A difference exists among conveyancers as to the legitimate use of recitals: some practitioners employing such only as will give an insight into the interests and objects of the parties to the deed, sufficient to render the subsequent parts clear and intelligible; while others introduce matter which although clearly irrelevant, e. g., the recital of the probate of a will of real estate, or of the places of burials, marriages, and baptisms, etc, is yet calculated to save trouble upon future investigations of the title: it is submitted, that, as a general rule, no recital should be admitted which has not a logical connection with some operative part of the draft, and that the purpose of the other class of recitals may be well answered by a memorandum indorsed on the deed, and signed by the parties conversant with the facts.

Jointure.

Recitals to be used with what object.

(f) See Mr. Jarman's note, 1 Jarm. Conv. by S. 508.

(g) Major v. Ward, 12 Jur. 473,

V. c. w.

(h) Rendering the assignment of satisfied terms unnecessary.

(i) Bass v. Wellsted, 12 Jur. 347. (k) Sug. 542.

So, in disentailing deeds, whose statutory effect is independent, not only of the motives, but even of the expressed intention of the parties (m), recitals seem to be in general useless, and therefore inexpedient; especially, since the enrolment of these conveyances in a public office is open to all the objections, and is attended by few of the benefits, incident to registration of titles under the protective Statutes: a simple conveyance by A. of a specified estate, or of all the lands held by him as tenant in tail under a specified settlement or in a specified locality, and the mere consent of B. as protector, either generally or under the limitations of any specified instrument, are quite as effective, and in the general as intelligible, as they would be if preceded by the most elaborate statement of the previous title, or of the motives which induce the parties to do that which, when done, takes effect without any regard to motive.

In a late case, a question was raised and not decided, whether, when a purchase-deed contained a recital of the vendor's title, the purchaser upon being evicted was not estopped from questioning the accuracy of such recital in an action on the covenants for title (n): the contrary appears however to have been decided in a later case (o) where the Court held that where a recital is intended to be the statement of one party only, the estoppel is confined to that party; and the intention is to be gathered from construing the instrument.

Whether desirable in disentailing assurances.

Of vendor's title; whether purchaser estopped thereby.

(m) See 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 74, s. 21.

(n) Young v. Raincock, 7 C. B.310

(o) Stronghill v. Buck, 15 L. T., 22, Q. B.; 14 Jur. 741.

Where a deed is executed pursuant to a written agreement, it is generally inexpedient to recite that agreement, and so bring it upon the title, unless it be material to the full operation or validity of the deed; as in the case of a post-nuptial settlement, where it is generally proper to recite prior articles, in order to show that the settlement is not voluntary.

Where a person executes a deed for the purpose of removing objections to the title, and the deed merely mentions their existence, without specifying them or showing that objections have been withheld from him, and he asks no questions, he will, as between himself and the purchaser, be bound, although in fact unaware of their real nature (p): and it is presumed, that a person executing such a general confirmation, even although in fact deceived as to the real nature of the objections, would be bound, if the purchaser had no notice of the deception: a general confirmation would appear to be the most eligible for the purchaser; but the party confirming should insist on the particular objections being specified, and should in terms confine his confirmation to their removal.