied on should bring two-thirds of a valuation attached to it by appraisers, has been held unconstitutional in respect to debts incurred prior to the passage of the act;1 and so of a statute relieving a bank from the duty of paying specie on its notes.2 And state insolvent laws, undertaking to discharge antecedent debts, are inoperative,3 and so are laws so far exempting the debtor's property from execution as materially to impair his liability for antecedent debts,4 and staying execution for any extended period on antecedent debts,5 or putting other material obstacles in the way of their collection,6 or virtually precluding recovery on them.7.

State V. Gaillard, 11 S. C. 309; 101 U. S. 433; Louisiana V. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203; Koshkoning V. Burton, 104 U. S. 668; Newark Savings Inst. V. Forman, 33 N. J. Eq. 436; Long's Appeal, 87 Penn. St. 114; Richardson V. Arkin, 87 Ill. 138; Watts V. Everett, 47 Iowa, 269; Northwest. Ins. Co. V. Neeves, 46 Wis. 147; Whitehead V. Latham, 83 N. C. 232; Horne V. State, 84 N. C. 362; Carnes V. Red River Parish, 29 La. An. 608; Vance V. Vance, 32 La. An. 186.

A state funding act, which excludes from its operation certain bonds, supposed to be tainted with illegality, until their legality is established in court, is not, although affecting bona fide holders, in conflict with the limitation. New York Guaranty Co. V. Board of Liquidation, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1882; 4 Morris. Trans. 508.

Where the statute of Alabama subjecting the state to suit in its own courts was in force at the time when a contract with it was made and a suit thereon brought, but the functions of the courts were essentially those of a board of audit, and the plaintiff had no means of enforcing the payment of a judgment or a decree in his favor, it was held that the repeal of the statute deprived the court of jurisdiction to proceed, and was not in violation of the contract clause of the constitution of the United States. South & North Ala. R. R. Co. V. Alabama, 101 U. S. 832. See Memphis, etc. R. R. V. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337.

1 McCracken V. Hayward, 2 How. 608.

2 Godfrey V. Terry, 97 U. S. 171.

3 Sturges V. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Farmers', etc. Bank V. Smith, 6 Wheat. 131; Ogden V. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Planters' Bank V. Sharp, 6 How. 301; aliter as to debts after the passage of the act, Eckstein V. Shoemaker, 3 Whart. 15.

4 Lewis V. Lewis, 47 Penn. St. 127; Baldwin V. Flagg, 43 N. J. L. 495; Barnes V. Barnes, 8 Jones L. 366; Wilson V. Brown, 58 Ala. 62.

5 McClain V. Easly, 4 Baxt. 520; Bunn V. Gorgas, 41 Penn. St. 441; Williams's Appeal, 72 Penn. St. 214.

6 U. S. V. Lincoln Co., 5 Dill. 184; U. S. V. Johnson Co., 5 Dill. 207; West. Ark. Bk. V. Sebastian Co., 5 Dill. 414; Olmstead V. Kellogg, 47 Iowa, 460; McCracken V. Moody, 33 Ark. 81.

7 People V. Otis, 24 Hun, 519; Edwards V. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; New Orleans V. City Hotel, 28 La. An. 423.