The most important classes of civil cases over which the District Courts take jurisdiction are admiralty and bankruptcy cases, both of which have been already referred to under the subject of Constitutional Law.9 The Federal Bankruptcy Act has been given in full in a previous volume.10

The question of the exclusiveness of the admiralty jurisdiction vested in the District Courts was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case

7 Kennedy vs. Gibson, 8 Wallace,

498.

8 In re Barz, 135 U. S.. 403; Davis vs. Packard, 7 Peters, 276.

9 Volume II, Subject 3, Sections of The Moses Taylor vs. Hammond,11 the decision in which case was in part as follows:

35 92. 10 Volume IX, Subject 29.

"The case presented is clearly one within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. The contract for the transportation of the plaintiff was a maritime contract. As stated in this complaint, it related exclusively to a service to be performed on the high seas, and pertained solely to the business of commerce and navigation. There is no distinction in principle between a contract of this character and a contract for transportation of merchandise. The same liability attaches upon their execution both to the owner and the ship. The passage money in the one case is equivalent to the freight money in the other. A breach of either contract is the appropriate subject of admiralty jurisdiction.

" The action against the steamer by name, authorized by the Statute of California, is a proceeding in the nature and with the incidents of a suit in admiralty. The distinguishing and characteristic feature of such suit is that the vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the defendant, and is judged and sentenced accordingly. It is this dominion of the suit in admiralty over the vessel or thing itself which gives to the title, made under its decrees, validity against all the world. By the common law process, whether of mesne attachment or execution, property is reached only through a personal defendant, and then only to the extent of his title. Under a sale, therefore, upon a judgment in a common law proceeding the title acquired can never be better than that possessed by the personal defendant. It is his title, and not the property itself, which is sold.

11 4 Wallace, 411.

"The Statute of California, to the extent in which it authorizes actions in rem against vessels for causes of action cognizable in the admiralty, invests her courts with admiralty jurisdiction, and so the Supreme Court of that state has decided in several cases. In Averill vs. The Steamer Hartford, 2 Cal, 308, the court thus held, and added that The proceedings in such actions must be governed by the principles and forms of admiralty courts, except where otherwise controlled or directed by the Act.'

'This jurisdiction of the courts of California was asserted and is maintained upon the assumed ground that the cognizance by the Federal Courts, 'of civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' is not exclusive as declared by the 9th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat., 73.

'The Constitution declares that the judicial power of the United States 'shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states; and between a state or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects.' Art. III, Sec. 2.

"How far this judicial power is exclusive, or may by the legislation of Congress, be made exclusive, in the Courts of the United States, has been much discussed, though there has been no direct adjudication upon the point. In the opinion delivered in the case of Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat., 334, Mr. Justice Story comments upon the fact that there are two classes of cases enumerated in the clause cited between which a distinction is drawn; that the first class includes cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and that, with reference to this class, the expression is that the judicial power shall extend to all cases; but that in the subsequent part of the clause, which embraces all the other cases of national cognizance, and forms the second class, the word 'all' is dropped. And the learned justice appears to have thought the variation in the language the result of some determinate reason, and suggests that, with respect to the first class, it may have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution imperatively to extend the judicial power either in an original or appellant form to all cases, and, with respect to the latter class, to leave it to Congress to qualify the jurisdiction in such manner as public policy might dictate. Many cogent reasons and various considerations of public policy are stated in support of this suggestion. The vital importance of all the cases enumerated in the first class to the national sovereignty is mentioned as a reason which may have warranted the distinction, and which would seem to require that they should be vested exclusively in the National Courts - a consideration which does not apply, at least with equal force, to cases of the second class. Without, however, placing implicit reliance upon the distinction stated, the learned justice observes, in conclusion, that it is manifest that the judicial power of the United States is, in some cases, unavoidably exclusive of all state authority, and that in all others it may be made so at the election of Congress. We agree fully with this conclusion. The legislation of Congress has proceeded upon this supposition. The Judiciary Act of 1789, in its distribution of jurisdiction to the several Federal Courts, recognizes and is framed upon the theory that in all cases to which the judicial power of the United States extends, Congress may rightfully vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Courts. It declares that in some cases, from their commencement, such jurisdiction shall be exclusive; in other cases it determines at what stage of procedure such jurisdiction shall attach, and how long and how far concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts shall be permitted. Thus, cases in which the United States are parties, civil causes of admiralty jurisdiction, and cases against consuls and vice-consuls, except for certain offenses, are placed, from their commencement, exclusively under the cognizance of the Federal Courts.

"On the other hand, some cases, in which an alien or a citizen of another state is made a party, may be brought either in a federal or a state court at the option of the plaintiff; and if brought in the state court may be prosecuted until the appearance of the defendant, and then, at his option, may be suffered to remain there, or may be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.

"Other cases, not included under these heads, but involving questions under the Constitution, laws, treaties, or authority of the United States, are only drawn within the control of the Federal Courts upon appeal or writ of error, after final judgment.

"By subsequent legislation of Congress, and particularly by the legislation of the last four years, many of the cases, which by the Judiciary Act could only come under the cognizance of the Federal Courts after final judgment in the state courts, may be withdrawn from the concurrent jurisdiction of the latter courts at earlier stages, upon the application of the defendant.

"The constitutionality of these provisions cannot be seriously questioned, and is of frequent recognition by both State and Federal Courts.

"The cognizance of civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction vested in the district courts by the 9th section of the Judiciary Act, may be supported upon like considerations. It has been made exclusive by Congress, and that is sufficient, even if we should admit that in the absence of its legislation the State Courts might have taken cognizance of these causes. But there are many weighty reasons why it was so declared. The admiralty jurisdiction,' says Mr. Justice Story, 'naturally connects itself, on the one hand, with our diplomatic relations and the duties to foreign nations and their subjects; and, on the other hand, with the great interests of navigation and commerce, foreign and domestic. There is, then, a peculiar wisdom in giving to the national government a jurisdiction of this sort which cannot be yielded, except for the general good, and which multiplies the securities for the public peace abroad, and gives to commerce and navigation the most encouraging support at home.' Com., Sec. 1672.

"The case before us is not within the saving clause of the ninth section. That clause only saves to suitors 'the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.' It is not a remedy in the common law courts which is saved, but a common law remedy. A proceeding in rem, as used in the admiralty court, is not a remedy afforded by the common law; it is a proceeding under the civil law. When used in the common law courts, it is given by statute."

The criminal jurisdiction of the United States is mainly vested in the district courts, although in some cases the Circuit Courts have concurrent jurisdiction. The United States courts have no common law criminal jurisdiction.

"It is long since settled that the courts of the United States have no common law jurisdiction in criminal cases; that, so far as the United States are concerned, there are no common law crimes; and that therefore its courts cannot take cognizance of any act or omission as a crime unless it has been made such by an act of congress." 12

The jurisdiction of the district courts over suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under any law of the United States is exclusive.13

12 United States vs. Lewis, 36 Fed. Rep., 449.

13 Lees vs. United States, 150 U. S., 476.