Sec 1068

Whether a state law discharging under insolvent procedure binds contracts elsewhere to be performed, or the parties to which are elsewhere domiciled, are questions which are discussed in another work. It may be here stated that a state has a right to bind its domiciled citizens, and all other consenting parties, so far as concerns future contracts, by legislation of this character, but not other persons. It is also settled that parties domiciled in other states, whether contractors or endorsees or purchasers, are not barred by such insolvent discharges from the fact that the debt is payable in the discharging state.1 But where there is a contract between two citizens of the same state, one of whom subsequently removes to another state, the removal does not relieve the creditor removing from an insolvent discharge by the first state.2

Sec 1069

It is agreed on all sides that marriage is not within the limitation before us. Divorces may be granted by states having jurisdiction irrespective of the question of the place where the marriage was solemnized.3

State discharges do not bind citizens of other states.

Marriage not within the limitation.

1 Wh. Conf. of Laws, 2d ed. sec 525 et seq., and cases there cited.

2 Stoddard V. Harrington, 100 Mass. 87; and see generally Baldwin V. Hale, 1 Wal. 223.

In Guernsey V. Wood, 130 Mass. 503, A., the agent of C, the plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, sold goods in Massachusetts to defendant, a resident there, who supposed A. to be P., the principal. Afterward D., who had not paid for the goods, was discharged from liability for his debts under the insolvent law of Massachusetts. C. did not consent to the discharge or take part in the proceedings therefor. In an action by C. to recover the price of the goods, it was ruled that the discharge could not be set up by D. the defendant. The contract, it was argued, being in fact made by the plain-tiff's agent in his behalf, he had the right to sue thereon. Of that right he could not be deprived by the insolvent law of Massachusetts without his consent. He did not give such consent by the making of a contract in this commonwealth, either by himself or through an agent, even if the contract is to be performed here. "The fact that the certificate of discharge obtained by the defendant under that law might have been pleaded in bar of an action brought by the agent cannot make it available in this action brought by the principal, who is not a citizen of the commonwealth and is not bound by that law." The court (Gray, C. J., giving the opinion) relied on Baldwin V. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Baldwin V. Bank of Newbury, id. 234; Kelley V. Drnry, 9 Allen, 27; Ilsley V. Merriam, 7 Cush. 242; Fessenden V. Willey, 2 Allen, 67. 3 Wh. Conf. of Laws, sec 223 et seq.

Sec 1070

Claims arising from torts (e. g., damage to property by a mob, for which a prior statute had created responsibility), are not within the limitation; and statutes modifying such responsibility are constitutional.1